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EDITOR
According to a report recently released by the UK Lords select committee
on science and technology, scientists need to open a dialogue with the
public that is "direct, open and timely". Lord Jenkin, the committee's chairman,
said it was a paradox that the present crisis of trust should come at a time
when the public was finding science, engineering and technology more
interesting and exciting than ever.
"But the evidence of mistrust is undeniable, and must be of deep concern"
Risk communication is a critical component of risk management, aimed at
improving the credibility and acceptability of decisions.  It is a means of
transferring information between all stakeholders and provides an arena for
discussing different viewpoints. Effective risk communication should be a
genuine effort to involve all parties in the resolution of an issue.
While risk communication is sometimes thought of solely from the perspective
of an organisation communicating with its external stakeholders, external
risk communication is part of good practice and helps an organisation to
fulfil its legislative responsibilities, provide due diligence and obtain necessary
permits. It will improve community understanding and awareness of an
organisation’s environmental activities.
This book addresses the theoretical foundations of risk communication, and
includes a number of New Zealand and international examples of its application.
 It will provide you with an understanding how risk communication can
practically be applied to improve your chances of meeting your organisation’s
risk management objectives.
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Preface
David Elms
Risk Management has two close companions: decision and communication. The
three are inseparable, and could follow Dumas’ heroes in saying, “All for one and
one for all”. This book deals with risk communication and its many facets.
The central issues in risk communication differ according to context. Different
stakeholders have different needs and backgrounds. Within an organisation, for
instance, managers will need to understand their place in the firm’s risk frame-
work, which determines what has to be communicated and how. Dealing with the
public needs a different approach, especially when the issue relates to public
safety or the environment. Different again is the way in which risk is shared
between contractor and client, and how this risk is to be communicated between
the two.
The Chernobyl disaster resulted in part from poor risk communication. The Chernobyl
plant had received a myriad directive from Moscow. The operators had no idea
that while many were trivial, some rules were associated with enormous risk.
We can get an overview of the issues by considering the attributes and capabili-
ties of the skilled risk communicator – the SRC, for short. The first thing the SRC
will understand is that, in an organisation, it is seldom the SRC that does the risk
communication. The SRC will plan, teach, mentor, advise and assess, but others
will do the communication. For instance, following a bad airline accident it is not
a PR expert that should be dealing with the public, but the Chief Executive.
The second attribute of the SRC must be a deep and sophisticated understanding
of communication and its nature. Only a small proportion of communication be-
tween people and groups is concerned with facts. Communication takes place at
many levels, some of them in unconscious. We could at times even think of some
methods as using hypnosis, in broad terms. The SRC needs to be on top of the
subject for two reasons: to help people in an organisation communicate effec-
tively in a given risk context, but also sometimes to understand the communica-
tion techniques used by others. To be blunt, in the arena of public risk communi-
cation, others will often (yes, often) use sophisticated techniques to sway public
opinion. It is vital that the SRC is aware of all the tricks.
Next, the SRC must have a deep understanding to risk psychology and risk per-
ception. A great deal of research has been done on the factors controlling risk
perception. To give one example, a voluntary risk is many times more likely to be
accepted than an involuntary risk. However, that is what the science will tell us.
The SRC has to go an important step further, and use the scientific findings as
part of a strategy for communication risk. To continue the example, the SRC will
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find a way to convert the perception of a risk from involuntary to voluntary. Thus
it is vital to know the science, but the science is not enough.
The SRC also needs to understand the social and political context of risk commu-
nication. For example, in a public context, we have to work within the “law
system”. This is not the same as the legal system, but contains it. The law system
contains statute and case law. It includes lawyers, their conventions and their
ways of looking at the world. It also includes the statutory authorities (such as
district councils) and statutory regulations and planning documents. It is a sense
the web that holds society together. But it does not always deal comfortably with
risk. A lawyer, might, for instance, cite the building Act which says in effect that if
there is a risk, the building must be lived in. A black and white position. We, on
the other hand, might know that the risk is minimal; but the law might not see it
that way at all. Risk has to be dealt with in a system not well-equipped to do so.
Finally, there is the question of ethics. The good SRC will have a great deal of
power – power to change, power to persuade, power to manipulate understand-
ing and opinion. It would be easy to misuse the power, and for that reason the
SRC must have a strong personal ethic, perhaps by subscribing to the New Zealand
Society for Risk Management Code of Ethics.
An understanding of risk communication is vitally important for the risk manage-
ment professional. The subject is sophisticated and has many facets. It is not
something learned in a day. I am therefore delighted that CAE has published this
book and hope that many will read it and learn its lessons. The book promises to
be a major contribution to risk management sophistication in New Zealand and
beyond.
D G Elms
1 July 2003
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1 Introduction and OverviewJanet Gough
The chapter is a brief and personal introduction to risk communication. The
views expressed here derive from observation over the past fifteen years.
Janet begins by describing some of the background to the book, and then exam-
ines the origins of risk communication, and the relationship between risk com-
munication, risk perceptions and acceptable and tolerable risk. The context for
this discussion is environmental risk communication, which includes consider-
ation of risk to the natural environment and the health and safety of individuals
and communities.
She outlines briefly some of the principles of risk communication, and notes the
importance of internal risk communication within organisations as well as exter-
nal communication between an organisation (public or private) and its stake-
holders. Risk communication is an intrinsic part of risk management and this
relationship is examined in the context of the Australian and New Zealand Risk
Management Standard.
New Zealand’s experience in the practice of risk communication has tended to
focus on particular areas and Janet describes some of the programmes from
personal experience. Finally, Janet refers to some of the more recent develop-
ments in terms of recognition of the importance of good risk communication,
and introduces the CAE Risk Communication Project being launched in 2003.
The purpose of this chapter is to ‘set the scene’ and provide a context for the
remainder of the book. While this chapter provides an introduction to the field of
risk communication it is not intended to be an exhaustive review of a discipline
that is employed in a wide range of subject areas, and by a large number of
expert international practitioners (two of whom have provided chapters for this
book). Nor is it intended to provide best practice guidelines – this will be the
objective of a forthcoming CAE project. It is, however, intended to introduce the
sound theoretical foundation of the practice of risk communication, and to make
the reader want to know more about the theory and practice of risk communica-
tion. To this end a selection of recommended readings is provided.
2Introduction & Overview
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Introduction
The papers published in this book were presented either at the CAE conference,
The Risk Communication Challenge: Issues, Techniques and Practice held in No-
vember 2000, or the CAE Risk Communication Workshop held as part of the New
Zealand Society for Risk Management inaugural conference in October 2002.
The contributors come from a wide range of backgrounds, including ecology,
biology, veterinary sciences, psychology, mathematics, economics, geography, law,
and engineering, thus illustrating the importance of risk communication within a
range of disciplines. Many of the papers presented here reflect experience in the
public sector, at a national and regional level. To some extent this reflects the
public notification requirements of much of our environmental legislation, includ-
ing (in New Zealand) the Resource Management Act (1991) and the Hazardous
Substances and New Organisms Act (1996). However, CAE is very much aware of
the importance of risk communication in private sector organisations and has
initiated a project examining practice and performance in organisational risk com-
munication, with emphasis on risk appetite, in both the public and private sec-
tors.
The origins of risk communication
People’s perceptions of risks provide a valid and required input to both formal and
informal risk assessment and risk management procedures. In recent years the
public has become much more aware of, and concerned about, environmental
hazards. Part of this concern has arisen because of changing attitudes to the
environment, reflecting changes in people’s value systems, and a greater aware-
ness of the importance of environmental health to our own well-being. This chap-
ter concentrates on perceptions of environmental risk (unless otherwise stated).
This includes risks to people and their physical and social environment (health
and welfare) as well as the environment itself. The primary emphasis is on tech-
nology-induced risk, but most of the discussion also relates to natural hazard risk.
One of the drivers of risk perception research was the recognition that individuals
and particular groups in the community view risk in a very different way from
technical experts and scientists who use scientific models and tools to analyse
and measure risk. Early researchers examined the different factors and character-
istics of situations and specified risks that individuals take into account when
they are making their own estimates of risk (and benefit).
Some researchers were initially motivated by the expectation that if it were pos-
sible to understand why people perceived risk in different ways to experts then it
would be comparatively straightforward to ‘educate’ people so that they would
‘understand’ risk better and would therefore accept the advice being given by
technical and scientific experts. However, greater understanding of both the fac-
tors affecting public perceptions and the reasons why expert predictions and lay
perceptions differ has shown that this may not necessarily be the appropriate
outcome. Over time, more emphasis has been given to understanding risk percep-
4Introduction & Overview
tions and including consideration of them in making decisions involving risk.
Perceived risk research (see Chapter 3) has provided improved understanding of
how individuals think about risk, with the key outcomes being the identification of
the main factors affecting people’s perceptions of risk, the recognition that the
technical concept of risk as a compound of probability and magnitude is inad-
equate in terms of the way most people think about risk, and a greater comprehen-
sion of the heuristics that people use in their efforts to estimate risk (e.g. Starr,
1969; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982; Fischhoff et al., 1975; Fischhoff et al., 1978;
Slovic, 1987).
Risk conflicts arise when experts and the public differ in their views about risks
associated with an activity, and are due to many causes. Research into perceived
risk has provided considerable insight, and has highlighted a major social prob-
lem that derives from risk conflicts — the lack of confidence that the public has
in the technical expert. The credibility of the expert is now a key issue of risk
research reflecting on the credibility of the public-sector decision-making pro-
cesses.
The concept of acceptable risk is linked to perceived risk. Acceptable risk is best
seen as the result of a decision process where risks are analysed and, according
to the particular decision criteria, specified as being either ‘acceptable’ or ‘unac-
ceptable’1. In public decision processes, the criteria for determining acceptability
or tolerability2 should include consideration of public opinion or public percep-
tions of the risk, though how this ‘consideration’ is included in the decision
process may vary widely, and is the subject of some of the following chapters.
The concept of ‘accepted’ risk, referring to that which people choose to accept
even if they don’t like it3, is also relevant.
One important result of the early perceived risk and acceptable risk research was
that people’s perceptions are not simply ‘irrational’, and that people use a wide
variety of input information including expert predictions to make their own social
evaluations of risk (Fischhoff et al., 1982, Kraus et al., 1992). Essentially, indi-
vidual and community perceptions are a valid input into decision processes,
particularly the perceptions of groups likely to be affected by decisions. As a
result, and also as a by-product of a certain amount of soul searching as to the
purpose of research into perceived risk, the emphasis in risk research in the late
1980s switched towards designing ways of communicating risk information, as a
1 Needless to say it isn’t as simple as this, and in many cases three categories are defined, such that there is a
group between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ that consists of those risks that require further attention.
2 Tolerable risk depends primarily on the idea of the benefits outweighing the risks. The risk will never be
accepted, but it will be tolerated for a particular activity or for a specified time period. Moore (1988) describes
the term ‘tolerable risk’ as originating from the Sizewell B Inquiry in Britain. “A tolerable risk is not the same
as an acceptable risk as people may tolerate a certain level of danger associated with a particular risk but that
does not mean they will ever accept it.” The term derives from comments by Sir Frank Layfield Q.C. (1987) that
“although acceptable risk is often used in balancing risks and benefits, it does not adequately convey the
reluctance with which possible substantial risks and benefits may be tolerated”.
3 Accepted risk differs from tolerable risk in that people accept it voluntarily; for example, smoking.
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means of (a) capturing public knowledge, and (b) avoiding costly risk conflicts
that have the potential to slow or even halt some development activities. There is
also a considerable body of work directed towards exploring the differences be-
tween expert and lay perceptions of risk (e.g. Lazo, et al. 2000; Flynn and Slovic,
1999).
An important driver for finding better ways of communicating on risk issues, and
incorporating public knowledge into decision making, is that in many environ-
mental decision processes there can be no absolute right answer because of the
existence of uncertainty4. Therefore, the most acceptable solution to all parties
must intuitively be reached by a process of trade-off between them (Renn, 1989;
Renn and Levine, 1992).
For this to be successful, all parties must be prepared to negotiate and to estab-
lish a framework for this negotiation that will include the areas in which they are
prepared to negotiate. Risk conflicts typically include elements of value conflicts
as well as interest conflicts and risk communication seeks to clarify ways in which
these can be defined and properly described.
Some principles of risk communication
The National Research Council (1989) defined risk communication by stating that
the risk communication approach:
 “...is an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion
among individuals, groups and institutions. It involves multiple
messages about the nature of risk and other messages, not strictly
about risk, that express concerns, opinions or reactions to risk mes-
sages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk manage-
ment.”
There are two important concepts outlined in this definition. Firstly, risk commu-
nication is an exchange of information, or an interactive process requiring the
establishment of two-way communication channels. Secondly, at times the com-
munication channels will process messages that are not strictly related to risk.
Risk concerns are often used as a surrogate for other issues in public-sector
decision processes. This aspect of risk communication can be very important, as
long as it is used judiciously and does not result either in ‘information overload’
or in a loss of confidence in the channel.
There are many manuals written on the ‘how to’ of risk communication. A number
of consultants have taken the results from risk perception research, as well as
communications research and participatory research, and have used this to specify
sets of ‘principles’ or rules to be applied in communicating with the general
public on risk issues. Some of these are described in Chapter 5.
4 Other important issues to be mentioned here include the Precautionary Approach and decision maker’s
approach to risk.
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Some key messages can be extracted as to what should, and should not, be
done. The following list is a useful set of aims for a programme.
• Start early;
• Identify stakeholders and be inclusive rather than exclusive – communicate
broadly;
• Always involve the community in the decision-making process if appropriate
representatives can be identified;
• Address community concerns when explaining risk (try to consider their per-
spective), and be very careful when making comparisons with other risks;
• Present material clearly and simply (but not condescendingly), give people
time to assimilate and familiarise complex issues, and remember that there
are no ‘dumb’ questions;
• Pay as much attention to the community’s intuitive perception of the risk, and
to the community’s concerns, as to scientific variables (provide the informa-
tion that the community wants as well a what it ‘needs’);
• Don’t avoid negative information, and admit when you simply don’t know;
and
• Focus on building trust as well as generating good data, and only make
promises that you know you can keep.
All of these aims are directed towards building trust and credibility which are
essential elements of a good risk communication programme.
What risk communication can’t achieve
When risk communication processes were initially promoted some experts be-
lieved that it would be possible to solve all conflict simply by providing the public
with ‘better’ information.  This has indeed been the case in some instances,
however, there have also been a number of studies of conflicts where the public
is not prepared to accept that the experts’ viewpoint is ‘better’.   The fundamental
flaw in this approach is that risk communication is not just about ‘telling people’
or ‘educating the public’ but about exchanging information for the purpose of
better informing all parties.  With hindsight, most experts who have been in-
volved in risk communication processes now have a greater understanding of the
public’s attitudes and concerns.
Attitudes are based on values and beliefs.  Communication is associated with
flow of information (and knowledge).  Therefore while risk communication can
provide all parties with a better general understanding of the issue it cannot (and
should not) attempt to change basic values and beliefs.  However, risk communi-
cation can help by identifying points of commonality and points of difference,
and also why these arise (Gerrard, 1995).
The National Research Council definition of risk communication (see above) ad-
dresses the issue of purpose obliquely, by noting that it may be used for a variety
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of messages some of which may not be related to risk.  The notion of purpose is
important because the organisation or individual initiating the process needs to
be clear about the intended purpose of the specific process so that the success or
otherwise can be judged against the criteria implicit in the purpose.  Risk commu-
nication is not necessarily unsuccessful because all parties cannot reach consen-
sus.  In some cases the purpose may simply be to gauge opinions or establish a
communication vehicle.
Internal and external risk communication
While much of the risk communication literature concentrates on communication
between an organisation and its stakeholder, it is important to remember that
communication about risks within an organisation can be critical. A classic and
dramatic example of where poor internal communication about risks led to a
tragic outcome is the case of the Challenger Shuttle disaster. The details on how
this occurred are well described in Feynman (1988). In this instance it was lack of
communication between engineers (analysts) and managers that resulted in poor
decisions. Another, more recent, example from the medical field relates to an
instance in the United States where information from gene therapy trials was not
sent to the central registry, thus resulting in incomplete information being given
to patients (New Scientist, 2000).
Chapter 2 touches on the way in which internal communication about risks can
affect the way and organisation communicates with its stakeholders, and Chapter
10 illustrates how differences in interpretation within an organisation regarding
risk appetite can arise when there is no explicit policy established.
Internal risk communication ensures that those who are responsible for imple-
menting the risk management framework understand why certain actions are
required. It can be used to encourage internal staff to keep a watchful eye for
activities or situations that may lead to risk. Good internal communication about
risk should be part of an organisation’s risk culture, and embedded into risk
management profiles and programmes.
Risk communication and risk management in Australia and New Zealand
The Australian and New Zealand risk management standard AS/NZS 4360: Risk
Management (Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, 1995, 1999), was
first published in 1995. This first version of the standard did not include explicit
consideration of risk communication. However, when the revised version was
republished in 19995, risk communication had become a fundamental component
of all steps of the process6.
5 AS/NZS 4360 is currently (2003) under revision again. In the 2004 version of the Standard the role of risk
communication has been further reinforced.
6 The development of the Environmental Risk Management Handbook (Standards Australia and Standards New
Zealand, 2000) was a positive driver in ensuring the recognition of risk communication.
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The standard promotes the development of a risk communication programme as
an essential part of risk management, where elements of such a programme
include determining:
• why communication and consultation is required;
• who is going to be involved (who are the stakeholders);
• when the different parties are going to be involved;
• what is to be the subject of the communication and consultation; and
• how the process is to be undertaken throughout the risk management cycle.
One of the benefits of embedding risk communication within the risk manage-
ment process is seen as being improved stakeholder relationships, allowing an
organisation to explicitly identify its internal and external stakeholders, and to
develop a conversation between the stakeholders and the organisation. One
important element may be assigning responsibilities for internal and external
communication, whilst keeping in mind that communication, as well as risk man-
agement, must be part of everyone’s responsibility.
Communicating and consulting on risk issues requires knowledge and consider-
ation of the varying factors that affect all stakeholder perceptions. Individuals
and communities respond to risk according to how the risk is perceived. Such
perceptions are influenced by a range of factors that go beyond the simple two-
dimensional model of likelihood and magnitude of effect, should the event occur.
When designing risk communication programmes as part of risk management,
the distribution of risk across the population is highly relevant since, in many
cases, external stakeholders believe that they are being asked to bear the risk
while the organisation garners the benefits. Chapter 2 and Chapter 12 illustrate
how directly involving stakeholders and convincing them that the organisation
has an interest in ensuring that stakeholders are not unnecessarily disadvan-
taged can help to allay these concerns. As discussed in Chapter 6, ‘respect’ is an
important element of good communication.
Risk communication in New Zealand
New Zealand has not yet faced the sorts of major risk conflict situations that have
concerned Europe and the United States over the past two decades. One reason
is that these have focused largely on large-scale questions such as nuclear power
generation and hazardous waste disposal. The second area is of concern to a
number of groups and agencies, but it has not yet surfaced as a major focus of
the general public.
In the past few years, however, there have been significant areas where differing
perceptions of risks have led to conflict. These include the siting of microwave
and cellular phone towers, genetic modification and biotechnology (Chapters 6
and 9), and large scale spraying of residential areas to eradicate pest species
(Chapter 12).
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Risk communication techniques have been applied in New Zealand to natural
hazard management and flood control. While Chapter 8 provides one example,
there are a number of other circumstances where councils have applied success-
ful risk communication programmes that have used community knowledge and
experience to help design appropriate systems. These include flood control
(Kingsbury, 2000), and general natural hazard management (McSaveney, et al.
1996; Gough, et al. 2001).
Since the implementation of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), commu-
nities have become accustomed to being consulted on the development of Dis-
trict and City Plans. Along with this, the notification requirements of the RMA has
resulted in community groups becoming more active about engaging with plan-
ning authorities in a number of areas, many of which involve risk.
The health sector in New Zealand has also become more aware of the importance
of risk communication, though in a number of recent examples the emphasis has
been on informing the public, rather than consulting the public. Part of this is the
result of current legislation; proposals for changes to the Health Act may result in
better recognition of the benefits of properly designed risk communication pro-
grammes. At a clinical level, a great deal of emphasis has been given to improv-
ing doctors’ and clinicians’ communication skills in recent years.
Two areas where long-term risk communication channels have been established
in New Zealand are the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) Farm Advisory
Service, and the Civil Defence Service. The Farm Advisory Service has for many
years operated as a communication channel between farmers and the scientific
and technical researchers of MAF. This has proved to be an effective two-way
communication channel with farm advisors acting as communicators. One of the
features of the service is that the communicators have been trained primarily as
farmers rather than as communicators so they have used their own professional
judgement to determine what the message should be and how it should be
communicated. Unfortunately, institutional change has resulted in the downgrad-
ing of the service.
The Civil Defence service has largely been a one-way communication system with
Civil Defence providing the public with information on what to do in cases of
emergency. The efficacy of this communication channel is hard to judge since Civil
Defence situations do not occur very often. The new Civil Defence and Emergency
Management Act (2002) aims to strengthen the role of risk communication in
managing for emergencies, and communities and councils will be more directly
involved in all aspects of planning for emergencies.
New Zealand needs to place emphasis on:
• encouraging institutions and agencies currently involved in risk assessment to
recognise the validity and utility of their procedures;
• enhancing the credibility of agencies and institutions likely to be involved in
risk communication exercises;
10
Introduction & Overview
• considering ways of providing comprehensive and comprehensible technical
information to the media and the public; and
• exploring imaginatively the establishment of communication channels (either
as institutional arrangements or flexible processes)7.
Towards the future
In 1997, the United States Presidential/Congress Commission on Risk Assessment
and Risk Management published a document entitled Framework for Health Risk
Management.
The importance of this document to proponents of risk communication was that
the central element of the diagram illustrating the relationship of risk assessment
and risk management was ‘engage stakeholders’. It discusses the need for better
communication between regulators and the public and concludes that “The prac-
tice of risk communication is moving from trying to explain risk information to
citizens toward building partnerships between plant managers and nearby resi-
dents, between companies and consumers, and between agency risk managers
and the public. Although our air, water, and food are measurably cleaner and
therefore less risky than they were 30 years ago, the fact that many citizens
believe that they are at greater risk indicates that risk communication has a long
way to go.”
In November 2002, the United Kingdom Cabinet Office published a document
entitled Risk: Improving Government’s capability to handle risk and uncertainty.
In it they refer to the importance of risk communication and note the following:
“Three specific concerns were raised in our study in relation to communication
with the public about risks they face:
– communication needs to start earlier in the policy development and decision
process, wherever possible when framing decisions are being made. A number
of NGOs8 told us that they were frequently approached for comments on a
narrowly defined solution to risk issues, rather than being involved early on in
analysing the problem and the range of options available for tackling it;
– communication with the public on risks that affect them needs to be a genu-
inely two-way process. NGOs have suggested that a one-way approach to risk
communication is more likely to increase public anxiety about risks than to
provide reassurance; and
– involvement of the public in decisions about risks, both formal and informal,
needs to be as widespread and balanced as possible. Stakeholders we spoke
to suggested that, by restricting formal consultation to their usual list of
contacts, Departments were more vulnerable to ‘group think’ and as a result
key risks were sometimes missed. Similar concerns were voiced about infor-
mal soundings such as public attitude surveys, with one politician we spoke
7 This statement derives from Gough, 1991. It remains appropriate today.
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to suggesting that Departments sometimes confuse market research with genu-
ine involvement in the decision process.”
The importance of these conclusions is not so much their content, which will be
well recognised by people familiar with risk communication literature and prac-
tice, but that they are presented in high level government documents.
In the New Zealand context, the public participation elements of our environmen-
tal legislation (Resource Management Act 1991, Hazardous Substances and New
Organisms Act, 1996, Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act, 2002) pro-
vide a legislative foundation for the development of better practice in communi-
cating about risk issues.  However, while there is an imperative for public partici-
pation, this does not necessarily translate to an imperative for risk communica-
tion in the broadest sense, and there is often a perceived as well as an actual
power imbalance.  Changes to the Local Government Act may help to empower
communities, who will need tools to assist them in participating fully.  At the
same time (as identified in later chapters) organisations also require tools for
both internal and external risk communication.
CAE is seeking to address some of these issues in a new project on risk commu-
nication.  The goal of the project is –
To develop approaches and techniques for enabling risk communication suitable
for New Zealand organisations, by means of
• An improved understanding of the psychology of risk taking and risk percep-
tions at an organisational level
• The development and promotion of a process within organisations for pro-
moting a more general awareness and understanding of expectations regard-
ing managing risk i.e. risk attitude
• The development and promotion of a process for assisting organisations to
communicate risk to external stakeholders and interested parties both on a
project basis and on a more general basis
It is important to note that the use of the term ‘approaches’ here includes notions
of how, why, what, when, and why, so as to assist organisations to undertake
‘better’ communication about risks.
This book provides a good base for the project.  In order for New Zealand to
manage risks better, there needs to be an open discussion on what risk manage-
ment can and cannot do, and how and where it should be applied.  An excellent
start would be greater recognition of the importance and value of risk communi-
cation and stakeholder contributions to decision making.
References
Feynman, R P, 1988. What do you care what people think?, Unwin.
Fischhoff, B, Slovic, P, and Lichtenstein, S, 1975. “Fault trees: sensitivity of
12
Introduction & Overview
estimated failure probabilities to problem representation”, Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 4 (2): 30-344.
Fischhoff, B, Slovic, P, Lichtenstein, S, Read, S, and Combs, B, 1978. “How safe
is safe enough?”, Policy Sciences 9: 126-152.
Fischhoff, B, Slovic, P, and Lichtenstein, S, 1982. “Lay foibles and expert fables
in judgements about risk”, American Statistician 36 (3): 240-255.
Flynn, J, and Slovic, P, 1999. “Expert and public evaluations of technological
risks: Searching for common ground”, Risk Analysis 19(2): 153-166.
Gerrard, S, 1995. “Environmental risk management” In : O’Riordan, T. Environ-
mental Science for Environmental Management. Longman Scientific and
Technical, Singapore.
Gough, J D, 1991. “Risk communication: the implications for risk management”,
Information Paper No. 33. Centre for Resource Management, Lincoln Univer-
sity, New Zealand.
Gough, J D, 2001. Changes in Understanding, awareness and preparedness for
natural hazard risk - Franz Josef Glacier, Institute for Geological and Nuclear
Sciences Science Report 2001/22.
Kingsbury, P, 2000. Presentation to World Bank Tour on risk communication
processes for flood control in Ashburton (pers. comm.)
Kraus, N, Malmfors, T, and Slovic, P, 1992. “Intuitive toxicology: expert and lay
judgments of chemical risks”, Risk Analysis 12(2): 215-252.
Layfield, Sir Frank, 1987. Sizewell B public inquiry report, Her Majesty’s Statio-
nery Office
Lazo, J K, Kinnell, J C , and Fisher, A, 2000. “Expert and layperson perceptions
of ecosystem risk”, Risk Analysis 20(2): 179-193.
McSaveney, M, Davies, T, and Gough, J D, (1996): Natural hazard assessment for
Mt Cook/Aoraki Village and environs, Unpublished report to the Mount Cook
Village Development Steering Group, and the Department of Conservation.
Moore, G, 1988. “Risk assessment — black art or science”, IEE Review 34 (4):
151-153.
National Research Council, 1989. Improving risk communication, National
Academy Press, Washington D.C.
New Scientist, 2000. “Don’t keep secrets”, New Scientist Editorial, 18 March
2000, page 3.
Renn, O, 1989. “Risk analysis: a need to communicate”, Forum for Applied
Research and Public Policy, Summer 1989.
13
Janet Gough
Renn, O & Levine, D, 1991. “Trust and credibility in risk communication”, In R.
E. Kasperson & P. J. Stallen (Eds.) Communicating risks to the public, 175-
218, Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Slovic, P, 1987. “Perception of risk”, Science 236: 280-285.
Tversky, A, and Kahneman, D, 1982. “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics
and biases” In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. Judgement under
uncertainty: heuristics and biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand,1995. AS/NZS 4360: 1995. Risk
Management, Sydney and Wellington.
Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand,1999. AS/NZS 4360: 1999. Risk
Management, Sydney and Wellington.
Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand,2000. HB-203: 2000. Environ-
mental Risk Management: principles and process, Sydney and Wellington.
Starr, C, 1969. “Social benefit versus technological risk”, Science 165: 1232.
United States Presidential/Congress Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management, 1997. Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management.
Presidential Commission, Washington.
United Kingdom Cabinet Office Strategic Unit, 2002. Risk: Improving
Government’s capability to handle risk and uncertainty, London.
Some further reading
Chess, C, 1999. “A model of organizational responsiveness to stakeholders”,
Risk: Health, Safety and Environment 10(3): 257-265.
Chess, C, Hance, B J and Sandman, P M, 1989. Planning dialogue with commu-
nities: a risk communication workbook, Environmental Communication
Research Programme, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Chess, C, Tamuz, M, Saville, A and Greenberg, M, 1992. “Reducing uncertainty
and increasing credibility: the case of Sybron Chemicals Inc.”, Industrial
Crisis Quarterly 6: 55-70.
Covello, V T, McCallum, D B and Pavlova, M T, (Eds). 1989. Effective Risk
Communication, Plenum Press, New York.
Fischhoff, B, 1995. “Risk perception and communication unplugged: twenty
years of process”, Risk Analysis 15 (2): 137-145.
Jasanoff, S, 1993. “Bridging the two cultures of risk analysis”, Risk Analysis 13
(2): 123-129.
Lundgren, R E, McMakin, A, 1999. Risk communication: a handbook for commu-
14
Introduction & Overview
nicating environmental, safety and health risks, Battelle Press.
Renn, O, 1998. “The role of risk communication and public dialogue for improv-
ing risk management”, Risk, Decision and Policy 3: 5-30.
Rohrmann, B, 2000. “A socio-psychological model for analyzing risk communi-
cation processes”, Australasian J. of Disaster Studies, 2000 (2).
[www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/2000-2/rohrmann.htm]
Rohrmann, B, 1996. “Perception and Evaluation of Risks: Findings for New
Zealand and Cross-cultural Comparisons. Information Paper No. 52”, Lincoln
Ventures, Lincoln University, New Zealand.
Rohrmann, B and Renn, O, 2000. “Risk perception research: an introduction”
In: Renn, O. and Rohrmann, B. Cross Cultural Risk Perception: a Survey of
Empirical Studies, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Slovic, P, Layman, M and Flynn, J H, 1991. “Lessons from Yucca Mountain”,
Environment 33(3): 7-11.
Useful websites
Risk Communication in Print and on the Web: A Critical Guide to Manuals and
Internet Resources on Risk Communication and Issues Management, Philip CR
Gray and Peter M Wiedemann — www.fz-juelich.de/mut/rc/inhalt.html
15
Caron Chess
2 Managing Risk Communication:Risk Communication Inside Out
Caron Chess
Risk communication is a process aimed at improving the credibility of decisions,
and at achieving effective management of risk. It is a means of transferring
information between all stakeholders and provides an arena for discussing dif-
ferent viewpoints. Effective risk communication should be a genuine effort to
involve all parties in the resolution of an issue.
Risk communication is sometimes thought of solely from the perspective of an
organisation communicating with its external stakeholders. External risk commu-
nication is part of good practice and helps an organisation to fulfil its legislative
responsibilities, provide due diligence and obtain necessary permits. It will im-
prove community understanding and awareness of an organisation’s environ-
mental activities.
However, Caron points out that there are two further aspects that are critical to
good risk communication: the policy and structures within the organisation that
support risk communication and, closely linked to this, internal risk communica-
tion processes. From a risk management perspective, internal risk communica-
tion ensures that those who are responsible for implementing the risk manage-
ment framework understand why certain actions are required.
This chapter introduces and discusses how internal aspects of risk communica-
tion affect the success of risk communication with external stakeholders and
interested parties, and illustrates this by examining a set of questions relating to
internal processes that need to be addressed by organisations before undertak-
ing external risk communication.
By emphasising the organisational aspects of risk communication, as opposed
to procedural aspects, Caron provides the context for the remaining chapters.
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Introduction
Risk communication programmes may require effective internal systems that fa-
cilitate an organisation’s ability to communicate with outside audiences. Based
on two case studies, this paper raises six questions for organisations to consider:
1 Why are you communicating?
2 How do you listen?
3 Who communicates?
4 How do you communicate internally?
5 What is the relationship between what you say and what you do?
6 How do you keep risk communication efforts on track?
In the United States, risk communication was born less than a year after the
tragedy in Bhopal, with an accidental airborne release in August 1985 from the
Union Carbide plant in West Virginia. The release created a crisis of public confi-
dence that sent an alarm through the chemical industry (Lueck, 1985). Companies
sought to regain credibility, in part, with risk communication with communities.
The subsequent passage of a federal law that required public disclosure of infor-
mation provided further momentum to risk communication efforts.
While early risk communication efforts focused on translating technical informa-
tion into lay terms, the trend in the United States is towards developing participa-
tory processes that involve communities (e.g. Fischhoff, 1995). In the words of the
(US.) National Research Council (1996):
“The common practice of eliciting comments only after most of the
work of reaching a decision has been done is cause for resentment
of risk decisions. Many decisions can be better informed and their
information base can be more credible if the interested and affected
parties are appropriately and effectively involved.”
However, developing risk communication efforts that go beyond mere propa-
ganda may require companies and government agencies to change not only how
they communicate to those beyond their walls, but also how they communicate
internally. In some cases, it may require these organisations to change not only
what they say, but also what they do.
There is very limited research on the relationship between internal organisational
systems and external risk communication. Therefore, it would be unwise to de-
velop risk communication ‘rules’ for complex organisations dealing with difficult
risk issues and potentially contentious communities. My goal here is to provoke
some reflection by raising questions based on two case studies: 1) Sybron Chemi-
cals developed an innovative telecommunications system so that plant neigh-
bours could routinely communicate about concerns to the plant and 2) Rohm and
Haas’ Bristol, Pennsylvania plant developed one of the country’s first advisory
committees (Chess et al., 1992; Chess et al., 1995).
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Motivation: Why are you communicating?
In the cases studied, companies learned the hard way. A release from Sybron
Chemicals in the middle of the night led to the evacuation of 60 people and calls
from the community for the plant to shut down. As a result, the plant took a crash
course in community relations. Rohm and Haas’ Bristol plant was hit with head-
lines about its landfill before the site told anyone in the community.
One of the risk communication rules of thumb is to communicate before, rather
than after a crisis. There needs to be further research on the extent to which there
is sufficient motivation for most companies to develop participatory risk commu-
nication efforts before such motivating events.
How do you listen to outside voices?
The successes relied on a number of different methods to hear outside voices. In
this way, plants were more likely to hear of community concerns before citizens
felt a need to shout for attention. For example, at Sybron calls from the commu-
nity were put directly through to managers. Rohm and Haas had a sophisticated
response vehicle, complete with monitoring equipment and information on toxics
that went to the homes of callers concerned about odours.
Arguably Sybron had the most innovative mechanisms in place to hear outside
voices. To help Sybron listen, the PINS telecommunications system, which noti-
fied neighbours in event of an emergency, also functioned as a sophisticated
answering machine. Plant neighbours could call into PINS 24 hours a day to hear
a recorded message about the status of the plant, or to leave a message if they
had concerns. This allowed residents to report odours and gives operators infor-
mation to track plant malfunctions and track odour releases quickly and promptly.
The PINS system was such a success, both in helping the plant to quickly track
odour releases and in giving community people prompt access to information,
that Sybron went one step further. The plant set up an odour identification team
made up of volunteers from the neighbourhood who were trained to identify
odours that might come from the plant. In this way they could assist the plant by
reporting odours more accurately. Volunteers also had weather stations in their
backyards to help determine if Sybron was the source of the offending odours.
Volunteers served as resources to the plant, which could call members of the
odour ID team to verify a reported odour or to go over to a neighbour who
smelled something.
Sybron’s approach was an innovative one for a plant where odours were the
primary concern. Organisations with different problems will undoubtedly need
different mechanisms.
The role of public relations: Who talks and listens?
Too often, public relations personnel serve as a buffer between the plant and
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outsiders, creating a soundproof barrier that community residents may try to
shout down. Contrast this with the model of the amplifier where PR managers
and others listen to outsiders and carry the messages back to others in the
organisation. Then outsiders do not have to scream to be heard.
In the cases studied, public relations managers were facilitators of communica-
tion, serving as amplifiers, rather than buffers. Managers at all levels were in-
volved in dealing with outside people routinely. Plant and environmental manag-
ers played vital roles, and risk communication was part of the organisation rather
than a veneer.
Public affairs staff served as advisors, trouble-shooters, liaisons, coordinators,
writers, editors, coaches, and advocates for improved communication. But face-
to-face communication was left to managers and other personnel with the techni-
cal backgrounds. Rather than serving as a mouthpiece, the role of public relations
personnel was to make sure that other managers learned how to communicate.
They found it easier to train an engineer to speak to a community meeting than
to teach a public relations person an understanding of production processes.
How do you communicate within the organisation?
Rohm and Haas managers saw improvements in internal communication as criti-
cal to their efforts to communicate with outside audiences. “We make an inten-
tional effort as soon as we know about something to inform employees so they
know about it, and they don’t get a distorted message. And if [employees] do
hear a distorted message on the outside they can answer it directly,” according to
a manager from the Bristol plant. In addition, at Sybron and Rohm and Haas
routines were in place to make sure messages from outside the facility were
passed on clearly.
What is the relationship between what you say and what you do?
In these cases, responding to concerns about risk management was, to varying
extents, part of the risk communication programme. Communities’ suggestions
did not disappear into a black hole; companies improved environmental manage-
ment, increased monitoring and changed standard operating procedures. For ex-
ample, Sybron and Rohm and Haas’ pledges to reduce odours were part of larger
environmental efforts. Sybron’s PINS telecommunications system and members of
the odour identification team were integral to the plant’s risk communication and
risk management efforts. Reports of odours alerted plant personnel to explore
potential sources of problems in the plant.
How does your organisation keep risk communication on track?
For an organisation to listen and respond, more than one trained listener may be
required. To avoid the model of the great communicator riding off in the sunset,
organisational learning needs to take place.
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In all three cases there were systems in place so that the organisation developed
a shared understanding about risk communication. Not only did staff and manag-
ers change their behaviour, but records were kept and routines were developed
to build institutional memory, so the organisations could do better the next time
around.
Surprisingly few personnel interviewed had taken risk communication courses.
Most had learned the hard way and from feedback from others who had more
experience or training. While formal risk communication training is likely to en-
hance these skills, it is not sufficient for effective risk communication.
The bottom line may be: What is your organisation doing internally to promote
effective communication externally? Risk communication is not something you do
to others. Risk communication may also require you to make changes.
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3 Perception of Risk: Research,Results, Relevance
Bernd Rohrmann
The study of risk perception research is an interdisciplinary research area in
which psychologists, sociologists and political scientists investigate how indi-
viduals judge and evaluate hazards related to working conditions, private activi-
ties, technological developments, residential settings, environmental hazards and
global ecological changes. The main issues are the subjective concepts underly-
ing risk judgments, the determinants of perceived risk magnitude and risk accep-
tance, and differences in risk perception between societal groups or countries
and cultures. Most studies are based on a psychometric approach in which risk
sources are scaled according to a set of substantive risk criteria.
Risk perception research has provided input into the study of risk communication
processes as well. A major thread of the development of risk communication
derives from research into perceived and acceptable risk and seeks to find ways
(a) of avoiding the costly risk conflicts between promoters of projects and af-
fected public groups and individuals, and (b) to inform the public about risk
issues that may affect them in an appropriate manner. Risk communication thus
requires education of experts and laypersons so that their common understand-
ing of the issues, facts and values associated with risk will be increased.
Social-scientific research on risk perception has explicated the strong influence
of socio-psychological factors and the cultural quality of risk evaluations. How
the magnitude of risks is rated, and to what extent people are prepared to
accept a risk, is dependent on the type of hazard, on personal experiences,
beliefs and attitudes, and on diverse societal influences. Judgments are more
negative for technology-induced than for natural hazards, and involuntary than
self-chosen controllable) risk exposure. Fear associations, unfamiliarity, cata-
strophic potential, and long-term health impacts are stronger influences than
assumed probability to die. Clearly, ‘technical’ and statistical risk characteristics
cannot explain risk acceptance data. While individual and, particularly, societal
benefits counterbalance risk concerns for occupational and private risks, this is
less true for large-scale technology risks. Regarding personal characteristics,
attitudes such as environmental concern, scepticism about technology usage
and ‘post-material’ value orientation are significant determinants while socio-
demographic factors have only restricted effects. Those attitudes are embedded
in a wider cultural and political context; therefore, societal sub-groups differ
widely in risk acceptance.
Such findings are valuable for a better understanding of people’s attitude to-
ward risk and societal risk controversies. They can be utilised for designing
comprehensive information, communication, and education about risks — which
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is an indispensable component of effective risk management.
With this chapter, Bernd extends the context within which risk communication is
applied by providing an overview of risk perception concepts and principles. He
also helps to set the scene for Section II, which consists of examples of risk
communication processes and case studies. Since people respond to risk issues
according to their perceptions of the risk, an understanding of the concept of
acceptable risk and under what circumstances people will ‘accept’ or ‘tolerate’
different types and levels of risk, is fundamental for shaping risk communication
efforts.
The chapter has three parts: firstly, the main concepts and approaches regarding
risk perception are explicated. Then selected results collected in six countries,
including New Zealand) are used to illustrate main research outcomes, and a
structural model integrating these findings is discussed. Finally, the relevance for
risk communication is emphasised.
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Concepts and Approaches
Risk perception has provided a fertile source of both societal debate and scien-
tific research for two decades now. In this interdisciplinary area, psychologists,
sociologists and political scientists investigate how individuals judge and evalu-
ate hazards related to working conditions, private activities, technological de-
velopments, residential settings, environmental hazards and global ecological
changes. Researchers of particular backgrounds as well as the various groups
within ‘the public’ often differ in their understanding and use of risk-related
terminology; therefore this text begins with a brief discussion of main concepts
and approaches.
Hazards and risks
Without question ‘risk’ is a highly topical term. To illustrate this: an internet
search for ‘risk’ in May 2001 produced an amazing number of hits, namely
10,254,835 or 8,573,640 or 5,514,845 by three search engines. However, there
are many meanings of this concept, in terms of both denotations and connota-
tions, as the literature demonstrates, e.g. Drottz-Sjoeberg, 1991; Fischhoff, Watson
and Hope, 1984; Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992a; Rohrmann, 1998; Short, 1989; Vlek,
1996; Yates and Stone,  1992. One reason for this is that hazards, the sources of
risks, are very heterogeneous, as the taxonomy presented in Box 1 elucidates.
From a socio-psychological perspective, it is important to be conscious of differ-
ences between physical and psychological phenomena, and to distinguish be-
tween judgments, attitudes and behaviours in respect to risk situations. In Box 2
Note: This text is an extended version of my presentation at the CAE conference “The Risk Communication
Challenge” and mainly based on the work published in Rohrmann 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000.
Box 1: Taxonomy of Risk Sources
Subject of risk:
Risks for the state of the environment
Risk for humans, well-being and their assets
Kind of effects:
present
next generation
future
local
regional
global
acute
chronic
physical
financial
social
Types of personal risk exposure:
Individual activites
Residential conditions
occupational
private
natural hazards
technology-induced hazards
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a set of definitions for relevant risk terms is outlined based on Rohrmann 1998.
A hazard is a physical entity while risk is not; it is an inference about the implica-
tions of a hazard (for people or nature, or assets) exposed to it. In most contexts
‘risk’ refers to a danger of unwanted negative effects; however, in some fields
‘risk’ is treated as a neutral term equating to uncertainty about the outcomes of
choices and there is also a positive connotation, such as ‘desired risk’ e.g., ‘get-
ting a thrill’ by acting in a risky manner. Clearly risk is a multi-facetted concept.
Risk perceptions are interpretations of the world, based on experiences and/or
beliefs. They are embedded in the norms, value systems and cultural idiosyncra-
sies of societies. Every human is busy with risk perception most of the time,
whether driving a car or thinking about health care or worrying about upcoming
bad weather and so on. Strictly speaking, risks cannot be ‘perceived’ like a size or
speed or the weather. However, risk perception has become the standard label of
the respective research topic.
It is important to note that most people have views about every risk, regardless
of whether they are exposed to it or not. Also, neither perceptions of nor atti-
tudes towards risk should be taken as equivalents of actual behaviour.
Risk perceptions can be quantified by socio-psychological scaling and survey
techniques, e.g. the psychometric approach, cf. Section 1.4. In other words, while
Hazard
A situation, event or substance that can become harmful for people, nature or
human-made facilities
Risk
The possibility of physical or social or financial harm/detriment/loss when exposed
to a hazard
RiskPerception
People's judgments and evaluations of hazards they (or their facilities, or the
environment) are or might be exposed to
Perceived Risk Magnitude
A  person's judgment (belief) about how large the risk associated with a hazard is
Risk Acceptance /Refusal
Decisions  about  the  acceptability of risks  in  individual  or societal terms
(principal or de-facto)
Risk Propensity
An attitude towards taking a risk when deciding how to proceed in situations with
uncertain outcomes
Risk Behaviour
The actual behavior of people when facing a risk situation
Box 2: Core Concepts in Risk Research
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risk perception is subjective in nature, the data describing it are as objective as
other scientific findings.
Perceived versus ‘real’ risk
The understanding of ‘risk’ in natural and social sciences tends to clash. For
example, quite often the term ‘real’ or ‘actual’ risk is used as counterpart to
‘perceived risk’. Epistemologically this does not make much sense though Hudrey,
1996; Rohrmann, 1998; Slovic, 1996. All statements about risk, whether rough
guesses or highly quantitative data-based computations, are only depictions of
the ‘reality’ in question cf. Box 3 for an illustration.
It appears more appropriate to label results from Quantitative Risk Assessments
(which can be seen as a model-based estimate of the ‘real’ risk) as, for example,
‘statistical’ — which then may be contrasted to perceived risk.
Risk acceptance
The concept risk acceptance refers to statements about the acceptability of a risk
in individual or societal terms, i.e., whether it is evaluated as being tolerable or
not cf. e.g. Fischhoff et al., 1982; Fischhoff, 1994; Handmer et al., 1991; Vlek and
Cvetkovich, 1989. Principal acceptability is the normative, and actual acceptance
the empirical aspect.
In strict terms ‘acceptance’ would need to be based on a deliberate decision;
however, if people do not choose or refuse a risk situation intentionally, defacto
acceptance results.
Box 3: Perceived, “Real”, Modelled Risk
theory-based
computed
probabilistic
statistical
acturial
estimated
predicted
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(intuitive judgement)
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Approaches to study human perception of hazards and risks
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods have been used extensively
to study and explain risk perception, e.g. Arabie and Maschmayer, 1988; Pigeon
et al., 1992; Rohrmann, 1999b. In the first phase, pertinent studies were inter-
ested in general principles of risk perception. More recently, the focus is on
cultural differences within and across societies.
The dominating approach, often labelled ‘psychometric paradigm’, is based on
four intentions:
• to establish ‘risk’ as a subjective concept, not an objective entity;
• to include technical/physical and social/psychological aspects in risk criteria;
• to accept opinions of ‘the public’ (i.e., laypeople, not experts) as the matter of
interest; and
• to analyse the cognitive structure of risk judgments, usually employing statistical
procedures such as factor analysis, multi-dimensional scaling or multiple
regression.
This approach was developed by B. Fischhoff, S. Lichtenstein and P. Slovic, the
‘Oregon Group’ see Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic et al., 1980; see also Slovic, 1992.
Many researchers followed their approach, most of them in the USA and European
countries. For overviews see, for example, Boholm, 1998; Fischhoff et al., 1997;
Guerin, 1991; Renn, 1990; and the documentation by Rohrmann, 1999.
The subjective meaning of risk concepts, evaluation of risk sources and determinants
of risk acceptance have also been investigated by means of qualitative approaches,
e.g. Earle and Lindell, 1984; Fischer et al., 1991; Tyszka and Goszcsynska, 1993.
Psychometric studies are based on individual or group responses to risk issues.
However, the process of risk perception in society has been thoroughly analysed
from a ‘macro-sociological’ perspective as well - see e.g. Beck 1992, Dake 1992,
Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Luhmann 1990, Wildavsky 1988. Sociologists have
particularly stressed that the evaluative process of risk perception is determined
by the norms, value systems, and cultural idiosyncrasies of societies. According
to the ‘cultural theory’ approach, risk is a ‘social and cultural construction’ (Johnson
and Covello, 1987) — not an ‘objective’ entity to be measured independently of
the context in which hazards occur (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 1992).
Most of the research conducted so far follows the psychometric paradigm. Some
researchers (e.g. Marris, Longford and O’Riordan, 1998) have attempted to bridge
the gap between psychological and sociological conceptualisations of risk per-
ception research.
Findings from Risk Perception Studies
Risk perception research is a large and flourishing area, with studies from at least
two dozen countries. Only few examples of empirical results can be presented
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here. For a substantive discussion of main findings see Pidgeon et al., 1992; Renn
and Rohrmann, 2000; and the reader by Slovic, 2000. A comprehensive review
and documentation of this body of research is provided in Rohrmann, 1999.
Main research questions
The core interest of risk perception research is to understand how people subjec-
tively assess hazards and how the manifold aspects of risk judgments are related.
This interest is linked to several further research issues, as outlined in Box 4.
Cultural differences in risk perception can be investigated from several perspec-
tives, based on intra-national group comparisons or cross-national studies (Box 5).
Design of a cross-cultural project
In the following paragraphs a few results from the author’s Project CRC, “Compari-
son of risk perception in different countries and cultures” will be presented,
because this is the only risk perception study with data for New Zealand and
Australia for more details cf. Rohrmann 1994, 1996, 1999, 2000. The ‘problem
space’, with the three facets: hazards, risk features, respondents, is summarised
in Box 6.
The project actually consists of two sub-projects, both cross-national, with data
collections in 3 and 6 countries; the respective samples are listed in Box 7.
The principal interest of CRC-1 was:
• to analyse the cognitive structure of subjective hazard evaluations; and
Box 4: Issues of Risk Perception Research
Relation to
statistical data
Individual/societal
risk acceptance
Link to actual
risk behaviour
Application to risk
communication
Cross-cultural
differences
Info-processing,
heuristics/biases
Cognitive
structure of risk
judgements
28
Perception of Risk: Research, Reults, Relevance
• to identify differences between societal groups of distinctive professional back-
ground.
The main focus of CRC-2 was:
• to compare two culturally different sets of countries, ‘western’ versus ‘eastern’;
and
• to look at differences between scientists and students.
The principal psychometric approach and the underlying conceptual model is the
same for both sub-projects. Final comparative data analyses are currently under-
way.
Risk magnitude ratings for hazard types
A first interest is which hazards are rated highest on riskiness scales. As an ex-
ample, in Box 8 the results for New Zealand are given (source: Rohrmann, 1996);
these are mean judgments including all 8 groups for 24 risk sources.
Overall, the following risks get the most negative evaluations in terms of perceived
risk magnitude <RM>, assumed probability of dying <PD> and health impacts <HI>:
long-term heavy smoking, working in asbestos production, living in polluted urban
areas, and living near a nuclear power plant. These risk sources also induce the
most fear associations <FA>. Not surprisingly, catastrophic potential <CP> is seen as
highest for nuclear power much higher than for earthquakes — which might sur-
prise, given the enormous death toll which many earthquakes incur.
The personal risk exposure <PR> is rather low for most risk sources; the highest
scores are for smoking, overeating and the earthquake hazard. Obviously smok-
ers know as well as non-smokers about the risk: smoking clearly ranks highest in
all three pertinent aspects <RM, PD, HI>.
Box 5: Notions of “Cross-cultural” Risk Perception Research
Level of comparison intra-national inter-national
Core variables beliefs and attitudes towards
perceived risk sources
culturally embedded values
regarding safety and risk
Units of study professional or ideological
sub-groups of society
countries or cultures
FACET Included Conceptual basis Example
Hazards: 24 risk sources hazard taxonomy earthquake
Risk features: 12 evaluation aspects causal model of risk perception rated magnitude
Respondents: (A)  8 countries ‘western’ vs ‘eastern’ NZ, Singapore
(B)  4 societal groups professional and political affialiations engineers
Box 6: Project CRC: Problem Space
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Judgments of individual and societal risk acceptance
Box 8 also contains the results for benefit and acceptance ratings, both measured
with regard to an individual and a societal viewpoint. Regarding the risk for
oneself <IA>, again nuclear power, asbestos production, and polluted urban areas
get the most negative ratings. Regarding risks for society at large <SA>, smoking,
tranquillisers and nuclear power are seen as least acceptable. It should be noted
that there are no nuclear power stations in New Zealand, nor in Australia.
Less adverse ratings are given to skiing, flying an emergency helicopter, coal power
plants and living in electric storm areas. For sporting activities, a positive individual
benefit <IB> is seen, and for public service professionals (e.g. fire fighters) both
individual and societal benefits <SB> are highly valued. Commonplace technical fa-
cilities (e.g. airports, chemical industry) are accepted as fairly beneficial as well.
The set of hazards investigated in this project was based on a taxonomy of risk
sources, allowing for the comparison of defined hazard types. The results (see
CRC-1 Country: Australia Germany New Zealand
Sub-Group :
<T> "Technological orientation" 65 40 65 170
<T-e>  Engineers 28 20 34
<T-s>  Students in techn. sciences 37 20 31
<E> "Ecological orientation" 73 40 65 178+94
<E-e>  Environmentalists 32 20 26
<E-s>  Students in (env.) psychology 41+67 20 39+27
<F> "Feminist orientation" 72 60 67 199
<F-e>  Members of fem./women groups 40 30 47
<F-s>  Students in women's studies 32 30 20
<M> "Monetarian orientation" 62 77 54 193
<M-e>  Accountants/Finance managers 33 36 26
<M-s>  Students in economics/finance 29 41 28
Sum: N = 272+67 217 251+27 834
(Not included here: "Psychology-1 students" in Switzerland, N=67)
CRC-2 "Western" countries "Eastern" countries
                                                 Australia Canada Germany      China Singapore Japan
S t u d e n t s 1024
T-s  Technology/Engineering  60  46  46  90  57  70
G-s  Geography  50  45  47  52  44  42
P-s  Psychology  60  50  58  74  52  84
S c i e n t i s t s   171
X-e  Technical & Social Sciences  33   --  84  54   --   --
Sum: N = 203 141 235 270 153 196 1195
Box 7: Project CRC: Sampling — Groups of Respondents
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Box 9, taken from the German sample) illustrates the following:
• Hazard impacts: Judgments of fatality rates are higher for risks comprising an
acute danger (i.e. accidents/catastrophes); in comparison, health impacts are
     Risk Aspect:
RM = Overall risk magnitude rating
                PD = (Assumed) Probability of dying
                        HI = (Danger of) Health impacts
                            CP = Catastrophic potential
                                  FA = Feelings of anxiety about risk
                                       IB = Individual benefit (of activity)
                                            SB = Societal benefit (of activity)
                                                 IA = Individual risk acceptance
                                                      SA = Societal risk acceptance
                                                           PR = Personal rel. to risk
                                                                 DM = Desire to move
RM  PD  HI  CP  FA  IB  SB  IA  SA  PR  DM
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard:
 A  6.0 3.5 2.9     6.6 7.4 2.2 7.8 6.2 3.2 Parachuting
 B  6.6 4.1 3.9     5.9 7.4 2.5 7.6 5.7 2.5 Car racing
 C  5.2 2.5 3.3     4.9 7.5 2.6 8.0 6.7 3.5 Skiing
 D  8.3 5.4 7.4     7.9 3.2 3.3 3.5 2.6 1.1 Asbestos production
 E  5.8 2.7 4.9     4.8 5.5 7.2 5.4 6.8 2.1 X-ray lab
 F  5.8 2.3 5.4     5.0 3.9 5.5 4.9 5.6 2.3 Compressor tools
 G  8.9 6.4 8.5     8.4 2.8 0.9 5.2 1.4 4.2 Smoking
 H  8.1 5.2 7.5     8.0 2.9 1.6 5.0 2.0 2.4 Tranquilizers
 I  7.6 5.0 7.2     6.4 3.2 1.6 5.7 3.0 4.6 Overeating
 K  6.3 3.7 4.7     5.8 7.1 8.6 6.7 8.5 1.9 Fire fighter
 L  6.1 3.6 4.7     5.7 4.9 5.7 5.7 5.8 1.2 Blaster
 M  5.5 3.9 3.4     5.6 8.0 8.7 7.0 8.8 1.3 Emerg. helicopter
 N  4.7 2.2 4.3 4.1 4.2     5.9 4.6 4.9 2.2 5.7 Coal power plant
 O  4.9 2.2 4.3 4.3 4.4     6.5 4.6 4.8 1.6 6.1 Metal production
 P  4.6 1.7 3.6 5.1 4.5     7.1 5.2 5.2 2.8 6.8 Airport
 Q  6.8 3.6 3.1 5.4 5.8         5.2 3.9 1.2 6.6 Avalanche area
 R  6.3 3.1 2.9 7.0 5.2         5.7 4.9 5.3 5.3 Earthquake area
 S  4.8 2.5 2.6 3.9 4.0         6.0 5.5 2.2 4.4 Electric storms area
 T  6.1 3.1 3.4 6.0 6.0     3.7 4.0 3.4 0.9 6.9 Explosives factory
 U  7.7 4.0 5.5 9.1 8.3     3.7 3.2 2.3 1.0 8.8 Nuclear power plant
 V  6.6 3.3 4.8 6.9 6.6     6.0 3.8 3.5 1.6 7.6 Chemical industry
 W  7.2 3.6 6.3 6.4 6.9         3.9 3.0 3.5 8.2 Polluted urban area
 X  6.5 3.2 5.8 5.5 6.2         4.6 3.8 2.8 7.6 Unhealthy climate
 Y  6.9 3.5 5.6 5.9 6.4         4.3 3.4 1.4 7.2 Natural radiation
--------------------------------------------------------------------
6.4 3.5 4.8 5.8 6.0 5.3 4.6 5.3 4.7 2.4 6.8 (Mean, all hazards)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
 NOTES:
 N=278 respondents (N=224 for variables PR and DM). Empty cells: n/a
Box 8: Hazard Appraisal: Means for 24 Hazards & 11 Risk Aspects
Data: NZ
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judged higher for chronic risk exposure.
• Benefits: for both occupational and private risky behaviours, people perceive
benefits for themselves (even smoking or working with dangerous tools);
however, benefits for the society relate to occupational activities only.
• Acceptance: Individual risk acceptance tends to be higher for private activities
(e.g. sport or consumption risks), societal risk acceptance clearly is higher for
occupational hazards. Regarding residential environmental risks, risk accep-
tance is higher for natural hazards from both a societal and an individual
perspective. On average, risky activities are more accepted than risks related
to residential hazards — voluntariness might be the crucial factor for this
difference.
Differences in risk magnitude are small and were neither expected nor even in-
tended, given the selection rationale for the risk sources considered in this project.
What determines whether risk sources are accepted or not? The principal model
assumes that acceptance is decreased by risk magnitude and increased by ben-
efits associated with the risk source, and that attitudes and ‘worldviews’ people
held are co-determinants (‘moderators’) of this judgmental process. Conceptions
like this can be analysed by multiple regression and especially structural/causal
modelling, e.g. the LISREL approach (Joereskog and Soerbom, 1988). Its purpose
is to identify ‘linear structural relationships’ among constructs on the basis of a
hypothesised theoretical model. One such analysis is shown in Box 10 (source:
Rohrmann 1994). It was computed with both Australian and German data (cf.
values on the right and the left in the graph).
This model was developed by introducing overarching constructs (namely, ‘ad-
verse impacts’ with probability of dying <PD> and concern about health impacts
<HI>) as indicators, and ‘risk as threat’ (determined by risk magnitude <RM>, fear
              Type:        Kind of Hazard    Effect      Activities   Env. Cond.
                           Act. Env.Cond. Acute Chronic Priv. Occup. Nat. Technol.
              n =            12     12     12     12     6      6      6      6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
N=217; * indicates significant difference; "n=" number of hazards for that type;
Hazards: "Act." = activities, "Env.Cond." = environmental conditions
Risk Aspect:
PD Probability of Dying                   2.7 *  2.4
HI Health Impacts                         4.4  * 4.9
IA Indiv. Risk Acceptance   5.8 *  4.4                  6.4 *  5.4    5.1 *  3.7
SA Societal Risk Accept.    4.9 *  4.6                  3.2  * 6.6    5.0 *  4.1
IB Individual Benefit                                   6.1 *  5.6
SB Societal Benefit                                     1.3  * 6.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Box 9: Mean Judgements for Different Types of Risk
German
Data
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associations <FA> and catastrophic potential <CP>); these variables represent the
negative evaluation of hazards. Societal risk acceptance <SA> is introduced as a
final dependent variable. In terms of risk sources, six technological hazards N/O/
P/T/U/V (cf. Box 8) are used and aggregated into sum variables. The result is well
in line with the basic claims of the project’s theoretical framework and it particu-
larly affirms the significance of the ‘threat’ aspect in risk perception.
This model also demonstrates the considerable influence of ecological attitudes,
here measured as a composite of environmental concern <AEC>, worry about the
impacts of technology <AIT> and ‘post-material’ societal values <ASV>: the stronger
these attitudes, the more likely technological hazards are seen as threats and the
less likely are benefits associated.
Together these findings elucidate the socio-psychological factors contributing to
the ‘intuitive’ risk concept which people use for risk evaluations and their signifi-
cance for risk acceptance.
Differences between societal groups
The sampling approach of this project is based on the assumption that people
with a specific professional and/or ideological background ‘worldviews’ or ‘cul-
tural biases’ (cf. Dake, 1991; Thompson 1990) differ in their evaluation of risks. A
comparison of the respective subgroups (cf. Box 7, above) confirms this expecta-
tion. The findings for the countries included in project CRC-1 (NZ, Australia, Ger-
many) are similar and can be summarised as follows:
Box 10: Evaluation of Environmental Hazards: Structural Analysis
PD* HI* RM* CP* FA*
AEC
AIT
ASW
SB*
SA*
ADVERSE
IMPACTS
RISK AS
THREAT
ECOLOG.
ATTITUDE
BENEFIT
OF
TECHN.
RISK
ACCEPT-
ANCE
LISREL analysis
10 variables based on
sources NOPTUV
N = 80/129 cases
(FRG/AUS)
69   79 96   94 81   80 61   60 71   86
57
71
95
84
84
86
74
69
62   57
59
41
57
84
73
82
100
100
-68
-58
32
30
-62
-27
29
40 100   100
Goodness of fit:
.92/.91
x (r - r) = .04/.06
residual value
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People with an ‘ecological orientation’ as well as those involved in ‘feminist’
issues evaluate risks much more critically than the other two groups. For ex-
ample, for most risk sources, their ratings on all riskiness scales <RM, PD, HI, CP>
and feelings of anxiety <FA> are higher, while benefit judgments <IB, SB> and risk
acceptance <IA, SA> are lower. By comparison, those with a ‘technological orienta-
tion’ show the lowest risk ratings, see more benefits and are more ready to accept
risks. The judgments of the ‘monetarian’ group fall in between the extremes.
This pattern is most obvious for technology-induced risks, as shown in Box 11.
The largest group differences occur with ‘living near a nuclear power plant’ or
‘chemical industry’, which in fact are the most debated large-scale technologies
anyway.
There are some interesting exceptions to the general pattern. For example, with
respect to ‘consumption risks’ such as smoking, tranquillisers and overeating,
engineers and technology students give the lowest acceptance ratings while the
‘monetarian’ and ‘feminist’ groups yield surprisingly high scores.
Group differences with respect to employees vs students were also analysed. The
effects were smaller than expected and insignificant for most risk sources and risk
aspects; therefore the groups were pooled.
In sub-project CRC-2, significant group differences were found too, but they are
less clear-cut. It appears that ‘geography’ students are the most and ‘technology’
students the least concerned about environmental hazards. Individual risk accep-
tance is lower for the ‘scientists’ group than for students; this is strongest for
‘lifestyle’ risks.
Altogether the societal groups looked at in this research differ considerably and
systematically in their risk perception. Interestingly, at least for the three coun-
tries looked at in project CRC-1, disparities between societal groups tend to be
stronger than cross-national differences, particularly regarding technology-induced
risks. This is in line with the strong influence of environmental and societal
attitudes on risk acceptance shown above (Box 10).
Cross-national differences
A cross-national comparison for the three countries from project CRC-1 is given in
Box 12, containing mean judgments for risk aspects. Significant differences in-
clude: NZ and Australian respondents reveal more acceptance <IA, SA> for sport-
related risks (e.g. car racing or skiing) and unhealthy private behaviours (e.g.
smoking, overeating) and they give lower risk ratings <RM, PD, HI, CP> for ‘con-
ventional’ technologies (e.g. airports, coal power plants). In contrast, risk-ex-
posed occupations even those of high social benefit <SB>, (e.g. fire fighting,
environmental pollution and large-scale technology such as nuclear energy) get
more negative evaluations than from the German respondents. However, given
the highly critical views on nuclear power in Australia and especially NZ, the latter
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Groups: T = ‘Technological’; M = ‘Monetarian’; E = ‘Ecological’; F = ‘Feminist’
N = 40 + 77 + 40 + 60 = 217 respondents
Living near
P  Large airport
T  Explosives factory
O  Metal production
V  Chemical industry
N  Coal power plant
U  Nuclear power plant
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RM  Risk Magnitude
T M E F
Living near
P  Large airport
T  Explosives factory
O  Metal production
V  Chemical industry
N  Coal power plant
U  Nuclear power plant
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SB  Societal Benefit
TMEF
Living near
P  Large airport
T  Explosives factory
O  Metal production
V  Chemical industry
N  Coal power plant
U  Nuclear power plant
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
IA  Individual Risk Acceptance
TME F
Box 11: Ratings for Technological Hazards by Different
Groups — German Data
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difference is not as large as expected.
The results from NZ and AUS are much the same, apart from some disparities
regarding earthquakes, a hazard more familiar to New Zealanders.
For results from sub-project CRC-2, a comparison of risk perception in ‘Western’
and ‘Eastern’ countries (see Rohrmann, 1999); as expected, differences are con-
siderably larger than those among the three countries included in Box 12.
A further issue for cross-national studies is to analyse whether the described
disparities between societal groups are valid across countries. Respective com-
    RM   SB      IA
Overall Risk Societal Individual Risk
   Magnitude Benefit    Acceptance
GER AUS NZL  GER AUS NZL  GER AUS NZL
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard:
A 5.5 6.5 6.0 1.2 2.2 2.2 7.2 7.5 7.7 Parachuting
B 7.5 6.9 6.6 1.4 2.7 2.4 6.3 7.4 7.6 Car racing
C 5.4 5.4 5.1 1.7 3.0 2.6 7.2 7.8 8.0 Skiing
D 8.2 8.6 8.3 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.5 Asbestos production
E 6.3 6.1 5.7 7.2 7.2 7.3 5.3 5.0 5.4 X-ray lab work
F 6.7 5.9 5.9 5.4 6.0 5.6 4.1 4.9 4.9 Compressor tools
G 8.4 9.0 8.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 4.3 5.2 5.2 Smoking
H 8.2 8.0 8.0 1.1 1.6 1.6 4.0 4.9 5.0 Tranquilizers
I 7.6 7.4 7.6 1.3 1.4 1.5 4.5 5.6 5.6 Overeating
K 4.8 6.1 6.3 8.9 8.7 8.7 7.9 6.6 6.7 Fire fighter
L 4.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.6 5.7 Blaster
M 4.1 5.2 5.6 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.2 6.9 7.0 Emerg. helicopter
N 5.9 5.6 4.7 6.6 6.3 6.0 4.0 4.3 4.5 Coal power plant
O 5.9 5.6 4.9 7.2 6.8 6.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 Metal production
P 5.8 4.3 4.7 6.6 7.1 7.0 3.7 4.9 5.0 Airport
Q 5.8 7.0 6.7       4.8 5.1 5.2 Avalanche area
R 6.3 6.8 6.1       4.8 5.1 5.7 Earthquake area
S 3.1 4.5 4.7       7.1 6.1 6.0 Electr. storms area
T 5.3 5.8 6.1 4.0 4.4 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.9 Explosive factory
U 6.8 7.6 7.6 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.1 Nuclear power plant
V 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.4 5.9 6.1 3.4 3.6 3.8 Chemical industry
W 6.8 6.6 7.3 3.6 4.5 3.8 Polluted urban area
X 5.4 5.8 6.6     5.1 5.1 4.6 Unhealthy climate
Y 5.3 6.7 6.8     5.2 4.6 4.3 Natural radiation
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
6.1 6.4 6.4 4.6 4.8 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.3 (Mean, 24 hazards)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
GER=Germany, AUS=Australia, NZL=New Zealand; N=217/272/224. Data based
on overall samples (i.e., sub-groups merged). For results of significance
tests for countries cf. Rohrmann 1994.
Box 12: Hazard Appraisal: Cross-national Comparison for 3 Risk Aspects
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parative tables cannot be included here, but the findings indicate this:
• the ‘pattern’ of disparities between groups with a ‘technological’ or ‘monetarian’
versus ‘ecological’ or ‘feminist’ orientation’ is quite similar;
• inter-group differences are stronger for the German data, while group polarisa-
tion is lower for the Australian and NZ groups.
Altogether the cross-cultural differences found in this project form a rather com-
plex pattern, reflecting interplay of group attitudes, national idiosyncrasies and
cultural factors in general.
Integration and Application
After twenty years of intensive research, risk perception can be seen as a ‘mature’
field (Fischhoff, 1995; Renn, 1998; Rohrmann, 1999). The rich body of findings has
many implications for other areas as well, especially for risk information and
management.
A structural model of the subjective evaluation of risks
Numerous psychological and sociological studies on the factors underlying risk
perception have clarified that a multitude of factors influence how humans per-
ceive, evaluate and handle risks. In Box 13 the relevant findings — particularly
those from structural/causal modelling — are ‘condensed’ into an influence dia-
gram adapted from Rohrmann 1995.
The structure shown in this model is gained from analyses using a variety of risk
sources and populations. The principal message of this model is that neither
perceived risk magnitude nor acceptance of risks — the two core issues of risk
perception — can be sufficiently explained by quantitative features such as event
probabilities or expected damage.
However, for specific risks and social groups the result could be quite different.
For example, a variable such as ‘catastrophic potential’ seems to be relevant
mainly for risks beyond individual control while ‘probability of dying’ might be
considered for personal voluntary activities, general value orientations, particu-
larly influence judgments of technology-induced hazards, while risk-taking pro-
pensity is most pertinent in financial risks contexts, and so on. Indeed, each
individual may have a personal influence pattern for the relevance of variables in
this model. This begins with the intuitive risk definition a person employs and
ends with the importance of societal attitudes not specific to the risk source.
The meaning of risk perception findings
The studies presented here have explicated the socio-psychological and culture-
bound quality of risk evaluations. How the magnitude of risks is rated, and to
what extent people are prepared to accept a risk, are dependent on the type of
hazard, on personal experiences, beliefs and attitudes, and on diverse societal
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influences. Judgments are more negative for technology-induced hazards than for
natural ones, and for involuntary rather than self-chosen (controllable) risk expo-
sure. While individual, and particularly societal benefits, counterbalance risk con-
cerns for occupational and private risks, this is less true for large-scale technol-
ogy risks. Fear associations, unfamiliarity, catastrophic potential and worry about
long-term health impacts are stronger influences than fatality statistics. Scepti-
cism about complex mega-technologies (such as nuclear power) can become part
of a country’s cultural identity.
Clearly, statistical risk characteristics cannot explain risk acceptance data. As has
been discussed by various psychologists, sociologists and some engineers as
well (e.g. Jungermann and Slovic, 1993; Lopes, 1992; Morgan, 1993; Renn, 1998;
Rohrmann, 1995; Tweeddale, 1994) the ‘technical’/‘quantitative’ approach of risk
analysis is inadequate to reflect the complex pattern of individual risk evalua-
tions. The way humans think about the magnitude and the acceptability of risks,
and the way in which they make their respective judgments and decisions is
influenced by a variety of ‘qualitative’ consequences of risky activities or living
conditions that are not reflected in hazard scenarios, accident probabilities, death
rates and so on. As people’s attitudes towards risks are embedded in a wider
cultural and political context, societal sub-groups differ widely in their risk evalu-
ation. Also, acceptance or defiance of risks is not determined by knowledge (or
lack thereof ) — value disparities are the key factor (cf. also Dake, 1991; Peters
and Slovic, 1996; Stern and Dietz, 1994).
Risk
Behaviour
Risk
Magnitude
Appraisal
Risk
Acceptance
Probability of Dying
Health Impairments
Harm to Assets
Catastrophic Potential
Delayed/Future Impacts
Eco-centric Worldview
Technology Skepticism
Safety Culture Benefit for One-self
Societal Benefit
Safety & Risk:
Cultural
Traditions
Individual
Situation &
Characteristics
Affective Associations
Reasons of Exposure
Exposure/Impact History
Controllability Beliefs
Attitude to
Risk-taking
Individual Context
Societal & Cultural Context
Box 13: Subjective Evaluation of Risks: Structural Model
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How did such a situation evolve, and why have so many people strong views on
risks even if they never personally encountered the respective hazards? To under-
stand the complex picture of risk perception, both psychological and social pro-
cesses need to be considered. In a theoretical framework developed by Kasperson
et al., 1988, the “social amplification of risks” is seen as a core phenomenon.
They particularly stress the influence of factors such as political/environmental
movements or media coverage, which either intensify or attenuate the perception
and interpretation of risk-related events. The enormous, but quite selective, pub-
lic attention paid to some risks over the last decade is indeed salient. As all
individuals are part of social ‘arenas’ (Renn, 1992b) they will inevitably be influ-
enced by current societal debates (Beck, 1992).
Furthermore, individual styles in judgment and decision making need to be seen
as culture-bound as well (Sjoeberg, 1999; Trimpop, 1994; Weber and Hsee, 2000).
The significance of personal characteristics such as risk-taking versus avoidance,
‘rationality’, and group adherence differs considerably across the cultures in-
cluded in risk perception studies so far — in this respect risk perception research
is rather at its beginning.
The relevance of risk perception for risk communication
Risk perception research is not just an academic enterprise — its findings are of
substantial value for many tasks of risk communication — a social process by
which people become informed about hazards, are influenced towards behavioural
change and can participate in decision-making about risk issues. In Box 14, main
reasons for utilising knowledge about risk perception are summarised.
Socio-psychological expertise on risk judgments and acceptance of risks is par-
ticularly relevant for a better understanding of conflicts about risk evaluation and
can be applied to improving communication among the various parties involved
in risk issues (Covello et al., 1989; Fischhoff et al., 1997; Kasperson and Stallen,
1990; Lundgren and McMakin, 1998). Interactive communication and co-operative
conflict resolution must be based on mutual knowledge and acceptance of the
Findings about socio-psychological risk perception processes are relevant for:
> analysing discrepancies between statistical risk data and subjective judgments
> understanding the influence of professional and societal orientations ('worldviews')
> clarifying the roots of controversies about risky technologies
> identifying core needs for risk communication and disaster preparedness programs
> designing risk information in line with people's thinking about hazards
> recognising reasons for shortcomings of safety campaigns
> considering cultural differences in conceptualising and conducting risk communication
Box 14: Utility of Perception Research
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actor’s way of thinking about risk (Renn, 1992b) Rohrmann, 1991; Sjoeberg, 1998).
Finally, the increasingly cross-cultural nature of risk perception research — pro-
viding knowledge about universal and culture-specific factors of subjective risk
evaluation — can help to better adapt risk communication efforts to the needs of
specific communities within their cultural context.
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4 Risk Communication and theAustralian and New Zealand Risk
Management Standard
Janet Gough
This chapter discusses the development of the Australian and New Zealand Risk
Management Standard (AS/NZS 4360: Risk Management), and notes the change
in attitude to risk communication of many of the stakeholders in the standards
development process between the mid- and late-1990s. This reflects a growing
understanding of the importance of recognising and improving risk communica-
tion practice.
Between the publication of the original Standard in 1995 and the revised version
in 1999, the committee reviewed the growing recognition of the importance of
risk communication in all forms of risk management. As a result, communication
and consultation were incorporated as an intrinsic part of each step of the pro-
cess.
Janet notes that techniques for the identification of, and communication with,
stakeholders vary according to the application and decisions about whether to
consult and who to consult must be made at an early stage, and an important
aspect of establishing the context for risk management involves the develop-
ment of a communication and consultation plan that includes principles for com-
munication. Thus, risk communication is firmly embedded as an intrinsic compo-
nent of good risk management, both for internal organisational risk manage-
ment, and processes involving external stakeholders and interested parties.
Because risk communication is a fundamental element of risk management, this
chapter again extends the context for the examples and case studies in Section
II.
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1 This section relies heavily on assistance from Professor Jean Cross, Chair of the Standards Australia and
Standards New Zealand Risk Management Committee.
Introduction
In 1992, in recognition of the growing prominence of risk management in the
early 1990s and an increasing number of organisations seeking to develop and
apply integrated risk management systems within their organisations, Standards
Australia formed a technical committee to develop a risk management standard.
Historically risk management had been compartmentalised. Organisations were
comfortable with managing financial risk, business risk, and operational risk (varying
according to their structure and purpose). However, new occupational health and
safety and environmental legislation was introducing new risks that needed dif-
ferent skills and new techniques. Developing ways of managing these new risk
areas highlighted the difficulties of fragmentation and the potential benefits to be
gained by integrating risk management.
The integration of risk management requires all people involved in managing risk
within an organisation to have a common understanding of terminology, and of
the concepts underpinning risk management. These issues were apparent to the
newly formed standards risk management technical committee (OB/7), whose
members came from a range of backgrounds including the insurance industry,
business risk management, the IT sector, Australian Customs (one of the main
sponsors), process engineering and safety science.
An additional complication was that the term ‘risk management’ was interpreted
in different ways. In the United States risk assessment and risk management were
often separated deliberately into two sequential but separate processes, ostensi-
bly to preserve the independence of the risk analysts from the decision makers.
As a result there was limited interaction between analysts and decision makers
and that at times led to incorrectly informed decisions being made, with serious
adverse consequences.
The protagonists for the American terminology argued strongly for a clear distinc-
tion between risk assessment, as the part of the process carried out by experts,
and risk management, as the part carried out by decision makers who are respon-
sible for implementing their decisions and bear responsibility for the risk. Identi-
fication of hazards and risks is seen as part of risk assessment process.
In Australia and New Zealand a more holistic approach was being adopted involv-
ing greater interaction between analysts and decision makers throughout the
combined risk management process of assessing (estimating) risk and establish-
ing procedures for controlling risks.
The development of AS/NZS 4360: Risk management1
Given the problem of addressing established preconceptions about what risk
management was, the committee decided to start from the beginning and exam-
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ine the potential building blocks that could be used to develop a process frame-
work.
Three elements were agreed as shown in Figure 1:
• identify risks;
• assess risks; and
• control risks.
Once agreement had been reached as to the initial framework, each of these
steps was defined and expanded out. At this point it became apparent that the
word ‘control’ meant different things to different people. To safety experts, con-
trol meant reduce risk, financial specialists included insurance as a means of risk
control, and health and environment practitioners preferred to use the word ‘man-
age’ instead of ‘control’.
The committee did not want to perpetuate the use of the word risk management
to mean both the whole process and the subset of the process carried out by
decision makers and wished to have a universal terminology which could be
applied to all risk. Therefore it was decided to introduce a new word ‘treat’ that
had not previously been used in this context. Thus the process became identify,
assess, and treat risks2.
The rationale behind the separation between risk assessment and risk manage-
ment in the United States approach was recognised as a perceived need to sepa-
rate an objective analytical phase from a subjective decision process where addi-
tional factors might be introduced. This was achieved within the Standard pro-
cess by separating risk assessment into two steps — risk analysis and risk evalu-
ation. Risk analysis provides estimates for the two elements of risk, likelihood,
and magnitude of consequence, and allows risks to be ordered. Risk evaluation is
where risks are compared against the predetermined criteria to determine whether
they are deemed acceptable or whether they require ‘treatment’.
Figure 2 shows the next evolution in the development.
IDENTIFY
ASSESS RISKS
CONTROL RISKS
Figure 1: Basic building blocks
2 Use of the term ‘treat’ has caused some problems with health risk managers, but the British National Health
Service has since adopted the standard, and accepted the terminology.
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All members of the committee agreed that monitoring and feedback was seen as
an intrinsic part of each step of the process, as well as being used as part of the
iterative process, and this was introduced as a ‘sidebar’ with interactive links to
each step.
An essential element of any systems process involves scoping the issues to be
addressed, defining the problem, setting the boundaries for analysis, and estab-
lishing a basis for decisions. Before starting to identify risks a considerable amount
of background work is required. This includes gathering information about the
activity or the organisation and the relevant stakeholders and interest parties.
Risks may be affected by outside influences, for example legislation, government
policy and natural events. Basic criteria for determining whether risks are going
to be acceptable or not should be developed at this stage, although subse-
quently they may be modified. This is necessary so that the identification and
assessment produces information of a type and in a form that is consistent with
the criteria. To emphasise the importance of this implicit step, a new explicit step
entitled ‘establish the context’ was included.
By the time New Zealand members attended committee meetings in early 1994
(some New Zealand members had corresponded prior to this time), the formal
process had been agreed. Early contribution from the New Zealand members
therefore concentrated on ensuring that the terminology of the standard was
reasonably consistent with, or at least able to be reconciled with, our particular
interests. After the normal Standards review processes, AS/NZS4360: risk man-
agement, was published in November 1995 (see Figure 3).
Treat Risks
Identify Risks
Analyse Risks
Evaluate Risks
R
is
k
A
ss
es
sm
en
t
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Figure 2: Risk management as overarching concept
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Supplementary guidance
Prior to the publication of the Standard in 1995 it had been recognised that while
the standard was a useful generic guide, people working in specific technical areas
were going to need additional guidance to assist them in implementing the stan-
dard.
A number of working parties or subcommittees of the risk management technical
committee were established and tasked with preparing sector specific guidelines
or handbooks. The core members of these committees were members of the risk
management committee, but in addition new experts were invited to join the
working groups.
At February 2003, nine guides based on AS/NZS 4360 have been published:
• A basic introduction to managing risk (SAA HB 142: 1999);
• Guidelines for managing risk in the Australian and New Zealand Public Sector
(SAA/NZS HB 143: 1999);
• Risk Financing (SAA HB 141: 1999);
• Environmental risk management: principles and processes (SAA HB 203: 2000);
• Information security risk management guidelines (HB 231: 2000);
• Guidelines for managing risk in outsourcing (HB 240: 2000);
• Organisational experiences in implementing risk management practices (HB
250: 2000);
• Guidelines for managing risk in the healthcare sector (SAA/SNZ HB 228:2001);
and
• Guidelines for managing risk in sport and recreation (SAA HB 246:2002).
Establish the Context
Identify Risks
Analyse risks
Evaluate and Rank Risks
Treat Risks
Monitor
and
Review
As
se
ss
R
is
ks
Figure 3: AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management (1995)
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One more is in press:
• Business Continuity Management.
While a further two are still with committees:
• Occupational safety and health; and
• Assurance and Governance.
Two further publications that are related to 4360 are:
• Risk Management for Local Government (SNZ 2000) — published by Stan-
dards New Zealand but without reference to the Standards committee, and
not endorsed by it.
• Emergency risk management: applications guide — reviewed and endorsed by
the risk management standard committee, and published by Emergency Man-
agement Australia.
Environmental risk management: principles and process
As part of the process of developing sector specific guidelines, in 1996 Standards
Australia established a separate environmental risk management committee to
provide a link between risk management and environmental management sys-
tems (EMS). This committee was tasked with preparing a guide or handbook on
environmental risk management that was consistent with the EMS procedures
currently in place under the ISO14000 series of standards.
A first full draft of the handbook was presented to a workshop in Melbourne in
July 1998. This workshop, which was sponsored by Standards Australia, the Envi-
ronment Institute of Australia, the CSIRO, the Australian Mineral and Energy Envi-
ronment Foundation, the Minerals Council of Australia and the Australian Cham-
ber of Manufacturers, was attended by over 200 people who provided valuable
feedback on the expectations of the intended audience. Additional changes were
required as a result of the revision of AS/NZS 4360 in 1999, and the guide was
published in mid 2000 as AS HB 203 Environmental Risk Management: Principles
and Process.
The stated purpose of the guide is to inform individuals and organisations about
environmental risk management, and to provide them with a process for manag-
ing the risk to the environment. Specifically, it can be used to assist in implement-
ing an environmental risk management programme based on AS/NZS 4360.
Some of the particular activities it can support are the development of a frame-
work for strategic planning and decision-making, and the implementation of en-
vironmental risk management at operational and strategic levels. It also provides
tools to help organisations improve their environmental management by identify-
ing areas of environmental risk within an organisation and evaluating the poten-
tial environmental effects of proposed or existing projects, programmes, and
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policies. In this way it can be used as a formal tool within an organisation’s
environmental management system.
Communication and consultation
While the handbooks were being developed the technical committee continued
to meet regularly to discuss further developments to the standard in light of the
experience rapidly being gained by organisations as the standard was adopted
and implemented.
There were three main areas where modification of the standard was deemed
necessary3. First of all it had quickly become apparent that the diagram of the
risk management process was not complete. All handbooks needed to stress the
importance of communication and consultation4, which had not been addressed
adequately in the 1995 version of the Standard.
Secondly, while risk management was readily accepted as a process, the commit-
tee recognised that for integrated risk management to be effective, risk manage-
ment should also be viewed as a ‘culture’ within an organisation. Thirdly, discus-
sion with users and feedback from interested parties demonstrated that the com-
mittee needed to review some of the terminology and techniques described.
Of concern also as the fact that while the committee had been careful to include
examples of techniques and tools in the Appendices of the standard, rather than
in the body of the standard, thus implying that there is not necessarily one ‘right
way’, many organisations had simply used elements such as the risk register and
the tables illustrating qualitative risk applications without modifying them to suit
their own specific requirements.
In 1999 the revised version of the standard was published. Aside from reasonably
minor terminology modifications, and some areas of elaboration, the two main
changes were:
• the definition of risk management was restated as “the culture, processes and
structures that are directed to the effective management of potential opportu-
nities and adverse effects”, and the original definition of risk management as
“the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices
to the tasks of establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating,
treating, monitoring [and communicating5] risk” was used as a definition for
the risk management process; and
• communication and consultation were included as integral components of the
process.
The essential element remains that risk management is both a formal process
3 Some minor changes in terminology had been adopted in 1996 and published as ‘amendments’.
4 The inclusion of communication and consultation as a formal step in the process was initially proposed and
promoted by the Environmental Risk management Committee.
5 Added during the 1999 revision.
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and a culture of thinking what if and being attuned to potential risks and oppor-
tunities.
While the impetus for explicit inclusion of communication and consultation as
part of the risk management process came initially from the environmental risk
management group, and was reflected in the environmental guide, the members
of the technical committee had also recognised that was a significant gap in the
standards process. Thus the framework diagram was modified to include a new
sidebar to the process, equivalent to the ‘monitor and review’ step, as shown in
Figure 4.
In the early stages of consideration of communication of risk a number of con-
cerns had been raised abut the implications of formal and explicit consideration
of communication and consultation. These could be summarised as:
• organisations will not always want to communicate with the public;
• legal implications;
• definition of interested parties and stakeholders; and
• communication and consultation is expensive and may not provide value.
It was agreed that organisations may not always want to communicate with the
public for a variety of reasons including commercial secrecy. In addition, there
may be other situations where full disclosure may not be appropriate for legal
reasons. These two issues are valid reasons for organisations not to want to
consult and communicate. It can be difficult to define interested parties and
stakeholders, and it may also be expensive to undertake consultation.
However, before an organisation implements an environmental risk management
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Figure 4: Risk Management (AS/NZS 4360: 1999)
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programme it should consider the purpose of the risk management process being
undertaken, the stakeholders and their likely interests, whether non-disclosure is
likely to have adverse effects on the organisation, and whether value might be
added by a targeted process of communication and consultation. In other words,
the organisation should prepare a communication plan
Specifically the communication plan should include:
• why communication and consultation are required (set objectives at organisa-
tional and project level);
• whether communication and consultation are to be internal, external or both;
• who is going to be involved;
• when the different parties are going to be involved;
• what is to be the subject of the communication and consultation; and
• how the process is to be undertaken throughout the risk management cycle.
Some of the common objectives of risk communication are to:
• improve the efficiency of risk decisions — what this really means to help
ensure that risk decisions ‘stick’ or that the control or treatment procedures
that are put in place are adhered to;
• provide risk managers with a means of involving affected (interested) parties;
• promote channels of communication between parties to minimise conflict;
• help establish and convey a richer of risk characteristics; and
• identify and facilitate compromises.
For example, the specific objectives of communication and consultation within
the environmental risk management process are to:
• ensure that appropriate internal and external communication and consultation
systems are considered and developed;
• assist in identifying stakeholders and interested parties, and to provide the
organisation with information about their expectations;
• identify clearly the roles and responsibilities of the organisation and its staff
for communication and consultation; and
• avoid business risk.
Good internal communication is part of good management and can enhance
productivity and minimise errors through ensuring that key staff understand the
purpose of guidelines and assignments.
External risk communication can improve community understanding and aware-
ness of an organisation’s environmental activities. It is part of good practice and
helps an organisation to fulfil its legislative responsibilities, provide due diligence
and obtain necessary permits.
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Implementing communication and consultation within a risk management
framework
Effective internal and external communication is important to ensure that those
responsible for implementing risk management, and those with a vested interest
understand the basis on which decisions are made and why particular actions are
required. While external communication may not always be required, it is impor-
tant to at least consider whether it is relevant, and to make a conscious decision
as to whether to communicate or not.
Perceptions of risk can vary due to differences in assumptions and concepts and
the needs, issues and concerns of stakeholders as they relate to the risk or the
issues under discussion. Stakeholders are likely to make judgements of the ac-
ceptability of a risk based on their perception of risk. Since stakeholders can
have a significant impact on the decisions made it is important that their percep-
tions of risk, as well as their perceptions of benefits, be identified and docu-
mented and the underlying reasons for them understood and addressed.
The inclusion of communication and consultation requires consideration and iden-
tification of interested parties and stakeholders as part of establishing the con-
text for risk management. Initially it may be useful to undertake a scoping exer-
cise that looks at interested parties in broad sense, before refining the set of
stakeholders at a later stage. Stakeholders may include user interests, as well as
community groups and individuals. In environmental risk management groups
such as future generations, native flora and fauna, and ecosystems may be in-
cluded as interested parties or stakeholders. The term ‘interested parties’ is often
considered to encompass a wider group than stakeholders. Differentiation be-
tween interested parties and stakeholders may be used to define different levels
for communication and consultation.
A common technique used for risk identification is brainstorming, often with a
wide range of participants. In some cases the inclusion of representatives from
stakeholder groups may enhance the risk identification process.
It can be difficult to communicate the results of quantitative analysis to stake-
holders. If people are involved throughout the process it can help them under-
stand the outcomes of complex analyses. Where appropriate, stakeholder assis-
tance can be sought in designing plans for communication and consultation to
ensure that information is relevant, appropriately presented, and timely.
Proposals for future developments
The SA/SNZ technical committee on risk management is continuing to meet on a
regular basis and to use its collective experience to identify areas of improvement
to the standard. In this way the standard itself is subject to a rigorous process of
risk management.
At present the standard is being implemented by a wide range of groups from
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different disciplines, and is being applied in many different circumstances. Over
time more guidance documents will be developed. A key area noted as requiring
attention is the preparation of a set of best practice case studies with commen-
tary and evaluation. The emphasis for these case studies will be on demonstrat-
ing the advantages and limitations of particular approaches applied in different
circumstances. The intention will be not to provide a cookbook, but to illustrate
ways of evaluating risk management to assist in continuous improvement of
processes and practices.
Standards are reviewed and revised on a five yearly cycle, and at February 2003,
the process of revising the base document AS/NZS 4360: risk management itself
has commenced. A revised draft will be circulated to stakeholders for comment
from March 2003, with a new version to be voted in later in the year.
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In this chapter, John presents material from work undertaken by three of the
major consultants in the United States working in the risk communication area in
the late 80s and early 90s. Each of these three original presenters developed a
particular set of rules, pointers or precepts that provide founding guidelines for
risk communication practitioners. There are obvious synergies among these dif-
ferent strategies, not least because they are for the most part derived from risk
perception research, or the theoretical and analytical work of academics, intro-
duced in Chapter 3.
The basic premise is that risk communication is the process of communicating
responsibly and effectively about risk factors associated with industrial technolo-
gies, natural hazards, and human activities. These communication responsibili-
ties arise for all those who are developers and managers of industry and techno-
logical change, as well as those who oversee health and environmental manage-
ment. Risk communication is about bridging the gap between experts and lay-
people. In fact, everyone in society faces a vast array of risks every day and,
often subconsciously, makes trade-offs regarding the acceptability of each risk.
People, understandably, have an aversion to admitting that they do indeed
tolerate various levels of risk for themselves and their children. To the public it
matters greatly whether or not one is exposed voluntarily or involuntarily to
risks. Good risk communication practice seeks to address the division between
experts and the public. The three specialists, whose work is featured in this
paper, each provide guidelines for facilitating this process.
Business needs to spend more time and resources on developing sound risk
communication practices. Not to do so represents a business risk. In essence,
this requires the promotion of a reasoned dialogue among stakeholders on the
nature of relevant risk factors and acceptable risk management strategies.
John emphasises that risk communication should become an integral part of the
risk management process. Informed public understanding of risk factors is the
key to achieving board support for and trust in risk management strategies, and
this in turn requires good risk communication practice.
This Chapter helps to demonstrate the links between theoretical developments
and practical applications by expounding the principles that the three consult-
ants have derived from the research undertaken by different specialists, and
which they are promoting in the development of guidelines to be applied by
organisations seeking to undertake risk communication.
Risk Communication
Strategies
John Lumsden
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Introduction
Whereas risk assessment has become an integral part of modern decision-mak-
ing, both in the public as well as in the private sector, risk communication on the
other hand has tended to either be ignored or, at best, treated as an afterthought
by many managers. Thus, while guidelines and methods on risk assessment have
flourished since the 1960s, risk communication has really only begun to receive
the attention it deserves in the past decade.
Traditionally, risk communication has been seen as the end result of the decision-
making process — the point where media, stakeholders, and the public were
informed of the outcome of an action or, perhaps, a regulatory decision.
Risk communication, thus, was often an exercise in public relations, generally
accomplished through well-crafted press releases and selected briefings to news
media, community groups and other interested parties. In most cases there was
often little involvement of scientific and technical staff and others responsible for
conducting the risk assessment.
It is probably fair to say that these past efforts were often quite successful in
informing the public and others about the general nature of problems of a less
controversial nature. But, it also seems that in the past people, outwardly at
least, more readily accepted decisions by those perceived to be respectable such
as state-owned organisations or local government. People also took much less
interest in their environment, and sustainable management hardly rated a men-
tion. In a way too, life was arguably simpler and the pace of technological change
was certainly slower. However, as the public came to question decisions on mat-
ters of interest to them and gradually became empowered, traditional communi-
cation efforts became much less effective, particularly where problems concerning
the environment, public health, or other matters of a politically-divisive or emo-
tionally-charged nature were concerned.
Risk communication is, thus, a relatively recent discipline that has developed out
of a growing need to bridge the gap between what may be a scientific and
technically-based assessment and an often uninformed public. Complicating this
is the fact that members of the public, community groups, etc., tend to perceive
risks quite differently from those conducting the risk assessments or those who
commission them. If this disparity did not exist, risk communication would be a
relatively straight-forward business.
The task for the risk communicator is to disseminate the various outcomes to an
audience that may include those with a range of agendas, abilities to understand
the information, ideologies, and sympathies.
Just as the audience can vary, so can the occasion. It might be instructing workers
about how to use equipment safely, teaching low-income families about the need
for proper nutrition or explaining the importance of water quality. In other in-
stances, there may be the need to tell people that a perceived hazard is not as
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serious as they think. Issues such as siting of cell-phone towers and landfills have
an ability to inflame public opinion even when the risk assessors declare that the
risk is very low. Another objective may be to inform people so that they will be
prepared in event of a natural disaster.
Opportunities for proper communication are thus many and varied and, in recent
years, various strategies and techniques have been developed to improve the
effectiveness by which technical and sometimes complex issues can be explained
to lay people and non-technical audiences.
Risk Communication Strategies
There are many ways in which the communication of public health, environmen-
tal, safety and hazard information can be improved. Much of the developmental
work on risk communication strategies has taken place in the USA.
This paper presents the work of three risk communication specialists who have
gained a reputation in the USA for their work in this field. The first two, Vincent
Covello and John Paling, have both developed sets of rules or guidelines for risk
communication.
Dr Covello is an internationally recognised expert in the field of risk communica-
tion and is currently serving as Director of the Center for Risk Communication in
New York City. Over the past 25 years, Dr Covello has served in numerous posi-
tions in academia and government, including Associate Professor of Environmen-
tal Sciences and Clinical Medicine at Columbia University. Prior to his joining the
Faculty at Columbia, Dr Covello was a senior scientist on detail to the White
House Council on Environmental Quality in Washington, DC; a Study Director at
the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC; Director of Risk Assessment
Programs at the National Science Foundation; and a professor at Brown Univer-
sity. He received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1976 and his MA and
BA with Honours from Cambridge University in Great Britain.
John Paling is Founder and President of The Environmental Institute and has
championed the benefits of co-operative, non-adversarial solutions to our envi-
ronmental challenges. He was a full professor, first at Oxford University, and then
at the Universities of California and Florida, and has numerous award winning
films to his credit including specials for the National Geographic Society and the
BBC. His films and wildlife documentaries have won four Emmy Awards. Now
working as a risk analyst in the States, he has formulated a Richter Scale For
Risks as a way of putting anxieties into perspective. “In order for the public to
understand the relative levels of risk, there must be some way of comparing new
levels of risk in daily life and those we are already familiar with.”
The work of Paul Sandman, the third specialist, adds a further dimension that
brings people’s perception of risk into the equation. A Rutgers University profes-
sor since 1977, Dr Sandman founded the Environmental Communication Research
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Programme at Rutgers in 1986, and was its Director until 1992. Now a full-time
consultant, Dr Sandman retains his academic affiliations as Professor of Human
Ecology at Rutgers. He received his PhD in Communication from Stanford Univer-
sity in 1971. His work is widely known and is commonly referred to in the litera-
ture.
Vincent Covello
Covello presents Seven Cardinal rules of Risk Communication. He notes that there
are no easy prescriptions for successful risk communication. His rules, which are
presented in an abbreviated form below, have been developed from the views of
those who have studied and participated in debates on the topic.
Rule 1 — Accept and Involve the Public as a Legitimate Partner
A basic tenet of risk communication in a democracy is that people and communi-
ties have a right to participate in decisions that affect their lives, their property,
and the things they value.
It is essential to demonstrate your respect for the public and underscore the
sincerity of your effort by involving the community early, before important deci-
sions are made. Involve all parties that have an interest or a stake in the issue
under consideration.
Rule 2 — Plan Carefully and Evaluate Your Efforts
Risk communication will be successful only if carefully planned.
Begin with clear, explicit risk communication objectives, such as providing infor-
mation to the public, motivating individuals to act, stimulating response to emer-
gencies, or contributing to the resolution of conflict. Evaluate the information you
have about the risks and know its strengths and weaknesses. Classify and seg-
ment the various groups in your audience. Aim your communications at specific
subgroups in your audience.
Remember that there is no such entity as ‘the public’; instead, there are many
publics, each with its own interests, needs, concerns, priorities, references and
organisations. Different risk communication goals, audience, and media may re-
quire different risk communication strategies.
Rule 3 — Listen to the Public’s Specific Concerns
If you do not listen to people, you cannot expect them to listen to you. Commu-
nication is a two-way activity.
Do not make assumptions about what people know, think, or want done about
risks. Take the time to find out what people are thinking: use techniques such as
interviews, focus groups, and surveys. Let all parties that have an interest or a
stake in the issue be heard. Identify with your audience and try to put yourself in
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their place. Recognise people’s emotions. Let people know that you understand
what they said, addressing their concerns as well as yours. Recognise the ‘hidden
agendas’,  symbolic meanings, and broader economic or political considerations
that often underlie and complicate the task of risk communication.
Rule 4 — Be Honest, Frank, and Open
In communicating risk information, trust and credibility are your most precious
assets.
State your credential, but do not ask or expect to be trusted by the public, at
least not at the outset. If you do not know an answer or are uncertain, say so. Get
back to people with answers. Admit mistakes. Disclose risk information honestly
and as soon as possible (emphasising any reservations about reliability). Do not
minimise or exaggerate the level of risk. If in doubt, lean toward sharing more
information, not less, or people may think you are hiding something. Discuss
data uncertainties, strengths and weaknesses, including the ones identified by
other credible sources. Identify worst-case estimates as such, and cite ranges of
risk estimates when appropriate.
Rule 5 — Co-ordinate and Collaborate with Other Credible Sources
Allies can be effective in helping you communicate risk information.
Take time to co-ordinate all inter-organisational and intra-organisational commu-
nications. Devote effort and resources to the slow, hard work of building bridges
with other organisations. Use credible and authoritative intermediaries. Consult
with others to determine if you or someone else are best able to answer ques-
tions about risk. Try to issue communications jointly with other trustworthy sources
(for example, credible university scientists, physicians, or trusted local officials).
Rule 6 — Meet the Needs of the Media
The media are a prime transmitter of information on risks; they play a critical role
in setting agendas and in determining outcomes.
Be open with and accessible to reporters. Respect their deadlines. Provide risk
information tailored to the needs of each type of media (for example, graphics
and other visual aids for television). Prepare in advance and provide background
material on complex risk issues. Do not hesitate to follow up on stories with
praise or criticism, as warranted. Try to establish long-term relationships of trust
with specific editors and reporters.
Remember that the media are frequently more interested in politics than in risk,
more interested in simplicity than in complexity, more interested in danger than
in safety.
Rule 7 — Speak Clearly and with Compassion
Technical language and jargon are useful as professional shorthand. But they are
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barriers to successful communication with the public.
It is preferable to use simple, non-technical language. Be sensitive to local norms,
such as speech and dress. Use vivid, concrete images that communicate on a
personal level. Use examples and anecdotes that make technical risk data come
alive. Avoid distant, abstract, unfeeling language about deaths, injuries, and ill-
nesses. Acknowledge and respond (both in words and with actions) to emotions
that people express, such as anxiety, fear, anger, outrage, and helplessness. Ac-
knowledge and respond to the distinctions that the public views as important in
evaluating risks, e.g., voluntariness, controllability, familiarity, dread, origin (natu-
ral or man-made), benefits, fairness, and catastrophic potential. Always try to
include a discussion of actions that are under way or can be taken. Promise only
what you can do, and be sure to do what you promise.
Regardless of how well you communicate risk information, some people will not
be satisfied. Never let your efforts to inform people about risks prevent you from
acknowledging, and saying, that any illness, injury or death is a tragedy. If people
are sufficiently motivated, they are quite capable of understanding complex risk
information even if they may not agree with you.
John Paling
Dr Paling provides ten ‘Pointers’ for communicating environmental, health and
safety risks to the public and the media. Although the words are different, in
essence he is really presenting much the same message as Covello, albeit in a
different manner.
1 Understand where your critics are coming from
Start by recognising that your critics are most likely energised by emotions rather
than facts. When the public believes there is a serious risk, expect that initially
the strength of their feelings will make them deaf to any discussion of figures or
statistics from business.
2 Listen
Be prepared to “Seek first to understand ... then to be understood” (Stephen
Covey). You should aim to be able to relay your understanding of your critics’
positions back to them such that they agree it correctly reflects their position.
(This does not mean you need to agree with them.)
Make a note of the specific risks and circumstances that are their main concerns
so that later you might offer to work together on getting more information from
all sides of the debate.
3 Empathise
Begin by believing that you are discussing the issues with fair-minded people
who have genuine concerns. Consider how you might feel if your child was unwell
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and you feared some business operation was causing the illness.
Be aware that there have been other businesses who have claimed that their
processes and products were safe, that there was no need to worry — and yet
events proved them wrong.
Move forward by offering to recheck and report back on all facts or concerns they
may have.
For mutual empathy to develop, both sides must be speaking the same ‘lan-
guage’.
4 Don’t tell them everything is safe
You could very well be wrong, for example, new chemicals may be interacting in
our environment to produce new poisons.
Strategically, you need to deal with your adversaries’ ‘outrage’ by offering simple
truths. Honesty and wisdom dictate that you should acknowledge that you are
aware that all industrial processes present risks to some degree and that you are
taking your responsibilities in this regard very seriously.
5 Facilitate working together to research their concerns
Build on your offer to look over the information that was at the root of the
concerns and arrange a follow up meeting to report back. Offer to show them the
safety procedures you have in place and how safety is monitored. Extend the
offer indefinitely in case they are not ready for that immediately.
Make available extra resources for additional input if necessary.
6 Offer them a way to sort out their concerns for themselves
Citizens need not feel at the mercy of businesses, politicians or environmental
activists. They can draw their own conclusions. If they wish, let them invite others
of their choosing to work with you “to establish a better understanding of the
facts.”
7 Work together to establish the ‘Home Base Zone’
As well as taking the figures in the book, work together at putting your own
figures for “risks which we are all at home with” on a blank scale. Fill in the ‘Home
Base Zone’ using figures from official sources (e.g. accident statistics) Invite your
new ‘partners’ to get independent figures from any source they choose to place
on the chart for comparison.
8 Compare the critics’ concerns with the ‘Home Base Zone’
Once citizens ‘get’ the concept of a Home Base Zone on the chart, they are
immediately interested in seeing where you believe the risks from your busi-
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nesses fall on the chart. Invite your new partners to get figures from others —
perhaps your old antagonists — and put them on the chart too. Then ask them to
discuss their findings with you so you have a fair chance to be kept in the loop.
This unusual openness has many benefits. First, it greatly diffuses suspicious
feeling towards your business since it demonstrates that you are not trying to
hide anything. Also, it allows the discussion to be focused on real issues and not
be side-tracked by emotional claims as would otherwise certainly take place.
9 Consider pro-active risk communication an investment
Recognising that good risk communication is an ongoing project which should
not be abandoned when things are going right. Plant managers wouldn’t remove
safety valves just because the equipment has not blown up over the past five
years! Take the same approach to your investment in risk communication.
Be aware that however well you present your data, your company’s credibility will
rest more on a good long-term performance record, than on any figures. Good
community relations are crucial.
10 How to handle hostile activists
In these special cases, we must recognise that when seasoned activists challenge
business, it is not always because they seek to put risks into perspective but
often it is to get a forum for their rhetoric and to recruit others to their cause.
Such people will not be ‘reasonable’ or respond to empathy, therefore a different
approach must be used.
Businesses, of course, must accept their responsibilities for how they manage
risks and must address all reasonable concerns. But now, as well as justifying
your company’s position in the traditional ways, you should challenge the activ-
ists to state what level of risk they believe they are dealing with.
Peter Sandman
Dr Sandman points out that risk communication differs from risk assessment in
that risk assessment deals with the physics and chemistry and probability of
something happening. Risk assessment defines risk as magnitude (how bad the
problem could be) times the probability (how likely it is to happen). Experts tend
to focus on this definition (let’s call it hazard), and so underestimate actual risk,
because they ignore outrage. The public tends to focus instead on outrage and
pay less attention to risk (hazard). Dr Sandman offers a new dimension to risk
communication. His thesis is that risk communication comprises two facets: ‘scar-
ing people’ and ‘calming people down’, or alerting and reassuring people.
He refers to The Four Levels of Risk Communication:
1 Stonewall Stage: No communication — ignore the public.
2 Missionary Stage: One-way communication — show the public why you are
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right and they are wrong.
3 Dialogue Stage: Two-way communication — learn from the public the ways in
which they are right and you are wrong.
4 Organisational Stage: — Internal communication — become the sort of
organisation that finds dialogue possible, even natural.
There are moderate hazards that people are apathetic about and minor hazards
that people are outraged about. Dr Sandman’s contention, for which he has be-
come well-known, is that:
Risk = Hazard + Outrage
It thus becomes important in risk communication to create a level of ‘outrage’
appropriate to the level of hazard. Public acceptability of certain risks depend
largely on the degree of their outrage. When public outrage about a perceived
risk, such as the use of certain pesticides, is very high and the actual risk, accord-
ing to experts, is low, the effectiveness of education efforts may be limited be-
cause of the defensive posture held by both parties. In this situation, educators
and scientists must acknowledge the public outrage as a component of the risk
equation. Simply acknowledging the outrage may not eliminate the concern, but
failure to validate the values and feelings of the public can lead to mistrust and
alienation.
Although Sandman’s model is simple, it is useful in gaining understanding about
why some traditional methods of educating and communicating about risks can
fail. He says “If people are outraged because they DO NOT understand the haz-
ard, educate them about the hazard. If they are outraged and DO understand the
hazard, you must address the outrage. ‘Educating the public’ is not necessarily
sufficient to deal with public outrage.
In other words, to decrease public concern about small hazards, risk managers
must work to diminish the outrage.
Components of Outrage
There are 12 principal components of  outrage in relation to risk that Dr Sandman
tells us need to be dealt with. These are the perceptions that should be ad-
dressed to lower community outrage.
1 Voluntary vs coerced
Voluntary risk is as much as three orders-of-magnitude more acceptable. The
‘right to say no’ makes the risk seem smaller. Make the risk more voluntary even
if you can’t make it completely voluntary.
2 Natural vs industrial
Natural is perceived as less risky (even when it isn’t). Don’t try to compare the
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risks you impose on people to natural risks. Natural and industrial risks are
measured on different scales. There’s a quite high radon risk in northern New
Jersey from the breakdown of uranium in the granite substrate. People there are
generally apathetic, it’s ‘natural’ radon. However, there’s a nearby township where
the houses are built on an old landfill that contains (thorium) tailings from a paint
factory. The same levels of radon in their basements, but people are upset about
it — it’s not ‘natural’ radon.
3 Familiar vs not familiar
Familiar is less risky: employees get so familiar with risk that their outrage goes
down (and sometimes so does their safety). If you can get the public familiar with
the hazard, their outrage may also go down. Use plant tours, mall displays and so
on to increase familiarity.
4 Not memorable vs memorable
Not memorable is better. How easy is it to visualise something going wrong? The
media creates memories. There are signals of risk: odours, guards, alarms, plumes,
warning signs. Signals increase memorability. So do symbols: the 55-gallon drum
is a symbol of the chemical industry, the cooling tower symbolises the nuclear
industry. The outrage is independent of the hazard (cooling towers aren’t danger-
ous) but such symbols create an emotional response (outrage) in the viewer.
5 Not dreaded vs dreaded
Not dreaded lessens outrage. HIV and cancer are the most dreaded diseases in
the United States whereas high-blood pressure is a MUCH more common risk, yet
it is difficult to arouse people’s interest in addressing that disease; versus the
much less common HIV and cancer, which present a much lower risk, but are
attended by tremendous ‘outrage’ and so get the funding, the activists, and the
interest and concern of ‘regular’ people.
It is important to acknowledge the dread. If there’s an oil spill, don’t keep talking
about how low the toxic effect will be. If people are saying “it’s disgusting”, you
must confirm their perception and agree “it’s disgusting, but the hazard is low.” If
you’re busy disagreeing with their perception, they will mistrust whatever you tell
them about the hazard. By agreeing that it’s disgusting, you change the focus
from the disgust to the hazard.
6 Chronic vs catastrophic
Chronic is perceived as less dangerous. This is why car-related deaths are con-
sider less newsworthy than aircraft-related deaths. The car deaths are spread out
over time and location. Companies too often focus on making the probability of
occurrence lower, and not on reducing the hazard. A low probability times a high
hazard will equal high outrage. You must focus on reducing the severity to lower
the perceived risk. People want the probability to be lowered, but especially the
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severity (magnitude) of the hazard reduced.
Companies must talk honestly about the worst-case scenario. This goes against
all company desires. They want to downplay the worst case because its (one
hopes) least likely. To gain the trust of the public you must address worst case.
A chemical company fought against meeting with the public and talking about the
true worst-case. Against their desires, they did it: they told the public what the
worst, worst, worst case could be, how many thousands of people would be
killed and injured and all the likely damage. The public and the activists agreed it
was the worst case, but since it was so very unlikely, they wanted to talk about
the more likely, less severe cases. Instead of mistrust and accusations of covering
up the worst possibility, the company and the public were about to work together
on the more possible cases.
7 Knowable vs unknowable
Knowable is better. The public is much less tolerant of uncertainty than are engi-
neers or scientists. The public prefers a lower ‘highest possible damage’ with a
higher likelihood of occurring to a higher ‘highest possible damage’ with a lower
likelihood of occurring. You must recognise that rationality doesn’t matter — how
the public perceives the risk is what you must address (outrage, not hazard).
Part of the ‘knowable’ component is detectability. It would be so much easier if
radioactivity was purple. At Three Mile Island (TMI), it was the first time anyone
had seen reporters hurrying a press briefing. When asked why, when the reporters
had been in wars and earthquakes and riots, they were in such a rush to get away
from TMI, a reporter said “At least in a war, you know you haven’t been hit yet.”
To address this outrage component, make the risk more detectable (if you dare).
An example is the siting of a chemical incinerator. In working with the public to
get them to accept the incinerator, the public asked the plant to put a 7-ft neon
sign on the plant roof, attached to the thermostat in the stack. As long as the
temperature stays above a certain level, the toxins would be burned and not
released. This detectability reduces outrage, and therefore reduces opposition.
8 Individually controlled vs controlled by others
Individually controlled makes people feel a sense of being safer, even if they’re
not. Consider: who implements the voluntary choice. Imagine you’re carving a
beef roast, but you’ve got no fork. You put your hand on top of the roast and start
carving. How close to t he knife do you put your hand? Now, imagine it’s a two-
person job. How close do you put your hand to the knife someone else is wield-
ing?
The public is holding the meat, the company the knife. It’s really hard to both
disempower people and reassure at the same time. The solution? Share the knife.
Share control with the public, through advisory committees, public representation
69
John Lumsden
on the board, and so on. Companies may dislike this, but they will do it because
they need to make a profit and so they need to mollify the public.
9 Fair vs unfair
The distribution of risk and benefits must be fair (or mitigated). Unfair risk is a big
risk: That is, if the people who are in jeopardy from the hazard are NOT receiving
a benefit from being near the hazard, then the outrage will be much higher (and
high outrage equals high risk).
You must find ways to make the benefit proportional to the hazard. If you cannot
make the benefit proportional, go for mitigation. Don’t just build a park for the
people affected by the hazard — ask them what they want: you’ll probably end
up building the same park, but the people will see it as mitigation (and as
company responsiveness), and not random (and unconnected) largesse. This al-
lows the company to connect fairness to individual control: if the company feels
a little blackmailed into doing something for mitigation, then they are probably
sharing control, and thus creating fairness.
10 Morally irrelevant vs morally relevant
Pollution used to be unimportant. Now, pollution is morally wrong, and polluters
are reprehensible. Once the public decides something is ‘wrong’ (morally), then
the language of trade-offs becomes insufficient. Now it’s not acceptable to pollute
only a little, you must be trying to avoid polluting at all. You may not reach zero,
but your goal must be zero. You can be right on the data (low hazard) but the
moral value prohibits acceptance.
11 Trustworthy sources vs untrustworthy sources
You need to build trust. Anytime you acknowledge a problem, you build trust. If
you deny problems, you destroy trust. While working to build trust, you must NOT
ask for it. If you ask for trust, you create mistrust.
The replacement for trust is accountability. Find ways to be accountable to regu-
lators, neighbours and activists. To increase the value of regulators, publicise
enforcement actions. Negotiate binding agreements with traditional opponents.
12 Responsive process vs unresponsive process
Responsive process has four facets:
1 Secrecy vs openness: Almost all the risk communication crises Dr Sandman
deals with are based in secrecy.
2 Acknowledging vs stonewalling on wrongdoing. A two-year-old spills juice and
says “It was an accident!” An adult spills juice and says “Oh dear, I’m so
sorry!” and the HOST says “It was an accident.” An oil company spills “juice”
and says “It was an accident!” What do you think the public says? About six
months after the Exxon Valdez (Alaska) spill, a ship carrying BP Oil ran aground
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and spilled oil at Huntington Beach (rich enclave), California. The BP CEO flew
to the spill, and had obviously planned his risk communication carefully. When
he was asked, “Whose fault was this spill?” you could see he wanted to say
“Look, it was a contract ship, with a contract crew. They spilled our oil!” But
instead he said, “My lawyers say this was not our fault, but I feel as if it were
our fault, and we will deal with it as if it were our fault.” Six months after the
spill, they polled the residents, and BP had a HIGHER approval rating than
before the spill.
3 Courtesy vs discourtesy. Even though your public may be angry and impolite,
you must never return discourtesy or you will create more outrage.
4 Compassion vs dispassion. When dealing with a situation, there comes a
point where you must stop dealing with the hazard and work with outrage.
There’s a common misperception that engineers and scientists and technolo-
gists can’t do it — they retreat further into the tech specs, rather than deal
with the emotionalism. But if an engineer’s 18-yr-old daughter comes home in
tears from college because her relationship broke up, the engineer realises
there is little point in saying “You must realise that the median teenager has
an average of 3.7 break-ups over the 4 years of college attendance.”
Seven Conclusions about Hazard and Outrage
1 The public responds more to outrage than hazard.
2 Activists and the media amplify outrage, but they don’t create it.
3. Outraged people don’t pay much attention to hazard data.
4 Outrage isn’t just a distraction from hazard. Both are legitimate and important.
5 When the hazard is high, risk communicators try to nurture the outrage.
6 When the hazard is low, risk communicators try to reduce the outrage.
7 Companies and agencies usually can’t reduce outrage much until they change
their own organisations.
Final Points
It will be clear that risk communication is the process of communicating respon-
sibly and effectively about risk factors associated with industrial technologies,
natural hazards and human activities. These communication responsibilities arise
for all those who are developers and mangers of industry and technological
change, as well as those who oversee health and environmental management.
Risk communication is about bridging the gap between experts and lay-people. In
fact, everyone in society faces a vast array of risks every day and, often subcon-
sciously, makes trade-offs regarding the acceptability of each risk. People, under-
standably, have an aversion to admitting that they do indeed tolerate various
levels of risk for themselves and their children. To the public it matters greatly
whether or not one is exposed voluntarily or involuntarily to risks. Good risk
communication practice seeks to address the division between experts and the
public. The three specialists, whose work has been featured in this paper, each
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provide guidelines for facilitating this process.
Business needs to spend more time and resources on developing sound risk
communication practices. To not do so represents a business risk. In essence this
requires the promotion of a reasoned dialogue among stakeholders on the nature
of relevant risk factors and acceptable risk management strategies.
Risk communication should become an integral part of the risk management
process. Informed public understanding of risk factors is the key to achieving
board support for and trust in risk management strategies, and this in turn re-
quires good risk communication practice.
Further Information
Most of the material in this chapter that has been attributed to Peter Sandman
was included in notes provided at a course on Risk Communication, presented by
Dr Sandman at Harvard University, Boston Ma., attended by the author in October
2000. Vincent Covello, John Paling and Peter Sandman are all widely published
and a substantial amount of further information is available from internet-based
sources.
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6 The Ethics of
 Risk Communication
Karen Cronin1
This paper reflects on some issues around applied communication that illustrate
fundamental principles in developing a risk communication programme.
Ethical issues arise both when risk communication is internal to an organisation
and between an organisation and its stakeholders. In this paper, Karen draws on
her experience at ERMA New Zealand to demonstrate the ethical issues faced
every day by government managers.
She bases her discussion on a presentation by Professor Donald Evans of the
Centre for Bioethics at Otago University, which concluded that applying ethical
considerations is essentially about ‘showing respect’ for the principles of:
• Autonomy;
• Beneficence;
• Truthfulness;
• Dignity;
• Non-maleficence; and
• Justice.
Ethical issues need to be addressed at a very early stage of developing a risk
communication programme, and considered throughout the project or activity.
Karen also discusses the difference between communication and consultation,
and the need to deal with community expectations as to the degree of influence
people will have on the decisions of public authorities. A lack of clarity in the
early stages of a project can cause significant problems in the later stages.
1 This is a personal presentation and does not represent the views or policy of the Environmental Risk
Management Authority.
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Imagine this...
You are the Communications Manager for a large New Zealand city council. The
council has had problems in the past over its handling of major development
projects but in recent times its public profile has been improving.
The Chief Engineer advises the management team that an old council landfill,
constructed in the 1960s, is now causing serious environmental problems. The
landfill was covered over and has been used as a park and sportsground for
many years. It is surrounded by middle-income housing and is next to a private
Christian primary school. Gas from the landfill is leaking out and in some places
at such levels that it could ignite or explode from a dropped cigarette.
What are the risk communication issues in this situation — and how should they
be dealt with ethically?
This is an hypothetical example, although based in part on actual events. The
management of this situation required good professional communications
‘techniques’ — but also raised a number of ethical considerations. The risk
management response included:
• immediately establishing the history of the landfill and the nature of the waste
involved;
• measuring and testing the gas emissions and establishing their potential
hazardous effects;
• setting up a close relationship with the neighbouring residents, on a personal
basis with a trusted senior council officer;
• also establishing a relationship with the school Principal and Board and the
wider church authorities;
• keeping these immediate stakeholders informed with all the information
available from the start and new information as it came to hand;
• informing councillors in the ward about the issue and what was being done;
• fencing off those parts of the park where the hazard was greatest;
• closing the park to general public access;
• implementing a management plan to reduce or eliminate the gas leaks;
• conducting a city wide investigation to check if any other landfills built at the
same time were causing similar problems — and setting up further plans to
manage or eliminate any problems found; and
• establishing the potential legal and financial liability the council might face.
There were some important communications dimensions in this response.
The situation first came to the attention of the council from some of the local
residents because they noticed the smell of the gas. But not all of them knew and
so the first thing was to ensure that all the immediate affected households were
informed — and kept fully updated at each step along the way. For the school, it
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was important that the Principal, the Board of Trustees and the parents were
informed.
Potentially in this situation the residents might have demanded financial
compensation from the council. This could have come to a significant amount,
especially if claims arose from other hazardous landfill sites around the city. The
general response of those affected was to accept that there was some risk but
that it was being managed and eliminated. Their overriding concern was that if
information got out, their property values would be seriously affected. They explicitly
asked the council not to tell the news media about the situation.
From an issues management point of view however, it was highly unlikely that the
media would not get to hear about this. Local word of mouth would have been
enough. The notices on the park would have soon attracted attention. Residents
usually talk to their councillors and — as in many local authorities — the temptation
for politicians to run with this story would have been hard to resist. And if the
media found out, one of their main angles would have been to accuse the council
of covering up another ‘major bungle’.
As it turned out, the story did find its way to journalists. The council responded
with detailed information including the history of the landfill and, more importantly,
explained what was being done to respect the wishes of residents — and to
manage the risk at this site and potentially other sites. The residents were
immediately informed, before the story began to surface in the media. The council
confirmed its policy of not initiating the story but explained that it had to respond
when questions started to be asked. Some residents, but not all, chose to speak
to the media themselves. Generally this comment was supportive of the council’s
approach.
What are the ethical issues that arise from this example?
First of all, it might be useful to establish what we mean by ‘ethics’. Entire university
programmes and a vast literature are devoted to this subject and it wouldn’t pay
to start down that track in a single chapter of this book. Ethical issues are
important generally to good communication practice, but take on a greater
significance when you are dealing with potential harm to public health and the
environment.
The Environmental Risk Management Authority have given some thought to how
it should incorporate ethical issues into risk decision-making. There is no easy
answer.
But as part of our thinking we sought advice from ethical specialists, including
Professor Donald Evans of the Centre for Bioethics at Otago University. He gave a
very useful overview of the issues from his knowledge of the field. In the end, he
said, “It is a matter of showing respect”. This meant showing respect for:
• Autonomy: in that people have a right to determine their own lives and to
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have a say about activities that may affect them.
• Beneficence: will the proposal do good? What are the benefits and to whom?
• Truthfulness: are people honestly being told the whole story?
• Dignity: are their situation and their needs being taken into account and
respected?
• Non-maleficence: making sure that a proposal, or the management of a risk,
does no harm.
• Justice: does the risk management decision reflect the principles of justice?
This provides a useful framework for those of us working in risk communication:
to show respect for the well being of individual people and communities.
Interestingly, these principles could also provide a basis for showing respect for
nature, including the well being of other species and the healthy functioning of
natural ecosystems. Those concepts have been developed more fully in the literature
on environmental ethics.
In the case of the landfill story, some of the ethical considerations included:
• Respecting the rights of the residents and the school to know what was going
on and to have a say in how the issue was managed. This also extended to
the ward councillors who wanted to be seen to be taking a responsible role in
the situation.
• Doing whatever was necessary straight away to reduce any danger to human
health at the site, especially given that children could be affected.
• Telling the complete truth to the residents and the media about the landfill,
what was in it, what the gas was and how harmful it might be — and what
was being done about it.
• Respecting the dignity of those most affected by keeping them informed from
an early stage — and being open to the possibility that some might chose to
seek compensation.
• Recognising that people themselves can articulate their own interests if allowed
to do so, for example the potential health harm from the gas versus likely the
financial harm from a reduction in their property values.
Another dimension of this was to trust that people would not over-react to the
true picture. There can be a bureaucratic inclination to ‘protect’ people from
information like this on the assumption that they will respond ‘hysterically’.
(The issue of so-called ‘public hysteria’ in the face of a risk might be an
interesting topic for another seminar).
• Making sure that no one else living near other landfills was in any danger.
• Recognising and communicating the actual potential harm of the gas leak —
and communicating the benefits of the management plan.
• Taking responsibility for the liability if compensation was sought; i.e. the
council was accountable for its past actions and was not evading the issue.
Turning to the ethics of risk communication generally, I wanted to explore some
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ideas that might apply to other kinds of environmental risk.
Environmental risks are becoming increasingly significant in our lives — and are
often major issues for communities or even countries to resolve. For example, as
well as landfill issues, local authorities in many parts of the country have had to
deal with the issue of cell phone tower installations, which have generated strong
community interest and concern. (This is a classic case study of risk communication,
including all the dimensions of expert and community risk perception.)
Risk management is now a growing professional field, in which risk communication
is recognised as a crucial dimension. A very useful model recently developed by
the Australia/ New Zealand Standards Committee, emphasises that communication
needs to happen throughout the process: from the identification of risks and
their evaluation, through to risk decision making and any management regime
that is then established (Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand, 2000).
For those of us involved in risk communication, there are a number of ethical
issues that we can consider as part of our professional practice.
But first a brief comment on terminology.
The words ‘risk’ and ‘communication’ can generate multiple interpretations when
they are used, let alone when they are used together. There are also the related
concepts of ‘consultation’ and ‘public education or raising ‘public awareness’. I
think it is useful to make the following distinctions:
Strictly speaking, ‘communication’, or ‘public relations’, involves giving people
targeted information and highlighting key messages from an organisation to position
it effectively with key audiences.
‘Consultation’ requires two-way communication: information is provided and there
is an opportunity for information to be fed back. It is a process that allows for
input into decision-making.
Public awareness programmes are aimed educating the public or specific groups
about a particular issue or proposal to increase their levels of awareness and
understanding.
‘Risk communication’ programmes can involve one or more of these components.
Risk communication might be needed in a reactive situation, like the landfill
example, or in a proactive situation when a proposal with potential risks is put
forward for consideration and a final decision is going to be made by a company
or a public authority.
One of the first ethical issues in designing a risk communication programme is to
be clear about the level of influence that external parties might have on the
decision.
Looking at the experience of public agencies, and a number of models for
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consultation, we can see that broadly the approaches are:
• No influence: the public authority makes the decision without any external
comments, and announces the final result.
• Limited influence: the public authority makes the final decision, but in the
process other information is sought and taken into account. The decision is
communicated to all parties to show how their comments were considered
and the outcome was reached.
• Shared decision-making: the public authority may not have all the information
to make the decision itself. The decision-making role is shared with other
parties. The final decision is one that all the parties reach together.
• Delegation: the public authority decides it does not need to take the decision
itself at all and the power to decide is given to another group.
It is important to define who is making the decision and to what extent external
parties will be able to influence the outcome. People quickly become disillusioned
if they think that their submissions are not going to have any effect. The ethical
issues here arise out of respect for autonomy, dignity, and justice. It is important
to clarify expectations and the scope of influence by laying down the ‘ground
rules’ at the start of the process. It is also important to let people know how their
views were taken into account in the final decision.
At ERMA New Zealand we developed a policy to explain our approach to public
involvement in applications for hazardous substances and new organisms under
Part V of the HSNO Act (ERMA New Zealand, 2000). Given the statutory processes
involved, the Authority decided that it was working with the second model, i.e.
‘limited influence’. The Authority calls for submissions and holds hearing for notified
applications for GM field tests and releases. At the end of its consideration, it
issues a comprehensive decision and this is widely publicised on our website and
in the media.
A second ethical issue might be the choice of the communication or consultation
technique we chose to employ in any given situation.
Communicating about environmental risks can involve various elements and
approaches including: baseline awareness studies, stakeholder analysis, opinion
surveys, focus groups, sector or interest group briefings and consultation, and
community participation programmes (in various forms, from informal networking
to formal statutory processes).
And it also includes all the standard communication techniques such as written
material, road shows, seminars, advertising, websites, special events, etc. — and
not least of all media relations.
The choice of technique depends on the purpose of the risk communication
programme.
Again, there are some choices facing the risk communication professional. It is
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important to be clear about what you are trying to achieve. For example your
approach could be aimed at different points on the following scale:
• Providing information — presenting basic facts and figures about the proposal
or the risk (usually done with a brochure or a display). But this is only ‘one
way’ communication. It is passive: the information may not be picked up or
used and does not allow for interaction or feedback.
• Raising awareness — information is provided in a way that the target audience
becomes aware of what is going on. This can be measured with before and
after surveys.
• Increasing understanding — as well as being aware, the audience is able to
develop an understanding of the proposal and make some judgements on it;
and is empowered to take part meaningfully in any consultation process.
• Changing behaviour — the programme is deliberately aimed at producing a
different behavioural response in the target audience.
In my current work, we are trying to apply this concept to a communication
programme about the risks of bringing new organisms into New Zealand, particularly
plants.
Publishing brochures or posters about the dangers of unwanted plants would
probably be useful but it is a minimalist approach. It would obviously provide
information and perhaps change awareness. But it would not be sufficient to
generate a wider change of attitudes and behaviour where people have learnt to
consciously consider the harm they might cause to New Zealand’s agriculture or
natural environment from the import of a new organism — and chose not to
create the risk.
To achieve those wider objectives, a more comprehensive campaign would be
needed, for example using television and well known public figures to ‘champion’
the cause — and to create a positive public commitment to idea of protecting the
‘treasures’ in our natural environment.
But running a campaign at that end of the scale raises some interesting questions
about ‘means and ends’ in the design of risk communication programmes.
Communication techniques, including sophisticated marketing and PR devices,
can be used to identify the current awareness or behaviour of an audience, but
also to try to change that understanding or behaviour. Communication strategies
can — and do — have a powerful influence on public opinion and social outcomes.
Obviously, when we want to communicate about the dangers of importing invasive
pests and weeds — about alcohol abuse or fire safety — we are consciously
trying to change public awareness and behaviour to achieve an agreed social
good.
However, when the net social outcome is in dispute — for example with some
forms of technology — those of us involved in risk communication may want to
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ask “What is the real purpose of this programme” and “is it ethical to proceed?”
All risks — and their avoidance or management — occur within a social context.
The existence and significance of a risk inherently depend on your point of view,
including your professional worldview, your cultural worldview, your personal
opinions and attitudes, and your fundamental values and beliefs.
It is also depends on how you might be affected. Depending on their ‘stake’ in the
situation, people will identify a variety of risks including ecological, health, social,
cultural, and possibly political risks. They will also evaluate and seek remedy for
risks in different ways.
It comes down to how you look at the risk — and who is doing the looking. But
whose definition of the risk is the most valid or should have the most influence?
For example is it the policy maker, the technical expert, the regulator, the scientist,
the iwi, the lawyer, the neighbourhood group, or the wider public?
How can we take an ethical approach to risk communication in a situation where
there are diverse and sometimes deeply divided views about the risks involved?
Should risk communication programmes be developed to ‘educate’ some people
to perceive the risks in a different way and alter their judgements — and hence
the level of ‘social tolerance’ of an activity or proposal?
As a minimum, an ethical approach would require that all the risks in the situation
are identified, brought into the process and shown respect, including those that
might be seen as less valid by other stakeholder groups.
Another approach to consider is altering the direction of the communication
programme. Conventional practice would see the risk manager developing a
programme aimed at the ‘public’ to get feedback into the decision making process.
Thinking laterally, a communications programme could also be developed to support
the members of the community in a discussion amongst themselves about the
issues involved.
This might be particularly useful for the Maori community using hui or wananga.
Another approach would be to support a process where the different stakeholders
discuss — and potentially resolve — the issues with each other rather than with
the formal decision maker, (for example members of the public engaging in dialogue
with scientists).
All of this takes us into the wider territory of innovative processes for public
decision-making on major issues. (And that is definitely the topic for another
seminar).
The final issue I want to talk about is trust.
Social scientists such as Lynn Frewer and Paul Slovic have established that the
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credibility — and effectiveness — of any risk communication programme is
determined by how well the communicator is trusted.
The recent backlash in the UK against a public awareness campaign on genetic
engineering by Monsanto is a case in point. Briefly, the company decided to take
a proactive stance and spent millions on a communication campaign to ‘educate’
the public about GM crops. It did this in response to a groundswell of public
reaction to GMO issues both in the UK and Europe, which was being actively
highlighted by the popular press. The campaign was innovative in that it sought
to tackle the technical issues head on and provide general information on GE. It
included newspaper advertising that recommended people contact Greenpeace
for further information. However the campaign backfired: despite the considerable
investment in this communication strategy, the company’s favourability rating
was lower than before it started (Frewer, 2000; Allen, 2000).
A similar exercise here in New Zealand, involving a pamphlet on GE food ‘facts’
distributed and promoted through supermarkets, also produced an adverse reaction
including a ‘counter’ pamphlet and supermarket protests around the country.
The issue is just as an important for environmental groups. For example, Greenpeace
in the UK suffered a blow to its credibility when it used inaccurate figures related
to the oil spill from the Brent Spar. While it subsequently admitted a mistake and
corrected the figures, the incident was harmful to its reputation at that time
(Frewer, 2000).
Industry, environmental groups and public agencies that are trusted are more
likely to have their message heard and acted upon than those who are not. The
issue is especially important for government agencies that may be spending
taxpayer money on communication programmes — and in particular for agencies
like ours that also have a semi-judicial role and have to maintain a strictly neutral
stance.
At ERMA New Zealand, one way we have dealt with the potential conflict between
our educational role and our judicial role is to produce education material and
run events which enable the various issues and stakeholders to come together
and talk to each other, but without inserting an ERMA New Zealand point of view.
The community education kit on genetic engineering, which we produced earlier
this year, is an example. It includes a video that outlines the science of GE and
how it is actually done in the lab in a simple way for people to understand. And
it has a list of questions to act as a ‘discussion starter’ for groups to use themselves
to explore the issues involved.
So rather than running risk communication programmes that can be seen as
either ‘for or against’ an issue, a more appropriate approach for public agencies
may be to design programmes that will actively increase the level of awareness
and understanding in the target audience — and which then make it possible for
those groups to facilitate their own learning.
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The aim is to inform and educate but not to persuade. A desirable end point
would be to support stakeholders so they are confident enough to take part
meaningfully in the debate and therefore make a positive contribution to social
policy.
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The Role of Risk Communication
Processes in Disaster Preparedness
Bernd Rohrmann
People exposed to hazards — natural ones such as earthquakes, hurricanes,
wildfires or floods, or technological ones, such as explosions, chemical spills,
train crashes and so on — want and need to be optimally informed about risk
characteristics, preventative measures, and appropriate behaviours during emer-
gencies. To meet these expectations, authorities have to compose pertinent plan-
ning, prepare coping strategies, and communicate the relevant information ef-
fectively to residents, people in the workplace and communities as a whole.
The more disaster management requires active involvement of residents, the
more vital risk information/communication/education become. Furthermore, in
the case of controversial risk sources (e.g. the siting of an airport or a waste
incineration facility), public discussion, participation of stakeholders and possi-
bly joint conflict resolution are required.
The author notes that all of these situations involve social processes which are
usually subsumed under the (umbrella) term ‘risk communication’, and the ex-
change of risk information between interested parties (individuals, groups, insti-
tutions) is at the core of it. Risk communication is the link between risk percep-
tion (i.e. people’s observations, judgments and evaluations of hazards they are
or might be exposed to) and risk management (i.e. activities of individuals or
authorities to eliminate or mitigate the causes and/or impacts of hazardous
events).
Given the high relevance of effective disaster preparedness, risk communication
programmes need to be based on a sound understanding of the underlying
socio-psychological processes and preconditions for successful communication.
This chapter firstly presents a theoretical model for the risk communication pro-
cess. Secondly, two case studies are used to illustrate practical experiences, one
about informing residents about chemical emergency warnings, and one ad-
dressing community-based bushfire preparedness programmes. Thirdly, recom-
mendations for comprehensive risk communication will be outlined.
The following suggestions for good practice are based on relevant research.
• Reflect risk perception mechanisms when deciding about message content
and context.
• Identify existing knowledge and pertinent ‘mental models’ of the hazard.
• Check materials/advice for comprehensibility, plausibility, feasibility, capacity
to motivate.
7
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• Acknowledge apathy/inertia and information overload when requesting ac-
tivities.
• Adapt programmes to core characteristics of specified target groups (includ-
ing ethnicity).
• Incorporate community groups and induce community-based activities.
• Provide interactive communication and pathways for information requests
and confirmation.
• Strengthen personal involvement and responsibility.
• Take credibility issues very seriously.
The author recommends strongly that empirical outcome evaluations be incorpo-
rated into risk communication campaigns, and finally notes the importance of
interdisciplinary collaboration in enriching both the design and the assessment
of disaster preparedness campaigns.
This Chapter serves as an introduction to the case studies and examples that
make up Part II of the book.
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Core Concepts
Risk information, education, communication, dialogue
Humankind has made many inventions to prevent or at least reduce harm from
hazards, and safety has become a core value in our professional and private lives.
Nevertheless, very many residents, as well as people in the workplace or travellers,
are exposed to a wide range of hazards. Once humans face the risk of environmental
disasters — natural ones such as earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, or floods; or
technological ones, such as explosions, chemical spills, train crashes and so on
— hazard management and especially disaster preparedness becomes a very
important task. People exposed to hazards want and need to be optimally informed
about risk characteristics, preventative measures, and appropriate behaviours
during emergencies, and they must understand their own responsibility. Authorities
have to compose pertinent planning, prepare coping strategies, and communicate
the relevant information to residents and communities as a whole effectively. The
more disaster management requires active involvement of residents, the more
vital risk information/communication/education become. Furthermore, in the case
of controversial risk sources (e.g. the siting of an airport or a waste incineration
facility), public dialogue, participation of stakeholders and possibly joint conflict
resolution are required.
All these situations involve social processes that are usually subsumed under the
(umbrella) term ‘risk communication’, and the provision and exchange of risk
information between interested parties (individuals, groups, institutions) is at the
core of it. Depending on the nature of the hazard and the objectives of a risk
communication programme, different tasks evolve; in Box 1, primary aims are
listed. Usually risk awareness and preparedness are to be increased; however,
sometimes the aim is to reduce concern about risks.
Executing these tasks requires a variety of communication means and channels,
which need to be chosen carefully. Distribution of print material is (still) the most
frequent procedure; others, e.g., warning sirens, are restricted to specific purposes
(cf. Box 1).
For a systematic treatise of this very active field of research and application see,
for example, Bennet and Kalman, 1999; Covello et al., 1989; Hance et al., 1990;
Kasperson and Stallen, 1990; Lundgren and McMakin, 1998; NRC, 1990; Renn,
1992; Sadar and Shull, 1999; and The Royal Society, 1992. For overviews see
Fischhoff, 1995; Fischhoff et al., 1997; Leiss, 1996; Morgan et al., 1992; Plough
and Krimsky, 1987; Renn, 1998; and Rohrmann, 1995b.
Communicating about hazards and the involved risks for humans and their assets
is a commonplace activity which occurs in a multitude of situations (‘arenas’),
ranging from systematic campaigns planned by authorities to informal exchanges
in occupational or private contexts (see Box 2).
Note: This text is an extended version of my Keynote Address at the CAE conference The Risk Communication
Challenge, and is based on the work published in Rohrmann 1998, 1999 and 2000.
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These processes involve a variety of ‘actors’ which may be senders, audience, or
both. In addition to various risk-exposed people (employees, residents, consumers)
and public authorities, further actors in the RC ‘arena’ are to be considered (see
bottom of Box 2), such as industry, scientific institutions, and various types of
media; this alone makes RC a complex process (Covello et al., 1989; Rohrmann,
1991; Slovic, 1996). Mutual trust — or rather lack thereof — between actors is a
crucial issue (Peters et al., 1997; Renn and Levine, 1991).
Informing and communicating about risks is more likely to succeed when treated as
a two-way process, when participants are seen as legitimate partners (“experts must
respect and include citizens in decisions on risk”, Slovic. 1996, p7), and when people’s
Box 1: Risk Communication: Aims, Tasks, Means
Principal aim:
The provision and exchange of information about the characteristics, impacts and
mitigation of risks for humans or the environment among individuals and/or groups
Primary types of risk communication tasks
• Identifying unknown/difficult/controversial risk aspects (inducing RC problems)
• Advancing/changing knowledge and attitudes regarding hazards & risk-taking
• Modifying risk-related behaviour of people exposed to hazards
• Promoting community participation in hazard mitigation
• Facilitating cooperation and joint conflict resolution regarding controversial risks
• Developing disaster preparedness and emergency management
Communication means & channels
• Print material (e.g., fliers & brochures), distributed by institutions/agencies
• Product information, machine operating instructions, etc
• Public information services, 'hot lines', etc
• Educational video/film/computer products
• Info presented via broadcasting, television, newspapers, journals and the internet
• Expert presentations (at meetings, public hearings, trainings, drills etc)
• Warning sirens (or messages through mobile loudspeakers)
Box 2: Arenas And Actors Of The Risk Communication Process
Situations in which RC occurs
• Information campaigns by authorities • Counselling contacts, medical advice
• Safety training courses, tests, exercises • Advice for handling disaster impacts
• Emergency information and warnings • Evacuation
• Public hearings, conferences etc • Judicial proceedings
Target audiences and actors
• Risk-exposed people • The general public
• Industry/manufacturers/companies             • Administrative/regulatory authorities
• Scientific institutions                                    • Journalists/media
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attitudes and ‘worldviews’ regarding environment and technology are respected. This
is particularly true in the case of risk controversies. Acceptance of risks is not an
information/education issue; it results from a societal discourse (Cvetkovich and
Lofstedt, 1999; Susskind and Field, 1996; Wiedemann and Schuetz, 2000).
A theoretical model for the risk communication process
Designing valid and effective risk communication is a challenging task. Practical
experience may not be sufficient to ensure satisfactory results. Rather, a
comprehensive theoretical framework is needed to guide such efforts.
In spite of the immense literature on risk communication, systematic modelling of
the risk communication process is relatively rare (e.g. Earle et al., 1990; Mileti and
Fitzpatrick, 1991; Paton et al., 1999; Renn, 1992; Rohrmann, 1992; Powell and
Leiss, 1998; Zimmermann, 1987) and often restricted in scope — comprehensive
approaches are scarce. The need for a sound framework becomes especially
evident when risk communication outcomes are to be assessed (Rohrmann, 1998).
Thus concepts and findings from relevant research fields (social psychology, risk
research, verbal communication) were integrated to develop a model of risk
communication (Rohrmann 1992, 1995a, 2000).
The structural model identifies the main components of risk communication
processes and specifies the factors which determine the results of risk
communication efforts, referring to characteristics of the distributed messages,
the conveying authority, the receiving audiences and the context in which the
communication process occurs. Three processes overlap and need to be linked:
how people deal with hazards, how risk information is processed and evaluated,
and how accepted information effects risk perception, evaluation, and behaviour.
The full model (from Rohrmann 2000b) is presented as a graph in Box 3.
The focus is on an individual rather than collective (community) level of activities.
The proposed causal links between the variables are indicated on a global level
only, that is, for sets of related aspects of the risk communication process. (Note
that ‘feedback loops’ are assumed as well but not fully outlined here.)
In short, the model expresses that the final outcome variable, risk-reducing
behaviour <D> regarding a hazard <A>, is determined not just by the communicated
messages of the information/education programme <E> but the result of a complex
evaluation process <B-C and G-H-I>, including prior attitudes <N, O>, and influenced
by personal characteristics <K, L, M> and manifold context factors, e.g. attributes
of the information source and channel features <F> utilised by the respective
authority/agency <Y>, as well as family/peers/friends and the community one belongs
to <J>; the whole process is embedded into a culture’s health and safety orientation
<X>. As the feedback-loops in the figure indicate, risk-reducing behaviour <D> is
intended to mitigate the impacts of the hazard <A>; moreover, often people will
link their activities to their social network <J> or approach relevant authorities <Y>.
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This risk communication model can be elaborated and/or made specific to the
problem type, the target audience, and the relevant attitudes and behaviours to
be dealt with.
Such a framework is essential for designing evaluations and developing pertinent
instruments, as well as recognising reasons for lack of success with risk
communication campaigns.
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Links between risk perception, risk communication and risk management
As outlined above, the aims of risk communication involve information,
communication, education, and management tasks. Risk communication is the
link between risk perception (i.e., people’s observations, judgments and evaluations
of hazards they are or might be exposed to) and risk management (i.e., activities
of individuals or authorities to eliminate or mitigate the causes and/or impacts of
hazardous events).
Given the high relevance of human safety, pro-active accident prevention, and
effective disaster preparedness, risk communication programmes need to be based
on a sound understanding of the underlying socio-psychological processes and
preconditions for successful communication (Powell and Leiss, 1998; Renn, 1998).
Regarding risk management — very few measures are purely technical while most
activities include at least some communication with risk-exposed people; in most
cases risk information/communication/education is an indispensable prerequisite
of successful risk management.
Case Studies
In the following, risk communication experiences from two case studies are reported,
one related to a technological (and human-made), one to a natural hazard. In
both cases, enhancing the disaster preparedness of residents was the aim.
Informing residents about chemical emergency warnings
In industrialised countries, many residential areas are exposed to technological
hazards, especially industrial facilities such as airports or chemical production
and storage. These have the potential of accidents and can cause disasters. Thus
elaborated information procedures are usually in place, and considerable resources
are necessary to meet the requirements of risk control (e.g. Covello, 1990; Hance
et al., 1990; Lee, 1986; Muller-Vogt and Sorensen, 1994; Powell and Leiss, 1998;
Willis et al., 1997).
An example is the CAER (Community Awareness and Emergency Response)
programme run in many cities, including one around a complex of major chemical
facilities in Melbourne, Australia. In 1992 the local council informed residents
about emergency preparedness issues, linked to a new warning siren. In defined
areas each household received an information brochure (plus a condensed version
on a magnetic card), referring to the siren and containing behavioural guidelines
for emergencies. Translations of the main messages into other languages were
provided as well. Information distribution was repeated after about 12 months.
A year later, the author initiated a small field study (Project ICE, Informing about
Chemical Emergency Warnings) to assess the results of that hazard information
programme (Jaensch, 1995; see also Rohrmann, 1998). The study design represents
receivers as well as non-receivers (sampled in a control area) and ethnicity (Anglo
92
Risk Communication in Disaster Preparedness
versus Italian). Eighty-two residents were interviewed, based on a standardised
questionnaire. Selected results are summarised in Box 4.
Notably, only half of the respondents in the information distribution area actually
recalled receiving the emergency preparedness information, and only a small
proportion had the material at hand. While the knowledge about the nature of
the warning siren signal was limited (in fact the siren itself was not explained in
the brochure), the overall response to the information provided was positive; the
material was rated as understandable and intended compliance with the guide-
lines was rather high. However, perceived credibility of information sources seems
to be restricted (highest for a non-local governmental agency, lowest for the
media).
When asked about likely behaviours in the case of a chemical emergency (based
on two scenarios, being at home or in a shopping centre when the warning sirens
go off ), the group of receivers revealed a superior knowledge of emergency issues
— yet wrong answers were still quite frequent. Regarding ethnicity, no significant
Box 4: Perception Of A Chemical Hazard Information Campaign
(Project Ice)
Selected results from the case study in Altona/Melbourne (N=82, 1995)
Acknowledging receipt of the hazard information material:
• in distribution area   48 %
• in comparison area        4 %
Material stored (% of those acknowledging the campaign = Group A):
• information leaflet      4 %
• magnetic info card     52 %
Effects for respondents aware vs not aware of campaign A  Non-A
• Assumed source of emergency warnings correct (%)   88  25
• Likely compliance with guideline (5-point scale)  3.9   4.2
• Intended behaviour corresponds to guideline
     — if at home when emergency occurs (%)             60 23
    — if shopping during emergency (%)                 28  5
Perceived credibility of information sources
• Local government (Council)        3.3
• Chemical industry in Altona       2.8
• Environmental Protection Agency 3.7
• Media                             2.6
(Source: Jaensch 1995, Rohrmann 1998)
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differences were found between the two included groups; however, a majority of
the interviewed Italians (all bilingual) would prefer emergency information in their
first language.
This case study demonstrated that information distribution cannot be equated
with information receipt, that well-designed hazard information improves emergency
preparedness if actually reaching the target group, and that a ‘one-shot’ campaign
based on printed information is not sufficient to ensure a full acceptance of
behaviour directives for risk mitigation.
Community-based bushfire preparedness programmes
Fires are a constant threat to communities, especially in Australia where wildfires/
bushfires are common and have the potential for disasters (Pyne, 1991; Webster,
2000). Whenever people are exposed to the risk of fires, hazard prevention becomes
an obligation. Risk communication about fire hazards in the workplace or in
residential settings is an indispensable part of this task. Such an understanding
extends the ‘classic’ firefighting missions of fire authorities. In fact, a shift in the
general orientation of fire risk management seems obvious (see, for example,
Smith et al., 1996; Rhodes and Reinholtd, 1998).
A remarkable example is a novel approach to fire safety, the ‘Community Fireguard’
(C/F) programme introduced by the Country Fire Authority of Victoria/Australia. It
is based on community involvement (cf. Jones 1987) and aims to enhance individual
responsibility for fire safety and survival strategies (CFA, 1995; Beckinsale, 1994).
Interactive risk communication between residents and fire authority officers is a
core element.
In order to assess the process and outcomes of this programme, a detailed
investigation (Project EBP, Evaluation of community-based approaches to bushfire
preparedness) was conducted in Melbourne and regional Victoria (Rohrmann,
1998, 1999).
The sampling of this project is shown in Box 5. Of interest here is sub-study <X>,
which was used to create a ‘before/after’ design with an ‘experimental’ group <N>
= members of new C/F groups exposed to the programme and a comparison
group <C>.
Selected data for these groups are listed in Box 6. The results demonstrate:
• Judgments of risk awareness, knowledge re bushfires, own responsibilities,
technical fire preparedness as well as actions taken (A1, B1, B4, G2, H1, O1)
slightly increased for new C/F participants from phase 1 to phase 2, while
reading activities and perceived information need (E1) decreased.
• However, similar effects occurred within the comparison group (see columns
C1/C2), and some differences were actually higher (see C2-C1 vs N2-N1).
• While the absolute level of awareness, reading, knowledge, and action taken
was still somewhat lower in the ‘Non-C/F’ group (cf. C2/N2), subjective
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understanding, preparedness and acceptance of own responsibilities (cf. B1,
G2, H2) was actually about the same or slightly higher than for C/F participants.
To understand these somewhat surprising results it needs to be considered that
unfortunately the methodologically crucial data collection in phase II was severely
confounded by two ‘external’ events: serious fires occurred in the Sydney region
in November 1997 (larger and earlier than usual), inducing wide-spread media
activities; and the Victorian CFA had to modify its community education approach
(including the programme under study) in response to predictions of a high
bushfire risk for 1998. These events created considerable ‘risk communication’
too, obviously increasing problem awareness and consequently bushfire
preparedness in all investigation areas and thus blurring the specific effects of
the C/F programme.
The findings suggest that the C/F risk communication process achieved at least
three important aims: improved knowledge about bushfire preparedness; better
Box 5: Survey Design: Target Groups & Samples
<Project EBP>
 <E> Residents participating in existing C/F program      N=110
  <X> Bushfire-prone areas; no C/F; future CFG's likely    N=126
    out of <X> - interviewed again in Phase II:
     <N> residents participating in new C/F group          N=21
     <C> comparison group not exposed to C/F, same areas   N=36
  <F> Residents exposed to fires in 1997                    N=30
  <P> CFA personnel: officers dealing with the C/F program  N=20
Box 6: Resident’s Views on Bushfire Issues — Comparison Phase 1
<Project EBP>
A1 Rating of area’s bushfire  risk (0..100)
B1 Understanding bushfire issues (self-rating 0..100)
B4 Knowledge index re bushfire issues (0..24)
C5 Brochures/pamphlets re bushfires read (%)
E1 Need for information re bushfire issues (%)
G2 Responsibility attitude regarding the bushfire risk
Accepted as own responsibility (2..10)
Seen as CFA’s responsibility (3..15)
H1 Overall bushfire preparedness (self-rating) (0..100)
O1 Overall extent of actions taken (0..16)
Mean
81.2
63.8
16.1
93.8
62.5
7.8
8.2
56.3
8.1
s[M]
3.0
3.3
0.4
0.5
0.7
4.2
0.5
Mean
84.0
68.1
17.6
75.0
37.5
8.0
6.8
67.8
10.6
s[M]
3.1
2.7
0.5
0.4
0.5
3.8
0.6
Mean
74.0
62.0
13.6
60.0
48.0
8.1
8.8
60.0
8.0
s[M]
4.0
3.2
0.5
0.3
0.5
4.0
0.4
Mean
82.6
72.1
13.8
45.8
28.0
8.4
7.9
65.2
8.2
s[M]
3.5
2.4
0.7
0.3
0.6
3.5
0.5
Topic/Variable#
Phase: N1 N2 C1 C2
New C/F Groups Comparison Group
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understanding that the fire risk is not solely the authority’s (CFA’s) responsibility;
and higher levels of taking action. Box 7 demonstrates the changes in preparatory
activities. (This graph also indicates the considerable variance in the residents’
responses; the dotted lines depict the standard deviation for a variable; the solid
bar represents the standard error of the mean.)
Altogether the evidence from these and the other sub-studies (cf. Box 5 above)
clearly indicates that the community-based ‘Fireguard’ approach is beneficial on
the whole to the bushfire preparedness of residents in fire risk areas and provides
an effective context for interactive risk communication with high involvement of
citizens. Thus the project confirmed the advantages of risk communication based
on direct collaboration with residents and group activities. Yet an additional study
focusing on brochures about fire preparedness (Rohrmann, 2000a) showed that
carefully designed print material is also very useful and still indispensable.
Both case studies presented here are valuable for a better understanding of
successes and shortcomings of risk communication programmes. They also point
at several unresolved issues, such as: what is the optimal combination of info
material and group work? How best to overcome socio-psychological barriers to
0
04
06
08
10
12
16
1 2 1 2phase
New C/F Groups Comparison Group
Project EBP
Variable 01&
Extent of
actions taker
for b/f
preparedness
<index 0...16>
s (i)
s {M}
Mean
Box 7: Change in Resident’s Bushfire Preparedness Activity
96
Risk Communication in Disaster Preparedness
involvement and implementation? To which degree are procedures effective for
‘ethnic’ (non-’Anglo’) residents? And what is the long-term stability of programme
effects and behavioural change?
Conclusions
Recommendations for comprehensive risk communication
The two case studies demonstrate (once more) that designing effective risk
communication programmes is a complex undertaking — and something like the
‘seven cardinal rules’ (Covello and Allen, 1988) is not likely to solve the problem,
particularly as different risk communication tasks and target audiences (see Boxes
1 and 2) require different approaches. From a management viewpoint, careful
planning is the first task. Box 8 gives an example for the steps involved.
In the beginning, two steps are important: any programme should be based on
clear-cut decisions about the goals to be achieved; and a risk communicator must
understand what people to be addressed know already, don’t know, believe to
know but don’t, or might know inaccurately (Kahneman et al., 1982; Morgan et
al., 1992). To take terminology matters seriously is important as well (Rohrmann,
1998), for both internal and external communication. The list of steps in Box 8
refers to an approach in which monitoring the risk communication process and
empirical outcome evaluation after implementing/conducting the campaign is
integrated into the overall programme.
In substantive terms, the socio-psychological literature on risk communication
provides ample advice and guidance; this relates to the conceptualisation and
content as well as to the implementation and execution of campaigns (e.g. Covello
et al., 1989; Hance et al., 1990; Lundgren and McMakin, 1998; Powell and Leiss,
1998; Sadar and Shull, 1999). Main considerations are briefly listed in Box 9.
Even though establishing the information-behaviour chain is often the core task,
successful risk communication most likely needs to be treated as an interactive
process (Leiss, 1996; Renn, 1992; Slovic, 1996; Wiedemann and Schuetz, 2000).
Consequently, accessibility of institutions, feedback opportunities, and interactive
procedures are very important. Also, social trust is a fundamental factor which,
once missing or lost, is not easily (re-)established; therefore, credibility issues
should be taken very seriously. In the case of highly controversial problems, the
use of mediators (Brown et al., 1998; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992) can be beneficial.
Programmes aiming at enhancing risk awareness, reducing unsafe behaviours
and improving disaster preparedness face many obstacles and barriers. It is
instructive to look at the essential steps of the persuasion and attitude change
process, as studied in social psychology (e.g. Eagley and Chaiken, 1993; McGuire,
1985; Oskamp and Schultz, 1998):
attention -> comprehension -> interpretation -> confirmation -> acceptance -> retention
(—> behaviour change).
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Difficulties can be technical or socio-psychological in nature, ranging from
information distribution and storage problems to lack of involvement and inertia.
Many people’s overconfidence in safety matters, unrealistic optimism and cognitive
biases (Kahneman et al., 1982; McClure and Williams, 1996; Weinstein, 1989;
Weinstein and Klein, 1996) add to the problem. In terms of the sender, proficient
management of the risk communication process is essential. In Box 9, a conceptual
framework for preconditions of and barriers to an effective information-behaviour
link are outlined (taken from Rohrmann, 2000a). For each step of the core process
(from receiving information to implementing an advised action or behaviour change)
both internal and external preconditions must be favourable and barriers overcome
to accomplish the respective communication objectives. (This model depicts an
idealised process — however, it is not assumed that each step takes place in a
linear fashion; rather, some steps might not occur at all, e.g. confirmation; or the
message receiver might go back to previous steps, e.g. from retention to attention.)
In the light of this complex process, assuming a straight ‘conversion’ of information
into behaviour would be ‘unrealistic optimism’ on a meta level!
Such a model (as well as the one presented in Box 3) can be utilised to anticipate
problems and counterbalance them by creating a favourable risk communication
context.
Box 8: Steps Of A Risk Communication Program
• Hazard identification/specification
• Clarification of responsibilities within the organization
• Identification of exposed people, areas etc (according to various scenarios)
• Identification of relevant parties/'actors' (institutions or individuals) to be involved
• Analysis of information necessities/needs
• Explication and statement of the objectives of the RC program
• Critical assessment of available resources
• Selection of the target audience(s)
• Determination of the content of the RC
• Selection of communication means & channels
• Designing message format & layout
• Expert check of substantive correctness of information to be disseminated
• Pre-examination of comprehensibility and credibility
• Principal decision about conducting empirical evaluation research
• Survey and documentation of "before" situation
Implementing/conducting the RC campaign
• Monitoring the RC process and pertinent context factors
• Evaluation of effectiveness with respect to stated RC objectives
• Identification of implications for future risk management
• Revision of the RC program
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Finally, how risks are communicated has obvious implications for the health and
well-being (and possibly even life) of risk-exposed people, and in some cases
also has the potential to be harmful — thus ethical considerations (Johnson,
1999; Jungermann, 1996; Willis et al., 1997) may also be an issue in designing risk
communication programmes.
The need for empirical evaluation of risk communication campaigns
Risk information/communication/education campaigns are dealing with important
aims: human safety, health, and sometimes even survival may be at stake, as well
as social relations in a community in case of disagreements about hazard evaluation
and risk management. Consequently it is crucial that pertinent risk communication
activities actually achieve their goals.
To provide evidence for this, empirical evaluation research is necessary. ‘Evaluation’
means the scientific assessment of the content, process and outcomes of an
intervention and their appraisal according to defined criteria (Fink, 1995; Patton,
1997. See Rohrmann, 1992, 1998 or Weinstein et al., 1992 with respect to risk
communication). Systematic empirical investigations are required in order to prove
the effectiveness of risk communication — simple experience is not sufficient (in
fact even theoretically sound risk communication efforts might not work in practice);
see Box 11 for further considerations. In fact, evaluation research should be included
in a campaign in advance.
To conclude — clearly effective risk communication is essential for best-possible
risk mitigation and disaster preparedness, and two means seem to be especially
Box 9: Core Suggestions For Designing Risk
Information/Communication
Reflecting risk perception in RC design
  • Ensure valid understanding of how people process and evaluate risk information
  • Identify existing knowledge and pertinent 'mental models' of the hazard
Developing RC procedures & materials
  • Define and explicate a program's objectives before designing campaigns and materials
  • Focus risk communication on behaviour change (not just knowledge advancement)
  • Check materials/advice for comprehensibility, credibility, feasibility,  capacity to motivate
  • Acknowledge apathy/inertia and information overload when suggesting activities
  • Adapt materials to core characteristics of specified target groups (including ethnicity)
Implementing RC as interactive process
  • Incorporate community groups and induce community-based activities
  • Provide interactive communication and pathways for information requests & confirmation
  • Strengthen personal involvement and responsibility
Strive to provide an optimal context for risk communication programs
  • Take credibility problems very seriously
  • Respect differing viewpoints and do not discredit opinions as 'unscientific' or 'emotional'
  • Use neutral mediators/facilitators in case of serious conflicts
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important to achieve this: using a sound conceptual framework, and incorporating
empirical evaluation into a programme.
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On the West Coast of New Zealand, the community of Franz Josef is facing the
reality of a rapidly aggrading river and the threat of a dam burst, which together
are marginalising existing protection works, exposing residents and visitors to
considerable risk, and for which a long-term solution is well beyond the financial
resources of the community. Terry notes that theories of integrated risk manage-
ment and methodologies for effective risk communications are useful tools for
addressing these types of situation, but additional practical ingredients for suc-
cess in dealing with real community situations are patience, persistence and
personal commitment.
As a first step, any agency undertaking communication with a defined commu-
nity must recognise the complex internal relationships, and the fact that these
will evolve under hazard threats. In this case, the governmental framework is a
similarly complex reality for the community with two local authorities owning
aspects of the hazard issues and with several central government departments
seeking involvement.
Terry describes the ‘hazard history’ of the community, and how local government
has sought to manage the issues, using a range of tools including aspects of risk
management and risk communication. He notes that the main communication
issue now is keeping the community aware of the hazard threat, as civil defence
procedures are improved, and as local government seeks funds for a long-term
solution, and comments on the importance of personal relationships with com-
munities when trying to reconcile different objectives and expectations. With the
present lengthy negotiations to secure central government funding, keeping the
community focussed, and local government efforts credible in their eyes, is a
significant challenge.
An important aspect of the case-study reported in this chapter is that the pur-
pose of communication is not at this stage to provide input into a decision
process (since none of the primary stakeholders is in a position to make a
decision), but to ensure information sharing, and to maintain awareness of the
hazard and associated risks.
8 Practical Steps in Ensuring GoodRisk Communication in a Regional
Council
Terry J Day
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Introduction
A Local Government Perspective
Managing risks is daily business for local government. Certainly for small councils
rarely do we have time or make time to think back through an issue to evaluate
what we have done. Hence an opportunity to reflect upon and evaluate our risk
communications efforts on one of our more significant issues relating to the
hazards is welcomed.
The West Coast of New Zealand is a sparsely populated area of spectacular and
dynamic landscapes. From a local government perspective rating bases are small
and the issues as significant as elsewhere. Councils are marginally staffed and
everyone has a range of tasks to perform. The reality that emerges is both good
and bad. On one hand staff can be overworked and spread too thinly, and on the
other hand we are compelled to work with and through others to a large degree,
and as well, staff are more able to hand complex situations.
Franz Josef Community
The hazard situation used as an example is occurring at Franz Josef in South
Westland. Franz Josef is one of the jewels in New Zealand’s tourism crown. Each
year hundreds of thousands of tourists pass through this community to enjoy its
scenery. The community numbers are small with just a few hundred permanent
residents.
Franz Josef has been built near the Alpine fault line that has formed a dramatic
mountain scarp along the western edges of the Southern Alps. The township is
located at the apex of the alluvial fan that the Waiho River is building as it exits
the mountains.
Risk Assessment
Active river processes and flooding are a fact of life on the West Coast where
rainfalls can be intense and where waterways are generally short and steep with
large quantities of gravels to move. Some extraordinary events have occurred
under these conditions.
The Regional Council works with the West Coast community to provide protection
works. The Council manages this responsibility through rating district schemes
that see those who benefit pay for their protection on either a differential or
uniform basis. Approximately 20 such schemes are currently being managed.
Being a small entity with a small rating base the Council is unable to provide
general rates for these schemes. In fact the protected community, whether a
group of farmers or a community such as Greymouth, must pay all of its direct
costs of protection (capital construction, maintenance, insurance and administra-
tion).
Many of these protection schemes were developed in the days of central govern-
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ment subsidies and now with only local monies to continue these schemes, some
have had to be disestablished while others are maintained on a very limited
basis. As the costs of scheme maintenance increase other regions of New Zealand
are beginning to experience the realities long present on the West Coast.
The Waiho River is very active. The Franz Josef town site is to the north of where
the Waiho River exits the mountains. Further developments are on the south side.
Upstream of the town site is the Franz Josef Glacier, a very popular tourist site.
During the height of the tourist season as many as one thousand visitors are
present each day. For most New Zealanders the glacier and its environs are recog-
nised as a national tourist icon.
At first we considered that the situation at Franz Josef was no different from other
areas on the West Coast. Over the years various protection works had been
constructed either for the community or by Transit New Zealand to protect State
Highway 6, the vital transportation artery for the West Coast.
However, after the Council had to deliver a public hazard warning to the parties
on the south side (due to the river aggrading its bed and hence marginalising the
flood protection of the existing banks) a study was commissioned to:
• Provide the community with an overview of the behaviour of the Waiho River,
first as a natural system and then as one influenced by human intervention.
• Identify, quantify and rank the natural hazards within the village and periph-
eral areas.
• Identify the standard of protection (structural and non-structural) from natural
hazards (principally flood-induced) appropriate for the community.
• Assess the adequacy of existing protection and management to meet these
standards.
• Identify some course of action that the community could choose from that
would enable them to avoid or mitigate the identified hazards.
• Identify the possible consequences of taking any (or none) of these actions.
The resulting report was available in September 1998 (McSaveney and Davies,
1998). While the report also considered earthquake and dam-break risks, its
conclusions for the Waiho River were startling in that they identified that the
increasing aggradation near the Franz Josef Township was due to the existing
river protection works. As the community sought to protect its assets on the
Waiho alluvial fan the stopbanks constrained the river, and as it could no longer
deposit its sediment load over the width of its natural fan, it did so in its active
riverbed. This was a contentious view as it challenged conventional engineering
thought and indicated that future protection could not come from simply more
stopbanking (even if the community could afford to do so).
A cooperative river-surveying programme has been established between Transit
New Zealand and the Regional Council. This programme provides information on
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(1) the temporal variations of the riverbed and (2) the distribution and amounts
of sediment moving onto the Waiho fan surface. These studies show that an
enormous amount of sediment has yet to enter the Waiho riverbed near the
township. Hence the threat is increasing.
Further opportunities for discussing this risk assessment have been taken. A
particularly significant one was during an international gravel river conference in
August 2000, where many of the top experts spent a day discussing the situation
and commenting critically on the McSaveney and Davies report.
Risk Management
As the Councils seek a lasting solution to the river hazard at Franz Josef we are
taking a number of practical steps to manage risk and to demonstrate to the
community our resolve to protect them.
Managing Continued Economic Development
As our process continues the councils are faced with a community that has to
continue to exist and we have to manage the resulting pressures within the
context of a yet undefined long-term solution.
The Westland District Council has varied its District Plan to accommodate the
flooding threat. The proposed Westland District Plan now has objectives, polices
and rules relating to the hazard area. Anyone requesting a Land Information
Memorandum is advised that the riverbed is aggrading and that a serious poten-
tial for flooding exists. Applicants are also given a copy of the McSaveney and
Davies report.
The Westland District Council is continually reminding owners who wish to ex-
pand their businesses of the hazard implications.
The Regional Council’s response to resource consents for river protection works
on the Waiho River is consistent with our views on communicating the hazard. We
pass each application to one of the authors of our report to ensure the request is
situated within the appropriate context. We are tending to give short duration
consents with appropriate monitoring and removal conditions.
Monitoring
The survey monitoring information provides an immediate context for decisions
on hazard level and possible community activities, and as well providing a data-
base for the modelling and engineering work we consider will be part of any
lasting solution.
Civil Defence
The Westland District Council, with assistance from the Ministry for Emergency
Management, has upgraded its civil defence capabilities at Franz Josef. As the
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Waiho is a short, steep system, floods arise very quickly and there is little time to
warn and evacuate residents and tourists. A well-experienced civil defence team
is absolutely critical to prevent a tragedy.
In support the Regional Council has installed a flood warning system to supple-
ment (not supersede) the existing human-based civil defence processes.
Risk Communications Methodology
Our Council understood the importance of the need to inform and to engage the
community in finding the best solution. This is our role as local government
managers and as technical professionals.
We were also driven by the realisation that a lasting solution was beyond the
financial resources of either the Franz Josef community or the two councils (repre-
senting all ratepayers on the West Coast) and hence any approach to central
government for financial assistance would require a consensus in the local com-
munity.
Risk Communications: Practical Realities and Solutions
Our first major risk communications challenge was to translate a highly complex
report to the community that was busy managing their significant investments,
while having regard to the differing roles of the two Councils, and having to
integrate the interests of Transit New Zealand, the Ministry of Emergency Manage-
ment and the Ministry for the Environment.
For our Council, risk communications means ensuring that the right information
exists and is effectively transferred (that we have the most effective processes in
place to do so), and that we are managing the expectations and concerns that
arise in the community.
Translating the Report’s Findings
The first stage in managing the content of the McSaveney and Davies report was
to have it reviewed by staff of the two Councils and Transit New Zealand. This was
done on a confidential basis to ensure that we ironed out concerns before the
report was released. We wanted to prevent the disruptive impact of organisations
squabbling over the report in public. The community has a right to expect that
professionals can collectively and constructively work through their differences.
As the report’s findings on the cause of the aggradation were so contrary to the
standard river engineering philosophy of West Coast engineers, it took an exter-
nal peer review to settle discussions and to have the report’s findings accepted.
Even in spite of this concerted effort we continue to have to address dissenting
views. We have always shown extreme patience with these dissenting views and
when these are expressed in public we respectfully listen then patiently rebuild
our case.
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The next stage was to release the report to a selected number of residents,
picking those who were prominent in the rating districts that manage the existing
river works. This was done first on a confidential basis, and then as we began to
hear back from them, we allowed them to increase the circulation of the report.
In the various formal and informal meetings held with the community over the
contents of the report we have be patient to listen to and consider their views of
the hazard and how it should be managed. On several occasions we have brought
our consultants back into the community to re-discuss issues. The cost of doing
so has been significant, but as we might lose the support of the community if this
is not done, then the cost is considered acceptable. We found it very important to
have these sessions in public as it is easy for a dissenter to disrupt our work in
the community because we are not there on any continuing basis.
The report was made available to the public and certainly any prospective prop-
erty buyer who contacted either Council received the report (but staff were di-
rected not to talk about how the report might impact on property under sale).
Interestingly enough several properties and leases on the south side changed
hands after the report was released.
Managing the Inter-Council Relationship with the Community
We had to carefully manage the relationship between our Regional Council and
the Westland District Council. We have split our respective roles with the Regional
Council being responsible for hazard identification and warning, and the Westland
District Council being responsible for hazard management.
Both Councils realised the importance of a combined and sustained approach.
Consequently we formed a Joint Committee under the Local Government Act to
ensure that the issue obtained critical political support and that it worked with
the community through a public process. The subsequent Waiho Hazard Manage-
ment Committee was composed of two councillors from each council and several
residents elected in a public meeting. A Westland District Councillor chaired it as
the Committee’s focus is on hazard management. Staff from both councils provide
support to the committee. The Department of Conservation was also involved
due to its significant investment and responsibilities in the area. Our Council
used the Committee as its primary communications vehicle with the community.
As a risk communications vehicle this approach has certain strengths and weak-
nesses. Certainly one of its strengths is that it is an open process where meetings
have to be advertised, proper procedures followed and minutes kept. It also
engages local politicians whose support is necessary in any search for funding.
On the down side our expectations that the local representatives would interact
with others in the community was not fully realised. Everyone is seen to have a
vested interest and it is difficult for him or her to be separated from any recom-
mendation made by the Joint Committee. Also the local representatives are not as
conditioned as staff and councillors in handling diverse and sometimes extreme
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views. Even engaging councillors is challenging due to the complex nature of the
hazard and of the very public way we sought to manage communications. How-
ever one of our Regional Councillors who was committed actually went through
the community on an individual basis to gain input.
In communicating its efforts the Committee had to be conscious of the ‘structure’
of the Franz Josef community. There are a number of ways to stratify this small
community, for example: there are those who live and work there and those who
own from outside; there are long-term and others who are short-term residents (a
high transient workforce exists to service the tourist trade); and there are those
who live on the north side of the Waiho River and those who live on the south
side. As discussions about the best option to solve the river threat developed,
negative feelings between the north and south sides increased. We attempted to
deal with this diversity through public presentations on the report and through
the Committee that represented the range of views in the community.
Whenever we discussed the issue we were certain to remain consistent with the
report’s findings and to listen carefully to comments received. We, along with our
consultants, also had to deal with some very individual agendas.
Managing Relationships with Central Government Departments
Transit New Zealand has a prominent position on the West Coast because we are
so dependent upon their transportation decisions. At Franz Josef, Transit New
Zealand is recognised as a good citizen who has come to the aid of the commu-
nity during flood events.
Transit New Zealand is obviously committed to maintaining State Highway 6 with
stopbanks along the south side of the Waiho River. It wants to maintain this
protection. Even a few days of closure of this main transportation route have
been shown to have a significant impact on regional economic activities.
Keeping Transit New Zealand involved is of utmost importance to our process for
managing the Waiho hazard. Having them alongside the councils and the commu-
nity is very much part of our communications strategy.
Transit New Zealand has been engaged in our process from the initial report
review stage. They attend the public meetings and have participated in a subse-
quent study costing the options for managing the river threat. They have indi-
cated a willingness to contribute to a ‘final’ option but only as far as their respon-
sibilities take them. They will not be a cash cow to help the community out of its
dilemma and this is a perfectly reasonable decision. Hence one of the risk com-
munications objectives is to ensure that the community is aware of Transit’s
responsibilities and commitments.
As we promoted this community’s issue to central government (done primarily
through our local Member of Parliament) both the Ministry for the Environment
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(through their past involvements in river schemes) and the Ministry for Emer-
gency Management (for their risk management responsibilities) sought to be-
come involved. Such involvements presented certain challenges to our efforts to
manage the risk communications process. On one hand we had to ensure they
were fully aware of the background and status of our efforts, and not inadvert-
ently comprise our efforts, and on the other we had a community that could have
adverse reactions to a flying visit of ‘Wellington suits’.
Overall they handled their involvement professionally, making certain they were
properly briefed and that they knew who to talk to in the community. Their
findings were dutifully reported back to the Councils and helped in particular to
spur on planning actions by the Westland District Council. Both departments are
still engaged with our Councils in finding a solution. The continuing commitment
of the staff of these two organisations has proved extremely helpful.
Managing Expectations on Central Government Discussions
Small communities hear and know everything. As we worked through our Member
of Parliament to gain support from central government the community’s concerns
and expectations became acute.
Our Council was invited by the Ministry for the Environment to approach the
community to determine their ability to contribute to a solution (that was identi-
fied in the $14-22 million range). This discussion took place around the concept
of a single-rating district for Franz Josef and its environs. The appropriate public
meetings took place; however the process became stuck on the reality that with-
out knowing exactly what they were to contribute to, the community declined to
commit. Also, even though the river-related threats exist (in somewhat different
forms) for both north and south side residents, many on the north side sought to
distance themselves from any solution. A petition was made to our Council to this
effect. Hence as the reality of costs struck home we have to deal with a further
partitioning in the community.
These meetings occurred in the spring of 2000 and now two years later, we still
are without a commitment from central government to assist the community. As
the current government deals with the changes to the civil defence and emer-
gency management legislation, the associated organisational changes, and the
yet-to-be made decisions on their Disaster Recovery Plan, our inquiries are con-
tinuing to be unsuccessful.
We have remained committed to this quest, however, and are now renewing our
approaches to central government with the Ministry for the Environment’s critical
support. In the meantime we have to deal with the community’s expectations that
central government relief is possible, an expectation that we raised in the com-
munity. All we can do is continually tell the community that while central govern-
ment has not said yes, they have not said no. We can only continue to try while
ensuring the community maintains its awareness of the river hazard.
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Managing Community ‘Continuing-Use’ Interests
As our process continues, the Councils are faced with a range of interests that
have to be managed within the context of a yet undefined long-term solution.
How we react to continual economic development pressures is very much part of
the messaging we have to make to and on behalf of the community.
The last thing we seek is to allow any action that undoes the progress we have
made. Decisions Councils must now make with regards to further river protection
and building have to either lessen, or at least not aggravate, the present threats.
Certainly they cannot prevent a further option.
The practical steps we are taking to manage this aspect are outlined in the
section on Risk Management.
Managing the Media
We never had an explicit communication plan, but we ensured that the local
media were informed of our Committee meetings, that all reports were copied to
them, and that Councillors were available for interviews.
Evaluation
Against Methodology
If we consider an integrated risk management framework (management, assess-
ment and communications are continually linked and modified) then the Councils
have, and are continuing to assess the risk, to place management actions in
place and to consult with the community. With the various elements of integrated
risk management distributed amongst local and central governments, then over-
all it is believed we have kept it together well.
Whatever success we are having is directly attributable to individuals in the Franz
Josef community, in our Councils (staff and councillors), in the Ministry for the
Environment (in particular) and the Ministry of Emergency Management, most of
whom have made a personal commitment to protecting the community and work-
ing towards a lasting solution. There is a similar level of commitment from staff at
the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences and from Lincoln University. Their
professional commitment has been exemplary.
We have been at this issue for three years now. If there was criticism of our
efforts, it would be on timeframes. Some of the steps taken have been slow in
coming, and this is mostly due to the reality of small Councils with very limited
resources.
External Assessment
We are fortunate that two ‘community response’ studies have been undertaken.
The first one was sponsored by the Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences and
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took place in 1999 after the hazard report was released (Gough, Johnston and
McSaveney, 1999). The second report followed the establishment of the local
hazards committee and public consultations on the possible options for manag-
ing the river (Gough, 2001). Our Council sponsored the second report.
The key communications observations in the first report were:
• There was a general awareness of the likelihood of a flood and an under-
standing of the consequences (although this was not so true on the south
side);
• Sense of complacency on evacuation procedures;
• General concern for the tourists exposed in the south side accommodations;
• Community wanted a task group formed;
• Recognition that this was a national issue;
• Expectation that the community would be consulted on future options; and
• Concern that the community would opt for a cheap short term option (as
many business owners are there for a relatively short time to make money and
leave).
The key communications observations in the second report, remembering that
this report was commissioned after the Waiho Committee was active, were as
follows.
Improvements
• Increased awareness of the hazard reports and the implications of these risks;
• Residents taking precautions in case of an emergency (supplementary power,
staff training, food reserves); and
• Considerable support for the Regional Council and a reasonable understand-
ing of the relative roles of the two councils.
Concerns
• Continued concerns for information flow for those businesses that are leased
and to residents who rent;
• General need for more information through the mail;
• Council prepared information targeted for employees is required;
• A split between the north and south side residents;
• Increased economic activity has led to a concern that people will ignore the
warnings; and
• General uncertainty about the current status of Civil Defence.
These reports show that while improvements in understanding the risks have
occurred, certain areas require more careful attention, and most importantly the
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Councils need to keep their risk communications active.
Summary
Effective risk communication requires good process and commitment. The efforts
of science organisations and local and central governments to address the signifi-
cant hazards at Franz Josef on the West Coast are generally consistent with good
practice for integrated risk management and for risk communications. But the key
to our success has been the commitment of individuals in these organisations
and in the community itself.
The critical task of keeping track of and integrating the various organisational
inputs has been relatively easy due to the professionalism of all concerned.
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9 Communication and Consultation
 — Some Observations on the
ERMA New Zealand Experience
Karen Cronin
This chapter addresses the issue of communicating about issues and activities
that have a risk component, within a regulatory framework.
In this second paper, Karen describes how the Environmental Risk Management
Authority has sought to meet its obligations to communicate and interact with
stakeholders, within the statutory provisions set down in the Hazardous Sub-
stances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act 1996. The Authority manages the intro-
duction of new organisms, including genetically modified organisms, and of haz-
ardous substances to New Zealand.
A report published in 2000 by the Centre for Impact Assessment, Research and
Training at Otago University reviewed and analysed ERMA’s approach. While the
CIART report was positive about some aspects, it also criticised other areas and
suggested ways that ERMA might improve its approach. Karen notes that op-
tions for consultation are limited by the requirements of the HSNO Act but that
ERMA had gone beyond the statutory requirements in several respects.
Responding to the report, and reflecting the experience gained in its first years
of operation, ERMA has since made a number of changes in the way public
opinion is sought and incorporated in the decision process. Karen concludes by
raising a series of fundamental questions for public agencies when developing
communication programmes, including the need for proactive approaches to
engaging stakeholders, the incorporation of social responses into decision-mak-
ing and the role of risk communication in the risk management process.
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The Environmental Risk Management Authority
The Environmental Risk Management Authority was established under the Hazardous
Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act 1996. ERMA controls the introduction
of new plants and animals, including genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and
new and existing hazardous substances to New Zealand.
The Authority is a semi-judicial decision-making body with up to 8 members
appointed by the Minister for the Environment (currently the Hon. Marian Hobbs).
It is supported by a professional staff of around 50, known as ERMA New Zealand.
Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao is an advisory committee appointed by the Authority
under the HSNO Act. Nga Kaihautu helps the Authority with information on:
• taking account of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi;
• how Maori approach risk and risk aversion;
• specific risks of concern to Maori;
• appropriate consultation with Maori where risks are identified;
• the extent to which applications satisfactorily address Maori perspectives; and
• other advice on tikanga Maori as required.
Nga Kaihautu has a direct relationship with the Authority rather than applicants.
The chairperson takes part in governance meetings of the Authority. It may have
up to 6 members and can co-opt more people with specific expertise if needed
for particular issues. The committee does not represent specific iwi or hapu.
The purpose of the Authority is to protect the environment and the health and
safety of people and communities by preventing or managing the adverse effects
of hazardous substances and new organisms. The functions of the Authority include:
• Making decisions on applications under Part V of the Hazardous Substances
and New Organisms (HSNO) Act, by evaluating risks, costs and benefits and
placing conditions on approvals; and making decisions on transitional licenses
and other approvals;
• Transferring existing approvals to the HSNO Act;
• Monitoring and coordinating compliance with the Act and Authority decisions;
• Promoting public awareness of the risks of hazardous substances and new
organisms;
• Advising the Minister for the Environment on the effectiveness of the Act and
other matters; and
• Inquiring into accidents or emergencies.
The Authority’s main role is to make decisions on applications to import, develop,
or field test new organisms; or to import or manufacture hazardous substances.
These applications are made under Part V of the Act. Decisions by the Authority
are final and cannot be appealed – unlike under other environmental legislation.
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However, a decision by the Authority can be challenged on a point of law. To date
there has only been one appeal on an Authority decision.
There is provision for the Minister for the Environment to ‘call in’ an application
but, having done so, he or she must consider it under the same criteria applying
to the Authority.
Hazardous substance and new organism applications
A hazardous substance is any substance that may be explosive, flammable, able
to oxidise, corrosive, toxic or eco-toxic. Anyone who uses or is involved with
hazardous substances needs good information on their potential risks and how
to use them safely. The HSNO Act provides a platform for completely assessing a
hazardous substance so that it can be managed appropriately throughout its
lifecycle. The Act commenced for hazardous substances on 2 July 2001. Every new
hazardous substance imported or manufactured in New Zealand after that date
requires an approval from the Authority.
A ‘new organism’ is a new species coming into New Zealand for the first time. If it
was not here before the Act came into effect on 29 July 1998, it has to be approved
by the Authority. A new organism could be a breed of fish for marine farming, a
zoo animal, a packet of seeds, a flower plant, a new micro-organism, or a genetically
modified organism.
A GMO is any organism in which the genes have been modified by using in vitro
(recombinant DNA) techniques, for example GM potatoes or pine trees modified
to resist disease or improve their growth rate.
Since commencement in 1998, the Authority has received 267 applications, of
which 5 have been declined, 189 approved with controls, and 24 approved without
controls (the remainder were withdrawn).
Communication and consultation
To ‘consult’ means: “to have deliberations with someone, to seek information or
advice from a person or to take their feelings and interests into consideration”
(Concise Oxford Dictionary). Consultation is a two-way process which provides
information and an opportunity to comment. It provides for external contributions
to decision-making, from a range of sources.
A distinction can be made between ‘consultation’ and ‘communication’ or ‘public
awareness’ programmes. Communication, including public relations, involves giving
targeted information to selected audiences, to highlight key messages from an
organisation with the aim of positioning it effectively with external publics. Public
awareness programmes are aimed at educating the public or specified groups
about certain issues or practices, to increase knowledge, understanding or to
alter attitudes and behaviour.
121
Karen Cronin
‘Risk Communication’ uses a full range of approaches from information to
communication, awareness raising, and consultation.
General communication activities
As a small agency, ERMA NZ has only limited resources for communications work
and undertakes the following:
• ERMA NZ official website;
• an educational website on Hazardous Substances and New Organisms developed
with the Ministry for the Environment;
• quarterly newsletter Perspective;
• Annual conference;
• seminars and workshops on current policy issues;
• an industry consultative group meeting 3-4 times a year for industry/scientists
involved with HS or NO;
• an NGO consultative group meeting 3-4 times a year and/or written update;
• a public speaking programme – giving talks on request and to specified sectors
on key topics;
• targeted educational material for key groups e.g. small and medium enterprises
using HS, and Maori;
• regional meetings/site visits to industry or community groups;
• a wide range of publications including: policy documents, protocols for guiding
decision-making, quick guides to ERMA NZ operations, information sheets on
key issues;
• displays;
• videos/community education kits;
• participation in wider government education programmes, e.g. on biosecurity
awareness or on GM issues; and
• media liaison – general news, feature stories, etc.
Communication and consultation requirements under the HSNO Act
Under the Act, the Authority has a range of functions that will require communication
and consultation at some point. Some of these functions, particularly making
decisions under Part V, have specified processes for public input. Other functions,
such as developing policy to provide advice to the Minister, may benefit from
consultation, but this is done as a matter of general practice, rather than through
specified provisions.
The Authority has therefore developed two consultation policies:
• ERMA New Zealand Policy on Consultation (November 1998); and
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• Policy on Consultation and Interaction under Part V of the HSNO Act 1996,
published in April 1999 (recently updated but not yet republished).
The first policy covers general consultation by ERMA NZ on matters other than
those under Part V of the HSNO Act.
Consultation has been an important part of the work of the Authority since its
establishment in 1996. For example, under the Act the Authority was required to
develop a methodology – a set of guidelines to be used when considering new
organism or hazardous substance applications. Interestingly – and perhaps uniquely
in New Zealand law – the methodology itself was then formalised into statute by
way of an Order in Council. The Act required the Authority to prepare a draft
methodology, consult with the public about it, and report public submissions to
the government which then approved the final document and drafted it into law.
This provided an interesting political ‘balance’: the government had delegated
decision power to an independent Authority, but ensured that the way the issues
were weighed up and judged was constrained by a decision-making methodology
it approved.
Consultation on the methodology took place in a tight time frame over two
months in late 1997. The Authority had been in place less than a year and the new
managers and staff were only just being appointed. This programme involved
seven public meetings and seven hui in regions around New Zealand and a call
for written submissions. The regional visits served to put ERMA on the map and
provided the basis for later consultation with local communities.
ERMA also sought input on other policy, notably the development of a set of
‘Protocols’ that elaborated on the Authority’s thinking and approach to decision-
making. These documents provided more detail than could be written into the
formal Methodology Order in Council (1998) but did not have the same legal
standing.
The Authority has also consulted on the design of the application process (the
administrative and operational apparatus for making decisions on applications);
on its proposed fees and charges; a proposed enforcement and compliance regime;
and on how it might deal with issues of significance to Maori.
The general consultation policy (1998) set out how the Authority intended to run
such consultation programmes. It recognized two objectives:
• To enable accurate, quality information to be provided to the Authority for
achieving its functions under the HSNO Act; and
• To ensure that all organizations and individuals with an interest or a stake in
the work of ERMA NZ have an opportunity to interact, present their views and
be informed.
The aim was to conduct consultation in a way that enhanced ERMA New Zealand’s
“operation and its reputation”. A number of standards for good performance were
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set out: who might be consulted, how information would be made public, how
submissions might be made, and feedback on the final result. It also outlined
approaches to Maori consultation, requiring input from Nga Kaihautu Tikanga
Taiao on specific consultation programmes.
When it came to public participation on new organism and hazardous substance
applications, a different approach was seen as necessary. ERMA NZ argued that
this was not consultation in the general sense, or even in the sense set by
precedent under other law. The HSNO Act itself set out specific procedures and
these were seen as primary.
The policy on Part V applications uses the term ‘interaction’ to limit any generic
expectations on consultation, and makes it clear how far public views will be
allowed to influence the decision-making power of the Authority:
“In the context of Part V decision-making, the basic reason for
consulting and interacting with stakeholders is to contribute to high
quality information and informed decision-making” (Policy on
Consultation and Interaction under Part V of the HSNO Act 1996,
April 1999 p.5)
Referring to a model of different levels of influence on public agency decision
makers, the Authority made it clear that it would operate under an approach of
‘limited influence’:
“...in the process other information is sought or received. While
external views are taken into account, the final decision is still made
by the public authority. It is communicated to all parties, showing
how their comments were considered and how the outcome was
reached.” (op cit p.5)
Citing its formal decision-making role under HSNO, the Authority described itself as:
“a quasi-judicial body, with powers similar to those of court judges.
The opportunities for external comment are formally set down in the
Act, including procedures for notified and non-notified applications.
The Authority follows a prescribed statutory process of publicly
notifying relevant applications, receiving submissions, and holding
hearings. Decisions are made on the basis of the Act and the
Methodology.” (op cit p.7)
This strictly legal approach was seen as important to limit the extent to which
‘public opinion’ would have an effect on HSNO decisions. The Authority was
committed to rational decision-making, seeking submissions that provided ‘accurate’
and ‘quality’ information, with a strong reliance on scientific fact rather than
values or opinion.
Experience since that document was first published raises a number of issues,
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about the approach taken to decision-making by public agencies generally, and
also about the basis of rational risk assessment.
Public input to the application process
The ERMA consultation policy provides for a mix of statutory (*) and non statutory
steps, and (for notified applications) follows an operational time line, as follows:
Pre Application
• General information on ERMA, news and issues — ‘Perspective’ newsletter;
• General updates on applications in progress — consultative group meetings;
• Local Maori and other community consultation by applicant;
• Formal lodging of application*; and
• Verification of application by ERMA NZ staff.
Consultation
• Advice to Minister (opportunity to call in)*;
• Statutory notification to key agencies, e.g. DoC, regional councils*;
• Entry in formal Public Register*;
• Information on ERMA NZ website;
• Public notice in major daily papers and opening of submission period*;
• Media release for significant applications/ongoing media liaison;
• Bulletin (gazette of applications and decisions issued 9-10 times per year);
• Letter to those on application interest list;
• Statutory consultation with specified government agencies*;
• Distribution of executive summary/full application documents;
• Close of submissions (Note: any person can make a submission)*;
• Submissions analysis and report;
• Additional expert evaluation if required by ERMA;
• Nga Kaihautu evaluation and independent report; and
• ERMA NZ staff evaluation and review report.
Pre Hearing
• Pre-hearing meetings (with applicant/submitters on technical issues); and
• Announcement of hearing (Note: any submitter can call for a hearing)*.
Hearing
• Presentation of oral submissions to a committee of the Authority*.
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Post Hearing
• Formal consideration period and writing of Decision;
• Public issue of Decision — formal notification to parties and to general public*;
and
• Register/website information and media release.
Criticisms of the ERMA approach
In June 2000, researchers at the Centre for Impact Assessment, Research and
Training, University of Otago, published an evaluation of the ERMA approval process,
titled Public Involvement, Risk and Genetically Modified Organisms (Morgan, R K
and Archibald, B, 2000).
The report looked at the kinds of risks and effects being taken into account by
ERMA and the way the Authority was going about public participation. It focused
on GMO applications, which were the main business of the Authority at that date.
Biotechnology had begun to attract increasing social comment and concern,
internationally and in New Zealand:
“vigorous discussion of genetic engineering in the popular media,
rallies and protests opposing genetic engineering, heated public
meetings and lectures, and even the destruction of GMO sites [were
all] symptoms of a broadly based concern about the technology and
its implications for society.” (op cit page.1)
The researchers felt that given the level of public anxiety and the degree of
polarisation it was important that any regulatory processes should involve the
public and that, after two years of operation, it was timely to evaluate the ERMA
process. This was seen as important to:
“minimise the danger of longer term damage to public trust and
confidence in the approval process” (ibid).
Commenting on the difficulties of involving the public in consultation generally,
the authors noted that this is exacerbated when dealing with complex scientific
or technological activities, especially those with “potentially severe but vaguely
defined risks”. They noted that:
“regulatory authorities dealing with the approval of potentially high
risk activities have to deal with these challenges and involve the
public in an effective way, if concerns are to be allayed and proposed
activities are to receive the sanction of local communities.”
(page 2).
This is quite an important comment, in that it reflects a view that public sanction
is a pre-requisite when dealing with highly risky technologies. It also throws into
relief the underlying tensions in the ERMA situation – the relationship between
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scientific information as advocated by ERMA itself, and the expectations of others
for a wider and more socially responsive process.
The researchers commented that ERMA New Zealand was taking public involvement
“very seriously” and were positive about a number of aspects of the current
approach:
• The HSNO Act (1996) provides considerable opportunity for public input in the
decision-making process. When the Act was passed the then Minister for the
Environment, Hon. Simon Upton, commented that it provided a process to
assess and control new organisms “in as transparent and publicly accessible
way as can be practicably achieved.” (cited at page 1). ERMA NZ facilitates
public input through opportunities to make written submissions and the right
to call for and attend public hearings (page 11).
• The Authority had publicly outlined its approach to consultation in the 1999
policy document.
• ERMA New Zealand encouraged applicants to consult stakeholder groups and
at an early stage in the process before formal applications were made. And
specific consideration was given to Maori concerns, including guidelines
prepared for applicants (page 11).
• In addition to the statutory provisions, ERMA New Zealand had developed
other mechanisms such as providing an executive summary of applications,
posting information on the website, through publications, and public awareness
activities such as seminars on GM issues. (page.12).
However, they also raised a number of criticisms (pp.12-16):
• There was no requirement on applicants to consult with interested parties
before public submissions were called for. Applicants were required to identify
all possible effects on the ‘environment’, but this was not being extended to
the community as part of the definition of the environment (see page 23). The
public was therefore not been told about proposals or used as a source of
information on social effects.
• The focus on early consultation, where it was required, was mainly for the
purpose of generating information for the applicant to put in the application
and thereafter for the decision makers, i.e. consultation was undertaken for
that end use only.
• ERMA NZ itself did not consult with the general public in the risk identification
or assessment phase.
• There was a focus on specific technical issues related to the application at
hand, rather than dealing with general concerns. In this context, peoples’
cultural and spiritual beliefs were not being taken into account, although
there was provision for this under the objectives of the Act.
• Spiritual concerns of Maori were given consideration, but non-Maori spiritual
and cultural views appeared to have received less attention.
• Even so, the effectiveness of consultation by applicants with local Maori was
questioned (including by the Authority’s own Maori advisory committee). And
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the quality of responses by local Maori might be limited by the lack of a
national philosophical framework, based on tikanga, and developed by Maori
generally.
• The process of notification, relying on public notices in newspapers, was seen
as inadequate. Other methods (e.g. advertising on local radio, community
flyers, local meetings and displays) should also be considered.
• Within the operational process, submitters found it hard to prepare submissions
as the lay public were not generally aware of what information would be seen
as relevant. People (at that time) were generally not aware of the HSNO Act
and the ERMA approval process.
• Hearings (at that time) had all been held in Wellington, making it difficult for
some people to attend.
• The process of the hearings was seen as too formal and legalistic, inhibiting
an exchange between submitters and the Authority, and between submitters
and the applicant. More informal opportunities should be created for
stakeholders to negotiate or receive feedback from others.
• There was a major problem with the type of information regarded by ERMA as
relevant i.e. “unless submitters’ arguments have a valid scientific basis they
might not be considered”. Under those circumstances, the biophysical aspects
of the proposal might be given more attention than the health and well-being
of people and communities.
• Even within the technical information, there was an expectation that empirical
support for arguments was required before theoretical or hypothetical processes
might be given any weight.
• The approach taken to effects (technical/biophysical) limited the ability of the
Authority to identify the full range of social and community effects of a proposal.
This meant that the views of communities living near a field test, for example,
might be overlooked in the assessment process.
• The focus, by ERMA, on issues related only to the application at hand, left
submitters with no place to air their concerns about wider aspects of
biotechnology and the kind of social and economic options that the community
preferred for the future.
The researchers set out a set of general principles for effective public participation
(see pp 5-6):
• Early involvement of the public, so that concerns can be addressed before
they lead to antagonism.
• Development of an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect.
• A decision-making process that recognises the contribution of local people,
involves them in a meaningful way; and that is not technocratic and elitist.
• Recognising different groups in the community and involving them in an
appropriate way.
• Recognising social and cultural concerns and giving them due consideration
along with technical, ecological and economic variables.
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• Participation procedures that allow the public to know how they might be
affected and how they can take part.
• Effective communication of information about the risks involved to lay people,
using a range of media, so that people can understand and take part.
They were critical of ERMA’s view that the purpose of consultation was primarily
to provide information to decision-makers; and that this information was being
focused on scientific and technical variables, rather than other contributions:
“This view ignores the wider benefits of public involvement, such as
legitimizing the activity in the eyes of the local community, promoting
accountability in the decision-making process, and simply informing
local people.” (page 23).
Moreover, the framing of the risks – and how significant they might be – was left
to applicants and the Authority. There was no opportunity for the public to have
a say at the early stages of risk identification by the applicant, in helping to
decide if a risk existed or was significant. At the point when ERMA New Zealand
staff evaluated the application, there was no evidence that the involvement of
the public by the applicant was reviewed. There was also no opportunity for
public input in the decision-making phase to decide if the proposal constituted a
low or high risk.
The researchers went on to suggest that decision-making might be opened up to
the public, for example through the use of citizen juries and other methods. Given
that ERMA practised ‘limited influence’ decision-making, and was not representative
of the public, the authors argued for alternative models which would:
“allow for a community perspective to be brought into the heart of
the decision-making.” (pp. 25-26).
They concluded that the approach ERMA was using, particularly as laid out under
the Methodology, was ‘technocratic’, and more so than other regimes (e.g. as
used by local authorities under the Resource Management Act):
“ERMA has adopted an explicit risk assessment/risk management
approach to its operations despite the fact that the HSNO Act lacks
any formal requirement for such an approach”.
This is quite a provocative conclusion since it begs the question of whether risk
management is inherently technocratic or if it is simply being interpreted in a
narrow technical fashion.
Recent changes
ERMA New Zealand and the Authority have made a number of changes to its
procedures since the publication of the CIART report, two years ago. The Authority
examined the report in detail and noted the ideas about what more could be
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done in the Part V process. However, it restated that the process is a semi-judicial
one, set down under a set of statutory criteria and that several of the suggestions
made by the authors were therefore not appropriate under its statutory role. The
Authority nevertheless went on to approve a range of additional measures for
public input, at different points in the process, including:
Notification period:
• Actively identify and notify all key local stakeholders, e.g. neighbours;
• Local public meetings/seminar to explain proposal;
• Greater local media exposure and advertising;
• Displays and information in local libraries, council offices;
• Providing simply worded explanations of the proposal (not just relying on the
Executive Summary provided by the applicant); and
• Giving submitters help to write submissions (e.g. in a workshop).
Evaluation and review period:
• Hold pre-hearing technical information meetings;
• Hold pre-hearing facilitation/negotiation;
• Conduct research to measure perceptions of risk;
• Provide other external input to the risk evaluation, e.g. citizens panel or experts
group;
• Evaluate how well the applicant has involved the public; and
• Site visits for the media.
Hearing:
• Site visit prior to or during the hearing for all parties and the media; and
• Less formal procedures, e.g. more interaction between applicant and submitters.
Post Decision:
• Notify all key stakeholders (not just the formal parties to the submission); and
• If approved, consult locally as part of ongoing monitoring.
This policy was approved as a “menu of possible options that can be considered
where appropriate” (ERMA New Zealand , 2001). In addition, ERMA New Zealand
has commissioned two operational reviews: one on the process used for generating,
analysing and reporting on public submissions; and another on the process used
for publicly notifying applications and decisions. These reports have led to further
innovations and improvements in the operational process. Finally, the Authority
has issued two guidance documents that provide further direction for public
involvement in risk management under the Act.
About the same time as the Otago researchers were doing their work, ERMA New
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Zealand prepared and published a technical guide to identifying risks for
applications under the HSNO Act. This guide sets out a recommended approach
to identifying risk which includes socio-economic sources of risk and social/cultural
areas of risk effect.
Following the approach defined in the Australia/New Zealand Standard for Risk
Management (AS/NZS: 4360 Risk management), it emphasised the social dimension
in scoping out the context of the risks, and in the identification and assessment
phases. In suggesting techniques for risk identification, the guide makes note of
options such as brainstorming and the Delphi technique although it does not
refer to any specific mechanisms for public consultation or community input.
A further technical guide, Taking Account of Cultural, Ethical and Community
Issues, was developed in consultation with the Royal Society, MAF and the Health
Research Council, and published in August 2000. It was aimed at researchers who
might be involved with GMO applications that raised ethical concerns e.g. using
human genes. It leaned heavily on process matters, with reference to existing
guidelines (e.g. the Animal Welfare Act). It covered issues such as informed consent,
disclosure of the source of human genetic material, and the use of Maori experts
in decision-making when cultural issues were significant. It noted that community
concerns might also arise about the end use of a GMO, and genetic modifications
involving transgenes or native flora and fauna:
“If work is to be carried out in these areas, then this should be
made clear to the community and opportunities provided for the
public to ask questions and have concerns addressed” (page 10).
However it provided no specific methods or requirements for public input.
Some observations
The HSNO Act was passed in 1996 at a time when no one could have predicted
the speed and complexity of technical change that society would face in future
years. The developments in biotechnology have been significant, with the emergence
of new methods of genetic modification and the convergence of technologies
(such as nutriceuticals) which have surpassed even the most vivid imagination of
a legislator in the mid 1990s.
Genetic engineering is a multinational business which has raised substantial public
debate in countries all around the word. While the New Zealand legislation was
innovative in its time, to some extent the technology itself has outstripped the
capacity of out regulatory and political processes to deal with it.
Criticisms have been made of ERMA New Zealand — by researchers such as
Richard Morgan and Bronwyn Archibald — and indeed by participants in the
process including the applicants and the submitters.
The ERMA New Zealand experience illustrates a number of issues for public agencies,
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and for those of us who are interested in best practice in risk management and
risk communication.
A series of questions relating to communication and consultation arise from this
background.
On communication and consultation:
• What place should communication play in the risk management process?
• To what extent should it be one-way communication or a two-way process
designed to facilitate external input?
• How far should we go with consultation? How much influence should various
stakeholders have in risk identification and assessment – and in risk decision
making?
• To what extent can risk communication help us to identify social and community
risks, which may not be picked up by other methods?
• Is public concern about technology simply a perception or is it also a social
effect?
On risk identification and assessment:
• How can we evaluate social, cultural and ethical concerns, alongside other
technical or biophysical risk information?
• Is consultation simply a method of supplying information and risk data – or is
it meant to be part of the risk management process itself?
• Can regulatory decision-making about risk operate alongside other methods
of assessment and evaluation?
On risk decision making:
• To what extent should risk decision-makers be responding to public opinion?
• For some forms of technological risk, should regulatory decision making be
replaced with other models of evaluation and decision making?
• Is risk management inherently a technical process or does it provide the basis
for us to work within a social context and deal with issues that are thrown up
through communication and consultation with the public?
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10 Risk AppetiteAdrian Sparrow
The concept of ‘risk appetite’, or willingness to accept risk, is intrinsic to all
decision-making, but is seldom expressed explicitly. This can lead to different
parts of organisations having different attitudes towards risk, leading to incon-
sistent decisions. Good internal risk communication processes, as part of an
organisation’s risk management programme, can provide a mechanism to en-
hance transparency and consistency.
In this chapter, Adrian describes a project that analysed the risk appetite of
different managers within Treasury. The process assessed the risk appetite of a
selected group of individual managers at different levels in the organisation, by
asking them to rate their perception of the organisation’s preferred risk appetite
(based on a balancing of risk and reward) against a number of dimensions
relating to core activities of the organisation.  The result of this exercise demon-
strated the differences between expectations of different levels of management,
and of different groups within Treasury.
While the project stopped short of implementing a risk communication programme,
it clearly highlighted the importance of ensuring that all levels and groups within
an organisation have the same understanding of the policies and attitudes relat-
ing to risk (which may vary according to different activities undertaken). This
often requires that these policies be established at the top level and communi-
cated down through the organisation.
Adrian concludes by describing the benefits gained by undertaking the exercise,
including a greater awareness of issues relating to risk appetite and risk man-
agement in general, and an understanding of the importance of balancing risk
and opportunity.
This chapter is important to the context of the book for two reasons: firstly
because it addresses the issue of communicating risk internally within an
organisation, and secondly because it highlights the importance of decision-
maker and stakeholder attitudes towards risk, or risk appetite.
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Introduction
This project originated when the Secretary to the Treasury wanted to compare
risks that people believe they are encouraged to take, with how much risk Treasury
actually takes. A short internal exercise was commissioned, that involved all
managers as respondents. All members of the Treasury were given unrestricted
access to the results.
This paper outlines the process by which Treasury’s risk appetite was laid open
for debate: how dimensions against which to gauge risk appetite were developed,
the rationale underlying the process, the results, and some lessons learnt.
Background
A risk assessment programme updated the Treasury risk profile. To give the
assessment some context, it was important to compare senior management risk
appetite on key dimensions with (a) perceptions of senior management risk appetite
and (b) the actual exposure for each dimension. A simple, visual comparison
offered the best way to get a better understanding of the trade-off between risk
and reward, and a better alignment of expectations with practice.
The process steps were very simple:
• Design a questionnaire.
• Verify the questionnaire by the senior management group.
• Have selected respondents complete the questionnaire anonymously.
• Compile aggregated results.
• Facilitate a discussion within respondent groups to compare senior management
ratings with the ratings of other individuals or groups to highlight any large
gaps.
• Highlight gaps, discovering why each gap occurred.
• Use established planning processes to better align expectations, perceptions
and actual exposures.
Indicators and Performance measures
Figure 1 is a simple flow chart that shows how Treasury works. This chart was
used to identify the fourteen most important dimensions of risk to Treasury, and
to locate those dimensions in four groups relative to the model:
Input/Infrastructure (some dimensions occur in both groups)
• Information management
• Technology
• Intellectual capital
• Human capital
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Process
• Process
Output
• Debt management
• Expenditure analysis
• Forecasting
• Second Opinion
• Policy advice
• Special projects
• Statutory reporting
Performance measure/Indicator
• Credibility with Treasury Ministers
• Stakeholder relationships
Definitions
Risk appetite: “The inclination to depart from custom and practice, or the inclination
to accept the chance of a mishap.”
Risk dimensions: “A particular aspect of risk, which is significant to the achievement
of a world-class Treasury working for higher living standards for New Zealanders.”
Three criteria determined selection of each dimension:
• It is required by law or by a service agreement;
• It was specifically highlighted as such by the Secretary to the Treasury; and
Infrastructure
Input Process Output
Indicators and Performance Measures
Figure 1: A simple model of Treasury
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• It was inferred from the Strategic Plan, Annual Report and other documents to
be critical to the organisational vision of becoming a world-class Treasury.
Input/Infrastructure “Risk dimensions which either contain the raw material Treasury
needs to provide a service or product; or mechanisms necessary to support the
efficient functioning of Treasury.”
Process “The set of actions that use resources to produce outputs.”
Output “Principal risks relating to the delivery of the most important contracted
service or products.”
Performance measure/Indicator “Risk dimensions relating to the way that Treasury
performance is gauged.”
Rating
The following scale gave an explicit indication of risk appetite, to help make
comparisons between different peoples’ perceptions:
Variable or uncertain0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Lowest exposure possible or legally mandated
Equal weighting of reward to risk
Active encouragement to weight reward of risk
low appetite
high appetite
Questionnaire
The questionnaire shown in Table 10.1 was designed to take no longer than five
minutes to complete.
Development
In a short workshop, the Treasury senior management group agreed on the process.
The group accepted that an easy, convenient questionnaire was the best way to
gather the data necessary for later discussion. However, for a public sector
organisation in New Zealand, it made most sense to use the eleven output classes
for external dimensions. The eight ownership (internal) dimensions were retained,
and then the revised questionnaire was sent out for anonymous completion by
selected respondents:
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• Information management;
• Technology;
• Intellectual capital;
• Human capital;
• Process;
• Treasury finances;
• Budget management;
Group Dimension Definition Rating
Information management Data collection, collation, sorting,
indexing, storing, retrieval and
presentation
Technology Tools to speed up processes
Intellectual capital The discovery of new facts or the
collation of known facts to lead debate
on Government spending and revenue
Input /
Infrastructure
Human capital The wealth of human skill, experience
and talent available to Treasury
Process Process Courses of action, which use
resources to produce outputs
Debt and financial
management
Management of Crown debt and
financial assets
Expenditure analysis Professional opinion about the value
for money Ministers get for the
services they purchase
Forecasting The modelling of economic and fiscal
factors to help set policy
2nd Opinion Professional opinion about the
economic and fiscal implications of a
given policy, provided secondary to the
agency advocating that policy
Policy advice Recommendations to help the
Government achieve optimal economic
and fiscal outcomes
Special projects The management of one-off projects
which have extraordinary fiscal or
political ramifications
Output
Statutory reporting The publication of reports required by
statute, principally under the Public
Finance and Fiscal Responsibility Acts
Credibility with Treasury
Ministers
Standing in the eyes of those Ministers
accountable for the performance of the
Treasury
Performance
measure /
Indicator
Stakeholder relationships The quality of connections with
stakeholders in terms of trust, respect
and understanding
Table 10.1: Questionnaire
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• Crown companies;
• Commercial liabilities and claims;
• Crown financial management;
• Crown financial reporting;
• Debt management;
• Intervention analysis;
• Appropriation analysis;
• Forecasting;
• Policy advice (to go outside Treasury);
• Policy advice (to stay inside Treasury);
• Credibility with Treasury ministers;
• Relationships (external stakeholders); and
• Relationships (internal stakeholders).
Results
Although they are not actual examples, the following charts give a flavour of the
type of charts produced from the questionnaire data.
During the exercise at Treasury, the differences between the expectations of the
second tier managers (SMG – senior management group) and the third tier managers
become very clear. Similarly, the difference between intended and assessed
tolerance for risk by each group also raised interesting questions. As examples,
some of the actual observations to come out of the exercise include the following:
• Individual members of SMG assess risk appetite consistently with the SMG
team as a whole, although the Secretary’s assessment indicated exposure in
some areas, which were not shared with the rest of SMG.
• SMG sees Treasury operating to a margin within 25% of tolerance.
• SMG’s preference is for the pursuit of opportunity in ownership areas and low
exposure in outputs: ‘one size of risk’ does not fit all.
• Managers perceive SMG as having a lower appetite for risk than SMG is in fact
willing to tolerate.
• There is perceived to be more tolerance for pursuing opportunities in the
ownership areas, but this was not seen to be exploited very much.
Breaking the respondents into different groups allowed further analysis such as
comparing one business unit with the whole of Treasury; one set of managers
with another; the leaders of each business unit with the Secretary to the Treasury
(Chief Executive), etc.
Some of the most interesting results occurred because the Secretary allowed his
views to be isolated and compared with others, and because each individual
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Information management
Technology
Intellectual capital
Human capital
Process
Treasury finances
Budget management
Crown companies
Commercial liabilities & claims
Crown financial management
Crown financial reporting
Debt management
Intervention analysis
Appropration analysis
Forecasting
Policy advice (to go outside Treasury)
Policy debate (to stay inside Treasury)
Credibility with Treasury Ministers
Relationships (external stakeholders)
Relationships (internal stakeholders)
Managers’ assessed current tolerance for risk
SMG’s perceived intended risk appetite
Figure 2: Aggregate managers’ perceptions of SMG’s intended risk
appetite and Treasury’s current tolerance for risk
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Information management
Technology
Intellectual capital
Human capital
Process
Treasury finances
Budget management
Crown companies
Commercial liabilities & claims
Crown financial management
Crown financial reporting
Debt management
Intervention analysis
Appropration analysis
Forecasting
Policy advice (to go outside Treasury)
Policy debate (to stay inside Treasury)
Credibility with Treasury Ministers
Relationships (external stakeholders)
Relationships (internal stakeholders)
Managers’ assessmentSecretary’s assessment SMG’s assessment
Figure 3: Current tolerance for risk in Treasury
business unit manager allowed his or her views to be identified and compared
with others. All staff members were given access to all results. This transparency
allowed for many open and honest discussions, and hence better alignment of
expectations and tolerance for risk.
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Lessons learnt
The simple method develop here came about as a response to a series of casual
observations about the way risk was managed in the Treasury. On the face of it,
these are typical for many private and other public sector organisations:
• Perception and organisational myth replace reality.
• In-built buffers reduce the appetite for taking risks.
• Risk appetite is rarely specified or discussed explicitly.
• Overt and covert disincentives matter.
• There is little guidance readily available for a quick, convenient way to determine
organisational appetite for risk.
As it evolved, the more convenient, intuitive and visual the tool became, the
better it worked. Being open about the lack of precision meant that the exercise
was not dismissed as pseudo-scientific sophistry, and allowance was made to see
if the results had anything useful to add.
This willingness to take the results for what they were — curious observations —
meant that that there was no distraction from the purpose of stripping away
assumptions to allow for better informed debate.
For optimum results, similar exercises would work best if run as part of, or before,
planning sessions. There is no reason why risk appetite could not be reviewed
using this tool for finite projects as well as continuing organisational business.
Similarly, with minor adjustments, it offers the same potential in other organisations.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Information management
Technology
Intellectual capital
Human capital
Process
Treasury finances
Budget management
Crown companies
Commercial liabilities & claims
Crown financial management
Crown financial reporting
Debt management
Intervention analysis
Appropration analysis
Forecasting
Policy advice (to go outside Treasury)
Policy debate (to stay inside Treasury)
Credibility with Treasury Ministers
Relationships (external stakeholders)
Relationships (internal stakeholders)
SMG intended SMG assessed
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Summary
Five benefits accrued from this exercise:
• Expectations and perceptions became explicit.
• Investigative, dispassionate debate began over some controls used for managing
risk.
• Useful material from a fresh perspective entered the traditional business planning
process.
• Everyone became more aware of risk management.
• There was more discussion about pursuing opportunities.
The method used here is quick, imprecise, and subjective. While it is by no means
a performance metric, it showed a lot of promise as a convenient and versatile
diagnostic tool. Within Treasury it proved valuable for informing discussions about
tolerance for taking risks and expectations for taking risks.
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Rabbit Haemorrhagic (Calicivirus)
Disease: A Case Study
Peter O’Hara
11
In this chapter, Peter outlines the history of the introduction of rabbit haemorrhagic
disease (RHD) into New Zealand, describes the process that was used to evaluate
the risks associated with the application to introduce the disease as a biocontrol
agent, and considers some of the risk communication issues that arose in this
particular circumstance, and which might be common to other, similar, situations.
The application to import RHD into New Zealand predated the implementation of
the HSNO Act. It was clear from an early stage that there would be significant
public interest in this issue and since the existing legislation (the Animals Act)
did not have any procedures for public consultation, a specific process was
developed for the decision process.
The applicant was required to provide a detailed application including an
assessment of the risks and benefits associated with the introduction of RHD.
This material was circulated for public comment, and considerable public debate
followed. The decision process subsequently applied was based on a balancing
of the risks and the benefits of the introduction.
Views as to whether or not RHD should be introduced were highly polarised with
different sectors of the community having strongly entrenched views about the
risks and benefits. Farmers discounted all uncertainty and risk, and concentrated
on benefits, while other interest groups concentrated on the risks and ignored
the benefits. Within the scientific community, there was dissension, leading to
greater uncertainty in the uncommitted public.
This case study provides a good example of the problems that arise in
communicating risk issues when there is strong conflict of interest, a perceived
inequality of the distribution of risks and benefits, and high uncertainty both in
the risks and the benefits. It also illustrates the difficulty in communicating complex
scientific information when positions have already become entrenched.
The particular types of risk involved in this case, i.e. the irreversible release of a
virus into the environment, meant that the public attitude was more likely to be
risk averse than risk neutral.
Peter concludes that while it is often difficult to engage the public early in this
type of decision process, it is very important that this should occur, and therefore
every effort should be made to inform before positions become entrenched. He
notes that in addition to providing technical and other information about the
proposal, the proponents of this type of activity must recognise the legitimate
concerns of the public and make every effort to listen and to deal with these
concerns.
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Introduction
This chapter draws on experience with a proposal to import the rabbit haemorrhagic
disease (RHD) virus as a biological control agent for the rabbit, to illustrate and
discuss how people respond to and deal with a complex set of risks and competing
objectives. It offers some insights on how the risk communication process was
managed, and how it might have been managed differently.
A brief history of the introduction of the virus and of rabbit control in New
Zealand is provided so that the context in which the proposal was considered can
be better understood.
History of the Introduction of Rabbit Haemorrhagic Disease into New Zealand
In August 1996, a group representing four regional councils, a district council, the
Commissioner of Crown Lands and the New Zealand Federated Farmers Incorporated
applied to the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture for permission to
import the rabbit haemorrhagic disease (RHD) virus from Australia for use as a
biological control agent for the wild rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) (ministry of
Agriculture, 1996).
Because the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act, the intended decision-
making vehicle had not come into effect, the application was considered in
accordance with the provisions of the Animals Act 1967. As the Animals Act provided
no guidance as to how such a decision should be made, criteria and a process for
decision making were developed in consultation with the public and the Government
and were published prior to the application being made.
The applicants were required to prepare a detailed proposal for using the virus as
a biological control agent and an assessment of the benefits and risks that the
release of the virus into the New Zealand environment might convey. The detailed
proposal and supporting documentation was delivered to the Director General in
June 1996. The proposal was then released for public discussion and the
documentation provided by the applicant group was made publicly available.
After a year of very public, polarised and, at times, acrimonious debate, the
application was declined by the Director General primarily on the grounds that
while the risks were assessed to be relatively low, achievement of the purported
benefits was too uncertain to warrant the risks being acceptable to the public of
New Zealand (Ministry of Agriculture, 1997). The decision was greeted with both
applause and condemnation.
Within three months of the decision, an outbreak of fatal disease among wild
rabbits near Cromwell was confirmed as RHD. In the ensuing few weeks, RHD was
found at many different sites in the South Island and farmers confessed to operating
a covert campaign of deliberately spreading the virus. Although no one has been
found responsible for its introduction, the importation of the virus was probably
deliberate and therefore illegal and probably occurred before the decision to
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decline the legal importation of the virus was made. It is very likely that it was
even being spread before the decision was made. The covert operation to spread
the virus was carried on for three months before the existence of the disease was
suspected.
A Brief History of the Rabbit and its Control in New Zealand
From the time of its introduction by the early colonists, the rabbit multiplied and
spread to almost all parts of New Zealand. Its depredations were such that for
more than one hundred years (1887-1995), the Crown subsidised rabbit control
measures.
Ferrets, stoats and weasels were introduced last century as biological control
agents but their release into the wild has been a mixed blessing. Ferrets prefer
the rabbit as prey and continue to be important in regulating rabbit numbers in
many environments in New Zealand. However, their impact on indigenous species
is significant. Stoats have much more catholic prey preferences and probably
have little influence on rabbit numbers, but their impacts on native birds are well
known and documented.
Rabbit numbers in most parts of New Zealand have declined to manageable
proportions largely due to climate, habitat modification and the impact of predators
such as ferrets, cats and dogs. However, in the drier areas of New Zealand, high
survival rates of young rabbits allow the rabbit population to outstrip these
modifying influences and population densities that have a severe impact on the
comparatively fragile environments ensue. Rabbits in pest proportions occur over
approximately 9% of New Zealand’s land area and are a severe problem over
3.7% of the land area. There are those that argue that the sheep is also damaging
those environments and that the competition between the sheep and the rabbit
is the real problem.
Attempts to introduce the myxomatosis virus as a biological control agent in the
1950s failed through lack of effective spreading agents (vectors) and subsequent
applications to re-introduce the virus along with rabbit fleas that are known to be
effective vectors in Australia have been declined. At the time that the most recent
application to introduce myxomatosis was declined, the then Minister of Agriculture
noted that the RHD virus had potential as a biological control agent and stated
that the Government would investigate its potential use in New Zealand.
Following the recognition of RHD as an epidemic disease of rabbits in many
Northern Hemisphere countries, research was started in Australia on the potential
value of the RHD virus as a control agent. The New Zealand Government decided
to participate in the Australian research programme so that information relevant
to its possible use in New Zealand could be obtained.
At the same time, a programme of information dissemination and education was
begun to ensure that the public was well informed on the issues of using the
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virus in the intended way. The public’s distaste of myxomatosis as a biological
control was still fresh in the minds of politicians and officials.
The orderly progress of the research and the public information programme was
brought to a sudden halt by the escape of the virus from an island research
facility on to the mainland of Australia where it spread rapidly over a wide area,
aided and abetted by gleeful graziers. The fact that the escape was from a facility
managed by scientists was significant in conditioning some public attitudes to
the scientific reports prepared by those scientists.
Significantly for the Ministry of Agriculture, the time line for consideration of a
proposal to introduce the virus was foreshortened. Its Director General became
the decision maker because the expected decision maker, the Environmental Risk
Management Authority, was not ready.
Hazards and Risks
The terms ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ are often used interchangeably in the public arena
even though in modern usage in the literature on risk management the terms
have distinct meanings. It is very important in any risk communication process to
help the public understand the difference so that they can evaluate hazards using
their own frame of reference for risk assessment.
The hazards that had to be considered were the rabbit and the RHD virus. These
hazards were and are seen differently by different groups of people.
Farmers on the rabbit-prone land saw the rabbit as the principal threat to their
livelihood and indeed to their survival as farmers. The costs of controlling rabbits
for which they are now entirely responsible diverted expenditure from other
important farm inputs and, in some cases, were funded by borrowing, reducing
the farmer’s equity in his land. Further, many of these farmers felt abandoned by
central and local government because of the cessation of subsidies and the
implementation of ‘user pays’ pest control. They resented being told by bureaucrats
and environmentalists what their land should look like and how it should be
farmed, especially when they were expected to foot the bill.
They were frequently accused by environmentalists that they were exploiters of
the land and they were mining its resources.
For many of them, it seemed inevitable that the rabbit would drive them out of
farming and leave the land a desert if they had to depend on currently available
control measures such as poisoning, trapping and shooting. The consequence of
loss of their farms and, for many, their heritage, justified extreme counter-measures.
They considered the risks associated with the virus to be of a low order and the
probability of successful control using the virus to be high. They were scornful of
those who rated the risks to be higher.
The risks of releasing the RHD virus into the New Zealand environment knowing
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that there was little hope of retrieval or eradication if adverse effects were found
fell into four categories:
• the risk of human infection;
• the risk of infection in non-target species;
• the potential of the virus to mutate and initiate an unexpected adverse event;
and
• the potential of predator deprived of rabbits as their prey to switch their
attentions to other prey species, notably native fauna.
Many members of the public were concerned by the health hazards attributed to
the virus and the threat of mutation of the virus that would enhance its virulence
and/or extend its range to other host species. Most were ill-equipped to weigh up
the claims and counter-claims, especially those made by scientists. The ‘dread
factor’ and uncertainty were significant in formulating their opinions. In the absence
of any perceivable benefits to them personally, most opted for a precautionary
stance. Unlike the farmers, they assigned a relatively low value to potential benefits.
This should not be taken to mean that they were indifferent to the damage that
the rabbit was doing. They were not prepared to accept the proposed solution.
The environmental hazards and risks were of concern to a narrower range of
people and tended to be debated in a more objective way. Nevertheless, uncertainty
about the scale of the impact of the virus on the rabbit and the consequential
impact on predator species led to calls for precaution. The immediate risks to
endangered species from prey switching by predators deprived of the rabbit as
their prey were ranked higher than the broad-scale risks of the rabbit to the
fragile semi-arid environments.
For the decision-maker, the risks of the introduction of the virus had to be balanced
against the benefits of controlling rabbits by this means and the estimated
effectiveness of the virus to achieve control. A feature of the risk assessment
process for each one of these risks was the degree of uncertainty surrounding
estimates of the probability of occurrence of each risk and the consequences of
harmful effects. When coupled with uncertainty that the virus would be effective
as a biological control based on Australian experience, a decision based on the
precautionary principle may have seemed inevitable. However, it was a more
finely- balanced decision if one took a reasoned assessment of the risks and the
likelihood of a successful control outcome in an environmental degradation scenario
that demanded a solution.
Had it been known then what is now known about the performance of the virus
as a control agent, a decision to allow importation would have been made. In
other words, real benefits have been achieved and a better understanding of the
magnitude of some of the risks has been obtained.
Nevertheless, there are those that continue to argue that we do not yet know
what the long-term effects might be. That is, we do not know what we do not
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know. Is this a criterion for decision making?
Real and Perceived Risks
The proposal to import the RHD virus and the subsequent decision seem to fit
well with the statement:
“ the problem situations that involve post-normal science are ones
where, typically, facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high
and decisions are urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992).
Howden-Chapman and Chapman (1998) have carried out a detailed review of the
policy implications of risk, uncertainty and post-normal science. Their conclusion
that in policy development, uncertainty is often underestimated or misunderstood
leading to mis-communication between scientists, policy advisers and the public
about the complex nature of health and environmental issues are borne out by
the experience of this case study. The public is often expected to adjudicate on
the conflicting views and opinions of the ‘experts’ in order to form their own
views. There is no evidence that experts are less biased in making subjective
judgements in areas of uncertainty than non-experts (Morgan and Henrion, 1990).
While it is possible to describe risks in objective terms as functions of probability
estimates and estimates of the adverse impacts that hazards can cause, it is often
not possible to obtain a consensus that risks described in those terms are the
‘real’ risks. Implicit in agreeing with that description of a risk is acceptance of the
estimates and the analysis including assumptions that underpin them. Acceptance
is a personal decision involving subjective as well as objective considerations.
For example, it involves weighing up personal benefits and costs and making
personal assessments of uncertainty and its consequences. It may involve emotions
such as fear, dread and outrage. For these reasons, it is questionable whether the
term ‘real risk’ has any validity and it is potentially inflammatory because it
invites the response “says who?”.
For the farmers, the decision to import RHD virus was a ‘no brainer’. The devastation
caused by rabbits was real and was destroying not only their livelihoods, but the
land they loved. It is not too strong to describe their emotional attachment to the
land in that way. The available control methods were not only unaffordable, but
were failing. Their perception of the risks of importing of RHD virus was that they
were acceptable in the face of the benefits that the virus would confer. Further,
they believed that their representatives had produced a compelling body of scientific
analysis that demonstrated objectively that the risks were of a low order. They
discounted as emotional the uncertainty in the risk assessments claimed by the
opponents of the importation.
The opponents of the introduction of the virus leaned on uncertainty as the
reason why a cautious approach should be adopted. This was fuelled in part by
an argument among scientists over the interpretation of laboratory results relating
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to the testing of the virus for effect in non-target species. One group of scientists
that claimed particular expertise with caliciviruses chose to interpret the results
of one test in a way that had limited scientific justification and to use this flawed
interpretation in the absence of any other evidence to claim that infection in
some non-target species had occurred. This was then extrapolated to suggest a
high probability of infection in a wide range of species, including man. The group
also chose to go very public on their findings and their disagreements with other
scientists. In doing so, they acquired a high degree of credibility among those
opposed to the importation.
This dispute among scientists had two important effects:
• diametrically opposed views of the ‘real’ risk developed; and
• uncertainty and dread became big factors in the minds of many members of
the public because even the ‘experts’ could not agree.
The impact of time on risk assessment
For the reasons explained above, the consideration of RHD virus as a biological
control agent proceeded in two phases. The first phase was during the research
on the virus in containment facilities in Australia and ended abruptly with escape
of the virus from one of those facilities. The second phase began at this point and
was characterised by a degree of urgency that the decision on whether or not to
permit the importation of the virus into New Zealand should precede what some
regarded as the inevitable arrival of the virus by accidental or illegal means.
During the first phase it was considered important that the public be well informed
about biological control technologies in general, and about the RHD virus in
particular. In an effort to provide a source of information that could be seen to be
neutral and lacking bias, a Rabbit Biocontrol Advisory Group (RBAG) was established.
Its membership was drawn from a range of organisations that had, or could have,
an interest in the matter and the individual members were selected on the basis
of their knowledge and personal standing in the community. RBAG was funded by
a number of government departments acting in concert. RBAG provided written
material in newsletter form on a regular basis, provided speakers to the media
and interested organisations and was expected to be seen as the source of sound
information and advice on these topics.
The first phase was characterised by a relatively low-key interest, generally orderly
and objective discussions of the issues and an absence of emotion. No decisions
were required at the time or were imminent. Given subsequent events, it is
reasonable to infer that the public was not engaged with the issue at this time
and was not being asked to make up its mind. There was a good degree of
awareness of the subject of biocontrol and the virus but not any particular grasp
of what was to come in the second phase. It would be fair to say that people
seemed to be intellectually attuned to concept and some of the hazards and
appeared relaxed about the risks. In reality, they had not been challenged as
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individuals to make a judgement. That was something to be done in the future.
The second phase was quite different. The decision was imminent. It was being
made before the planned research had been completed. It had the air of being
rushed. It involved debates between the proponents and the opponents with
lines being drawn on issues that were more wide-ranging than the immediate
issues. The socio-economic context for the debates was complex and involved
matters such as the long-held distrust of farmers, particularly high-country farmers,
by the urban community. The decision was being forced on the public because
scientists had failed to keep the virus contained. This loss of trust of the scientists
that had done most of the research in Australia was crucial and much greater faith
was placed in other scientists who had dubious claims to expertise. Argument
and counter-argument were as much about scoring points as informing. The
background threat was that the virus was coming anyway and, if it got in, it
would never be eradicated.
The effect of the changed environment of the second phase was to polarise the
discussion so that having a rational debate was nearly impossible. Positions were
taken by parties on both sides of the debate and each would resort to using such
scientific information and commentary as suited their cause. Having produced an
impressively documented proposal, the proponent group responded to some
criticism by producing more as if to succeed by sheer weight of argument. ‘Talking
at’ became the norm, rather than ‘talking to’.
The Ministry of Agriculture’s role came under severe criticism. Its role in supporting
the research programme was alleged to have compromised its neutrality as the
decision maker. The decision process that had been agreed previously by
Government after public consultation was alleged to be deficient and further
consultation was demanded.
It is interesting to speculate whether, if the original programme and timetable of
considering the introduction of the virus at the completion of the planned research
could have been followed, the polarisation and acrimony of the debate that
occurred in the second phase could have been avoided. Better information may
have been available to the decision-maker, but whether a more informed debate
would have followed is questionable.
It is probable that the same issues around which the debate revolved would have
come to the fore and the answers to many of the questions that concerned the
public would have been no more satisfying. It seems likely that when people are
faced with having to make up their mind about a risk, the whole range of personal
beliefs and subjective considerations come into play. It is difficult to avoid the
tensions that surround a contentious issue and they can not be overcome just by
logical argument.
Zero risk – attaining the impossible
When people are able to make personal risk management decisions after weighing
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up the benefits of a certain action versus the assessed risks to them as individuals,
there will be a spectrum of ‘acceptable’ or ‘tolerable’ risks. For example, some will
drink and take the risk of driving, while others will obey the law and/or exercise
common sense.
When faced with risks over which they have no personal control and they have to
depend on the decisions of other risk managers, people demand that a high
degree of caution be exercised. Such risk management decisions are expected to
meet at least two criteria:
• the risk should produce ‘no harm’; and
• the ‘no harm’ consequence should be proved, not just inferred.
Most people will concede that there is no such thing as ‘zero’ risk but nonetheless,
will expect that they will not be harmed, especially if they perceive no benefits
accrue to them. Producing evidence that no harmful effects have been observed
is often not accepted; proof that no harm occurs is required. Expectations of
proof are often higher than is scientifically achievable.
In the tests of RHD virus on a range of non-target species, no concrete evidence
was found that the test subjects became infected with the virus — that is, that it
multiplied in their tissues. For icon species such as the kiwi, this evidence did not
satisfy some critics.
Similarly, the critics did not accept the evidence that thousands, perhaps millions,
of people who raised rabbits for food and who were exposed to high levels of
virus when their rabbits became infected in the epidemic that swept Europe
suffered no known ill effects. They were more concerned by the single case of an
attendant who slept in the rabbit house with infected rabbits and developed low
levels of antibody to the virus.
The decision to decline a permit to import the virus was based on the lack of
evidence that virus would be effective against the risks of releasing the virus. The
risks were not of a magnitude that ruled out using the virus in any circumstances.
That the expected benefits of biocontrol would not be achieved meant that
acceptance of the risks could not be justified. The clear inference was that if and
when evidence of effectiveness could be found, the decision could be reversed.
After the decision was announced, a number of opponents of the importation
expressed happiness with the ‘no’ decision even though it was clearly a qualified
‘no’. They did not take issue that the decision-maker did not accept their views
about the magnitude of the risks. Was winning was more important to them than
the quality of the argument?
Message given and message received
The complexity of the technical matters made it very difficult for the lay person to
understand the technical debate and reach their own conclusions. They were
forced to select a champion and follow that person’s views in a rather non-
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questioning way. In these circumstances, it was natural to select champions who
preached caution and who presented a ‘black and white’ argument, even though
that argument was technically flawed or over-simplified the issue’s complexity.
The proponents of the importation of the RHD virus produced a public discussion
document and supporting documentation that was exemplary in its thoroughness.
To the extent that they were advocating a particular proposal, the authors showed
some bias in favour of their proposal, but it could not be said that their paper
was misleading or failed to present all sides of the issues. The first draft was peer
reviewed prior to release to ensure that the paper was complete and balanced.
The authors took account of the reviewers’ comments in the final draft.
The sheer volume of the material presented made it very difficult for readers to
even access the material, let alone read it. Thus, in their efforts to canvass and
document all relevant matters, the proponents may have unwittingly failed to
deal with needs of many people who wished to be informed and alienated them
in the process.
More importantly, the proponents’ response to criticism during the public
consultation was to ignore it, counter it with even more documentary evidence,
or deride it. Discussion tended to be polarised and adversarial. The views of the
proponents were dismissed by many opponents simply because they were
proponents and therefore biased. The proponents got little credit for the quality
of their proposal and the documentation that it provided. It was markedly better
than most other material presented.
There was an alliance in opposition to the proposal between some scientists who
claimed expertise in the calicivirus family and lay people concerned about the
risks as they perceived them. Some members of this group were determined to
prevail at all costs.
Seven hundred and fifty submissions on the proposal were received, presenting
all shades of opinion, but the views of the majority of New Zealanders were
unknown and, indeed, unknowable. In this case, at least, a great deal of effort
was expended in meeting the needs and demands of a relatively small number of
people, but whether doing so contributed to a greater understanding of the
issues by the public at large is debatable.
The media had difficulty in presenting a concise balanced view of an issue as
complex as this proposal was. Complex arguments were often over-simplified,
argument that contained qualifications was sometimes presented as equivocation
and sweeping generalisations were presented as fact. Black and white statements
may seem to have authority and a ring of truth, but often gloss over crucial
qualifications.
Conclusions
When issues such as the irreversible release of a virus into the environment are
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involved, it is doubtful whether a risk communication process can ever overcome
the personal subjective reactions, such as dread and fear, that come into play
when a decision is imminent. Every effort must be made to make the public as
well informed as possible in the lead up to the decision, but it has to be accepted
that the public may not become truly engaged with the issue until the decision is
at hand. The communication process has to accommodate and deal with the
terminal period of tension and turbulence.
One of the most important elements of the risk communication process, especially
when the tensions begin to rise, is listening and responding to the needs that are
being expressed, however illogical or irrational they may seem. In the case of this
proposal, the failure of the proponents to deal sympathetically with the legitimate
concerns being expressed led to a view that they were arrogant and opened the
door to other champions to capture the moral high ground. Taking sides followed
and resolution was left to the decision-maker, a role that he or she should never
be expected to fill. In that circumstance, the decision inevitably makes winners
and losers.
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White Spotted Tussock Moth:
 A Case Study
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The communication of risks associated with biological events is complicated by
the high degree of uncertainty in predicting the behaviour of disrupted biological
systems. These difficulties are particularly acute in the case of newly-established
pests and diseases, where uncertainty is often accompanied by obscure technical
argument and analysis.
Gordon describes the process surrounding the discovery of white-spotted tussock
moth in the eastern suburbs of Auckland, and the subsequent eradication
programme. Risk communication was essential for securing the buy-in of the
stakeholders and interested parties.
The chapter begins by discussing the relationship between the stakeholders and
interested parties, the language used, and the importance of ensuring the credibility
of the team involved in the communication process. He goes on to look at the
different areas where communication was required (e.g. political, biological,
financial), and concludes that the exercise was a success because of the general
commitment by all parties.
This paper has parallels with the previous paper on RHD in that it relates to the
communication of risks where there is the potential for high uncertainty, some
ignorance, and polarisation of the community. One significant difference between
the two is that in this instance there was general agreement as to the acceptability
of the proposed control mechanism. The reason for this was that the agent had
been used for a significant length of time and has high specificity. Thus, uncertainty
was reduced by information. At the same time, this chapter illustrates well the
formal application of risk communication, and describes the particular processes
used.
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Introduction
The communication of risks associated with biological events is complicated by
the high degree of uncertainty in predicting the behaviour of disrupted biological
systems. These difficulties are particularly acute in the case of newly-established
pests and diseases, where uncertainty is often accompanied by obscure technical
argument and analysis (Hosking and Holden 1998).
The arrival of white-spotted tussock moth (Orgy hyaline) in Auckland’s eastern
suburbs, and the resulting eradication programme, known as Operation Evergreen
(Hosking 1998, Hosking et al 2002), illustrates the multi-faceted nature of biological
risk communication, addressing a range of risks of varying relevance to a range of
stakeholders. In hindsight, effective risk communication was clearly pivotal to a
successful outcome of the programme. However, at the time, individual risk
communication components ranged from a carefully planned approach (Anon
1997), to pure luck. This chapter first considers some generic issues central to
biological risk communication, and then examines the risk elements which had to
be considered in Operation Evergreen.
Generic Issues
The experience with white spotted tussock moth showed certain generic issues
underpinned effective risk communication. These issues are likely to be common
to other biological events, and were:
• recognising the relationship between individual risk elements and stakeholder
groups involved in decision-making;
• tailoring the characteristics of the language used in communicating with specific
stakeholder groups; and
• ensuring the credibility and experience of the team providing technical support
to risk communication.
Risk element/stakeholder relationship
Most biological events involving risk are made up of several risk elements, e.g.
financial risk, political risk, etc. Understanding the relationship between these
risks elements and the groups involved in decision-making, is critical to effective
risk communication. Risk communication with specific stakeholder groups needs
to be focused on those elements of primary interest to that specific group.
The relationship between five risk elements and three stakeholder groups for
Operation Evergreen are shown in Figure 1. The Government has the widest interest
because of its national governance responsibilities, while the community has the
narrowest. However, it would be a mistake to suggest the importance of Government
ranked ahead of that of the community in risk communication, since loss of
support from either could compromise the programme. What it does make clear
is the need to focus communication efforts on only the relevant risk elements
when in dialogue with a specific group.
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Language of Communication
Different groups of society legitimately have different views of reality, and the language
of one reality is not always the same as another. Le Shan and Morgenau (1982,) for
example, describe four models of reality, each reflected in its language as:
• sensory, preferred by scientists, where they are detached observers of the
larger whole;
• clairvoyant, as in music and dance, as if they are an extension of the whole;
• transpsychic, as in prayer, as if they are reciprocals of the whole; and
• mythic, as in dreaming and play as if they are identical to the whole.
While we can argue as to the validity of these particular models, there is no doubt
the language of technologists and science is not the language of most of the rest
of the community. Complex technical argument hedged by provisos and
qualifications, while appropriate to debate within a response team, is quite
inappropriate in communicating with the wider community.
Risk communication and dialogue with non-science stakeholders should be clear,
concise and focused on the key issues. It should acknowledge uncertainty, but
confidently describe the situation and options, based on current knowledge.
Operation Evergreen was fortunate in having a number of well-qualified technical
staff capable of translating science into plain language.
Credibility of the Team
It is not possible to communicate risk on any issue without credibility. In
Risk Elements
Political Risk
Biological Risk
Financial Risk
Risk of Failure
Risk from Strategy
Government
Forestry Sector
Community
Stakeholder
Groups
Figure 1: The relationship between risk elements and stakeholder
groups for Operation Evergreen
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communicating biological risk,  credibility is derived from knowledge, expertise
and the advocacy of defensible strategies.
All stakeholders expect the technical specialists to understand what has occurred,
how, and with what implications, before they initiate the risk communication
process. There is little point in undertaking risk communication until a robust
preliminary evaluation of the biological event has been completed. In the case of
Operation Evergreen, this involved acquiring knowledge of the insect’s biology,
completing a survey of its distribution, and evaluating its likely impact on the
urban environment in which it had been found. This activity was completed in
less than two weeks.
The assembly of a demonstrably strong scientific and technical team, with expertise
in all key areas of the response, greatly enhances credibility. A willingness to
welcome such expertise from whatever organization it can be drawn, builds
stakeholder confidence that the needs of the programme are being placed ahead
of self interest. Operation Evergreen relied on the core operational and scientific
expertise of the Ministry of Forestry and Forest Research Institute, but also included
specialist expertise from seven Government departments, seven different research
organizations, two communications consultancies, and six community and special
interest groups. This broad involvement reinforced an atmosphere of openness
and receptivity, as well as competence, by the project team.
Credibility is further enhanced if the strategies being proposed can be articulated
with confidence and defended with vigour and commitment. Credibility is rapidly
compromised by pusillanimous and bureaucratic proposals that lack commitment
and transparency. Most response strategies can be communicated in simple
language which reflects clear vision and objectives by the project team. Operation
Evergreen stated its goal as eradication of white-spotted tussock moth, to be
undertaken by the aerial application of a biological pesticide, combined with
intensive monitoring. It would aim for success in one season, but recognized it
might take two, providing its own commitment was reflected by that of the
community. This easily articulated strategy was taken to the community through
local meetings, the media, and newsletters, and established a strong foundation
of stakeholder support.
The White Spotted Tussock Moth Experience
Background
On the 17 April 1996, the white spotted tussock moth, Orgyia thyellina (Lepidoptera:
Lymantriidae) was found to be established in Auckland’s eastern suburbs. The
insect, native to Japan, Korea, China and Taiwan, was known to attack oak, elm,
willow, larch, apple, cherry, pear, plum, chestnut, walnut and mulberry. The resulting
eradication operation involved the aerial application of the biological pesticide
Btk (Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki) over 40 sq kms of suburban Auckland
and about 80,000 people. It took two years to complete, cost NZ$12 million and
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was the first successful eradication of a forest insect in an urban area anywhere
in the world (Hosking et al 2002).
The potential risks from the permanent establishment and spread of the insect
fell into five broad areas:
• environmental impacts — such a polyphagous defoliator could be expected to
affect some component of New Zealand’s indigenous flora;
• productivity losses — due to direct damage to horticultural crops and potential
damage to some commercial forestry species;
• trade restrictions — from new requirements to prevent the insect’s spread to
trading partners;
• increased chemical use — for control of the insect in crops and home gardens;
and
• health impacts — from allergic reactions to the urticating hairs of the larvae.
The stakeholders, and therefore the decision makers, for Operation Evergreen
were:
• the government, which ultimately had responsibility for the decision to act or
not;
• the forestry sector because the insect was a pest of trees, albeit mainly in an
urban environment; and
• the affected community who would bear the impact of the control strategy.
Technical credibility and risk communication
A primary asset of the Operation Evergreen team in risk communication was its
high technical credibility, a credibility that was clearly visible at all levels in the
organization in both leadership and capability.
Independent science panel. An independent science panel was established early
in the programme by the Chief Scientist of the Ministry for Research Science and
Technology. It was valuable in generating political confidence in the strategy
evaluation process, and providing greater credibility to the recommended course
of action. Its role was largely taken over by a dedicated science advisory group
once the strategy was agreed.
Operation leadership. A lead organization with strong sector responsibilities, in
the form of the Ministry of Forestry, provided a clear focus for stakeholder dialogue.
Within the Ministry, explicit delegation of responsibility for policy, operations and
science, showed a commitment to ensuring the highest quality of advice in all key
areas.
Operational capability. Sector confidence in operational capability was never
questioned, given that the forestry sector regularly undertook large-scale spray
operations, and pest and disease survey was a core responsibility of the Ministry.
This operational experience was underpinned by specialist research capability at
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Forest Research.
Science Support. The forestry sector’s primary research provider Forest Research,
an organization with an international reputation in forest protection, was the
focus of science support. However, specialist science input was also contributed
by three other research institutes as well as university and private sector research
organizations.
International collaboration. A strong existing relationship between Forest Research
and the US Department of Agriculture allowed access to American experience in
gypsy moth control, insect rearing, and the North American research network. The
world authority on lymantriid moths, Dr Paul Schaefer of the US Department of
Agriculture, already a close colleague of Forest Research entomologists, provided
definitive identification and all known background material. It was difficult to
imagine a project team that could give greater credibility to this major eradication
initiative. Experts were made freely available to stakeholder groups whenever
specific issues were discussed. The team was never challenged on its level of
expertise, nor on the decisions it made, by any stakeholder group.
Because of its depth of technical expertise, risk communication by the project
team was confident, comprehensive and open.
Political Risk Communication
The political establishment remains the key to major incursion responses such as
that undertaken by Operation Evergreen. The necessary funding only becomes
available if the politicians and their supporting bureaucracies are persuaded the
risks of doing nothing are greater than the risks of a proposed strategy. This
persuasion involves a formal communication process quite different from that
used with other stakeholders.
Language. Formal communication between officials and Government Ministers,
proposing new initiatives such as the response to white spotted tussock moth, is
in the form of a cabinet paper. Such papers have their own structure and require
a departmental consultative process, and ministerial approval, to progress. Both
the structure and process are quite foreign to those outside departmental policy
groups, but are essential in establishing Government support for new initiatives.
Operation Evergreen was shepherded through this process by the Ministry of
Forestry’s policy team, members of which become fully involved in the programme.
Cabinet papers were drafted and managed by policy specialists with technical
review by the wider project team.
Detail. Politicians are time poor. They do not welcome the detailed argument,
evaluation, and documentation, which must underpin a well-developed strategy
at an operational level. Risk communication involves building political confidence
in the response team, and providing clear, concise summaries of the situation
and proposed response. Operation Evergreen undertook this task through direct
briefings and the production of position papers developed by policy specialists
162
Tussock Moth: A Case Study
from the Ministry of Forestry.
Funding. Response strategies for biological events are driven by biological
imperatives, not the timetables of politicians and bureaucrats. Part of the risk
communication exercise is to ensure funding availability does not restrict strategy
implementation. Operation Evergreen was fortunate in having the winter dormancy
period of the tussock moth egg stage, within which to work through the funding
issues. Well developed and realistic cost estimates for a clearly-articulated strategy
ensured political support and funding availability.
Champion. A political champion, preferably with real power within the political
establishment, can be a critical asset to effective response. Operation Evergreen
had such a champion in John Falloon, Minister for Forestry, who understood the
risks and gave full support to the proposed strategy. He became personally involved
in risk communication, both within the political establishment and the community.
Such a champion represents a key asset in garnering political support and providing
visible political commitment to the affected community.
Biological Risk Communication
The risks generating a response to a biological event, such as a new incursion,
are either directly or indirectly biological in nature. They usually revolve around
impact on some component of the biosphere, be it a crop, an ecosystem or a
human population. Biological information is therefore pivotal to strategy
development and will underpin any proposed response. It is the biological risks
and impacts which will justify any proposed course of action, and decision-making
groups will be looking for as much certainty as possible as the basis for their
position. In the case of new incursions, biological information will almost certainly
be incomplete, particularly as it relates to the organism’s new environment.
Operation Evergreen was dealing with an organism relatively unknown in its home
range, and relied on field data from its establishment site, and dedicated studies,
to complement the scientific literature and the knowledge of international
colleagues. The acquisition of biological information was given high priority,
particularly in relation to likely impact and host range, and efficacy of pesticides
against different life stages. Risk communication is difficult in the absence of
clear and comprehensive information. The affected community, in particular, had
a strong interest in why action must be taken, and what the likely effect of that
action would be, both on the insect and the human population.
Close collaboration between science writers and technical experts delivered a
series of readable, but technically accurate, leaflets on all aspects of the programme,
which were made widely available throughout the affected community. A freephone
calling centre was established, through which further information could be accessed,
and community meetings were held to provide information and allow the public
to directly question members of the project team. Briefings of specialist groups
such as politicians and forest owners allowed a two-way dialogue on the likely
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biological impacts and the proposed response strategy.
As the programme progressed, Operation Evergreen continually refined its
knowledge of biological risk, largely by identifying knowledge gaps and undertaking
specific studies to address them. A major insect rearing programme in Forest
Research’s quarantine facilities was the key to this work, providing all stages of
insect material to a wide range of studies from host plant testing, to pheromone
production, to pesticide efficacy trials.
Because the proposed response inevitably flows from unacceptable biological
risk, the biological information on which it rests must be as complete as possible
and of the highest scientific quality.
Financial Risk Communication
Any response to a biological event involves money, and in the case of new
incursions usually a lot of money, with no guarantee of success. The money
almost always comes from government in the first instance. Government officials
need to be convinced that the financial cost of doing nothing is unacceptable,
and that if they spend what is requested there will be a reasonable chance of
success. Unfortunately, defining the costs and returns for biological events is
extremely difficult and can vary from the wildly optimistic to almost total pessimism.
It is legitimate to ask the question, however: is the cost of response justified
given the likely impact and probability of success? Such questions lead directly to
cost-benefit analysis. There is no doubt financial risk communication with both
government and the forestry sector is most effective through cost-benefit analysis.
The difficulty of this approach for biologists is the number of unquantifiable
variables which must be excluded from such an analysis, or given quite arbitrary
values.
Operation Evergreen undertook two cost benefit analyses, one by forestry
researchers, which included best estimates of as many variables as possible and
reflected the biologist’s view, and one by an economic research group which took
a more purist approach and excluded many variables that could not be quantified.
The former delivered a benefit: cost ratio of 8.6 and the latter 1.3.
The project team used these analyses to argue the benefit-cost ratio lay somewhere
in between, and given the level of uncertainty, a response was fully justified.
However, uncertainty proved to be two-edged sword when the initial cost estimate
of under $6 million doubled, due to asynchronous larval development leading to
many mor e aerial sprays than originally proposed.
In communicating financial risk it is wise to assume Treasury officials and economic
analysts have little, if any, understanding of the subtleties of biological systems,
and will be unsympathetic to the qualifications imposed by biologists. In the case
of Operation Evergreen the project team developed a realistic cost of eradication
and defended it vigorously. When the insect’s biology overtook these costs they
simply admitted their fallibility, recalculated, and continued to defend.
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Risk of Failure
All stakeholders need to recognise and understand the risk of failure of response
strategies, an unusually high risk in the unpredictable world of incursion response.
The greatest threat to an eradication attempt is lack of knowledge, particularly if
this lack of knowledge is not recognised. For example, if the proposed response
is based on a defined infested area, and the organism exists outside this area,
the strategy will be seriously compromised from its inception. Defining the extent
and distribution of the eradication target is fundamental to reducing the risk of
failure. However, fear of failure must not lead to risk aversion, i.e. let’s do nothing
so we cannot fail, nor must it sap confidence and commitment from the project
team.
Operation Evergreen probably underplayed the possibility of failure in
communicating with its stakeholders, at no cost because of its ultimate success.
The danger of such an approach is the creation of high expectations, which if
unfulfilled can reduce support for similar activities in the future. It can erode both
political and public support for future initiatives, making a political champion
more difficult to find, and communities less accepting of disruption.
Stakeholder ignorance of the risk of failure can have both individual and institutional
costs when projects go wrong, through loss of confidence in lead organizations
and the search for scapegoats. Such outcomes can destroy aggression and
confidence so necessary for the risky business of pest eradication.
Risk from Strategy
Eradication programmes, such as Operation Evergreen, often involve the aggressive
application of pesticides, restrictions on the movement of potentially infected
material, and the invasion of private property. The question has to be asked, is
the cure worse than the disease? Risk from the response strategy, particularly the
application of pesticide, is invariably a major concern to the affected community.
Such communities are often asked to bear costs and accept risks for the greater
good. Risk communication must recognize and acknowledge costs to the affected
community and ensure recognition of those costs by the wider community.
Operation Evergreen used only Btk in both aerial and ground spraying because of
its high acceptability. A natural organic product, it has high specificity to caterpillars,
a 30-year history of use, and is approved for use in organic production systems.
The choice of Btk undoubtedly avoided significant community resistance to the
spray operation. It is doubtful any other pesticide would have proved acceptable
for aerial application over an urban area. Despite the large amount of information
already available on Btk, Operation Evergreen commissioned a health risk
assessment which not only examined the pesticide, but also the population which
would be exposed, and the method of delivery. The risk assessment was made
widely available to the community and was discussed by public health specialists
at community meetings.
General public health advice was made available with specialist medical advice
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available on request by concerned individuals. Specific precautions were
recommended for asthmatics, those suffering from skin conditions, and in the
area of food hygiene. In addition, a voluntary register was compiled, of all residents
and operational staff exposed to Btk, and formally archived against any future
need.
The project team undertook the communication of risk from the proposed strategy
by being open and responsive to community concerns. This philosophy was
reinforced by a highly visible presence in the affected area through daily activity,
and through staff residing within the spray zone.
The elements of success
Dialogue
Dialogue would seem to be an obvious requirement of communicating risk to
stakeholders in an eradication attempt such as undertaken by Operation Evergreen.
However, dialogue is more than simply providing information, it involves listening,
responding, and if necessary changing a proposed course of action. It looks
beyond self interest and considers alternative view points. Dialogue involves a
partnership based on mutual respect and honesty leading to a strategy acceptable
to all participants. The Operation Evergreen team worked hard to build community
trust and support through the active involvement of stakeholders in strategy
development.
Confidence
The Operation Evergreen team projected confidence through its scientific and
operational expertise, and a belief success was achievable. This confidence was a
key asset in risk communication and in building similar confidence with
stakeholders. The team was acutely aware of the fine line between confidence
and arrogance, and sought to avoid the latter at all cost.
Openness
Stakeholders often requested additional information, but there was never any
suggestion of the project team withholding information. It was the policy of
Operation Evergreen to release all new information and data as soon as it came
to hand, both good and bad. Such a policy made it easy for team members to
respond to questions from both the media and the public. It also ensured an
equality of dialogue between stakeholders and the project team. The Minister’s
assurance to the community that “what I know you will know” became the guiding
principle for the project.
Accessibility
The team members were always accessible, to the public, the media, stakeholder
groups and the scientific community. They travelled extensively, they provided
statements and interviews, and they met personally with groups and individuals
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in the community. Their operational meetings were open and often attended by
sector representatives, overseas specialists, and politicians. But most of all, they
were on the ground in the operational area, monitoring, supervising, managing
and evaluating.
Operation Evergreen was successful because its contributors believed success
was important and achievable. Outstanding technical expertise was combined
with specialist communication skills to ensure the support of all stakeholder
groups, and the commitment of the wider community.
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According to a report recently released by the UK Lords select committee
on science and technology, scientists need to open a dialogue with the
public that is "direct, open and timely". Lord Jenkin, the committee's chairman,
said it was a paradox that the present crisis of trust should come at a time
when the public was finding science, engineering and technology more
interesting and exciting than ever.
"But the evidence of mistrust is undeniable, and must be of deep concern"
Risk communication is a critical component of risk management, aimed at
improving the credibility and acceptability of decisions.  It is a means of
transferring information between all stakeholders and provides an arena for
discussing different viewpoints. Effective risk communication should be a
genuine effort to involve all parties in the resolution of an issue.
While risk communication is sometimes thought of solely from the perspective
of an organisation communicating with its external stakeholders, external
risk communication is part of good practice and helps an organisation to
fulfil its legislative responsibilities, provide due diligence and obtain necessary
permits. It will improve community understanding and awareness of an
organisation’s environmental activities.
This book addresses the theoretical foundations of risk communication, and
includes a number of New Zealand and international examples of its application.
 It will provide you with an understanding how risk communication can
practically be applied to improve your chances of meeting your organisation’s
risk management objectives.
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